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(Same disclaimer) > What's changing now, is that those 3 computers are now no longer the same architecture I think / hope this idea will die a well deserved d
by crocal 7y ago
(Same disclaimer)
> What's changing now, is that those 3 computers are now no longer the same architecture
I think / hope this idea will die a well deserved death. Rail systems must face 25 years lifetime and with such design obsolescence headaches are multiplied by 3. In addition this creates bugs and integration nightmares.
And on top of all that, we have known for decades that CPUs can be protected against systemic failures using the vital coded processor technique [1].
Note to the curious: this is one of the most fascinating piece of software I have ever encountered. Make the software resilient to any hardware fault through the power of arithmetic...
[1] https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Vital-software%3A-Formal-method-and-coded-processor-Dollé/3a4a1645e672353c49d2c41718fe010c5fa2405b https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Vital-software%3A-Form...
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- fit2rule 7y agoSIL-4 doesn't generally follow the same rules as consumer computing, as I'm sure you are aware. There are track-side systems still running on 80386's, and a maintenance infrastructure in place to keep these systems running for at least a few more years, before they are replaced with the newer, Pentium-based systems. Design obsolescence is not built-in for these systems. Long-term ability to support is more important. Also, burn-in period. Many bullets (SPECTRE, etc.) have been dodged by relying on older, more proven, more tested technologies ..
- crocal 7y agoDesign obsolescence is absolutely built-in for railway systems (safety related or not). It’s part of the fun of the profession to deal with bizarre voltages that are inherited from the 1930s. For sure it’s not something consumer electronics care for but that’s precisely the point I am making. Actually, it’s one of the required extension to ISO 9002 by IRIS, the quality framework for rail engineers. Components are chosen not only for their function but also for their supply availability in the long run. One of the things we look at is « multisourcing »: how many different folks can provide this stuff. The more the better. Going back to this great idea about hardware diversity (that is absolutely not a general rule in railway): with an architecture requiring 3 different hardwares, you essentially shoot yourself in the foot. Instead of having 3 suppliers for one component, now you need to find at least 6 for 3 components. And the probability to face an obsolescence issue has basically tripled... And for what? It’s proven useless by science... :b And as far as dodging bullets, railway is no better than SCADA. Older tech means older vulnerabilities stay in place, and there are countless people on HN that will tell you it’s /not/ a good thing. I don’t think we dodged, I think we were just lucky. There is a reason why now cybersecurity is making its way inside the last revision of standards.
- fit2rule 7y ago> hardware diversity (that is absolutely not a general rule in railway) I don't know where you're working in the industry, but in my company (THALES) its definitely a thing, and we are absolutely working on diversifying the 3-of-3 and 3-of-5 configurations away from Intel. And maybe we're talking about design obsolescence in different terms, but yeah .. 30-year old CPU's are still being shipped to customers, yo. They WANT it, so.
- crocal 7y agoYou can design your platform in a number of ways to be relatively independant of the underlying CPU model, thereby mitigating the risk of supplier lock-in. All suppliers will try to find a way to achieve such target. It’s a different thing than saying you need hardware diversity in a majority vote system to achieve better safety. That is demonstrably false. For example, Siemens VCP is /proven/ to be safe and it does not even use a majority vote (see my previous comment for a reference to the VCP) I prefer not to involve my employers on HN. What I write here is my opinion only. As for your last remark, let’s be careful in assuming what customers want. The fact that they have to live with obsolete stuff does not necessarily mean they are super happy about it.
- fit2rule 7y agoIts not about the software being independent of the architecture. Its about using diverse hardware platforms to avoid the situation where an un-detected, hardware-level bug affects the voting ability of all participants. We've seen, time and time again, so-called dependable platforms weaken over the years as more and more issues are uncovered. Diverse voting node architecture requirements are designed to prevent hardware bugs from crashing trains, not software bugs. >Siemens VCP /proven/ .. and yet, it still crashed trains. >What customers want Its not obsolete if a customer wants it. Customers want older CPU platforms because the tooling and industry required to support them in the field is long-entrenched, and costs of upgrading to "newer, sexier CPU's", not really worth it if the lesser platforms are capable of doing the job...
- rrss 7y ago> Many bullets (SPECTRE, etc.) have been dodged Rail control systems run untrusted code? Why not dodge Spectre by not running random code in the control system?
- fit2rule 7y agoThey don't run random code, but nevertheless one of the reasons why SIL-4 systems don't just go for the 'latest and greatest' is because, even with trusted code, one can not be sure until a great deal of industry-wide testing, that there aren't bugs in the hardware.