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We know because hundreds of people died in the airframe. We know the MCAS was a workaround to an aerodynamics problem. Boeing has admitted this both directly an

We know because hundreds of people died in the airframe. We know the MCAS was a workaround to an aerodynamics problem. Boeing has admitted this both directly and indirectly. Airframes shouldn't need software fixes to accommodate for a design failure and design failures shouldn't be allowed to fly after killing hundreds of people. How do you argue what they did and are continuing to do is just in this situation?

skybrian 7y ago
Uncrashable airplanes don't exist. The question isn't whether there were crashes (nobody disputes that). It's whether the problem can be fixed so that pilots can fly it safely. Given all the times the plane flew without incident (other than the two crashes), it seems this should be possible?
- visarga 7y ago
  Yeah, it was perfectly safe except for two crashes. But that's two crashes more than I can tolerate. The problem is now the lack of public trust in their work. They might fix the software, but how to prove they're not lying again?
  - ethbro 7y ago
    The same way you prove Airbus isn't lying?
    - callalex 7y ago
      Presumably Airbus is still being watched by a regulator or two. Unlike Boeing which has not been watched as the FAA has clearly been gutted.
      - _ph_ 7y ago
        The 737 MAX will be watched by all regulators world-wide. So it will be checked as carefuly, or actually even way more carefully than any competing aircraft.
        AnthonBerg 7y ago
        We must remember that repeated checking does not make a bad design good. It’s completely clear now what Boeing’s priorities and methods were.
        _ph_ 7y ago
        The 737 is a very successful design and it is clear with practical experience, what its strengths and weaknesses are.
        AnthonBerg 7y ago
        Boeing build processes that build aeroplanes. Those processes swiftly mutilated and killed hundreds of people when the product was unleashed. The response from Boeing was 100% sociopathic. You may find that OK, if you wish. You may choose to do nothing. We don’t, and won’t.
        ulfw 7y ago
        Which NOONE bothered to do before millions of people were made to fly in them. THAT is the very issue at hand.
- est31 7y ago
  The plane still crashed twice which is many many times higher than the non-purely-human-cause crash rate of other airplane types. Probably even then 737 MAX is still safer overall than cars, but airplanes have a higher safety expectation than cars do.
  - _ph_ 7y ago
    But it crashed 2 times for the same reason. Take away that reason and you have a completely different situation to estimate its reliability.
    - mtgx 7y ago
      But what if the real reason isn't what Boeing tells us it is and it's completely different?
    - michaelt 7y ago
      The crash rate is zero if you ignore the crashes, it's true.
      - _ph_ 7y ago
        It is not about ignoring the crashes. But as both crashes were caused by MCAS, you cannot make a safety statement about a 737 without MCAS or rather with a fixed one.
        bronson 7y ago
        Yes you can. Clearly Boeing Is suffering serious process failure, especially in letting two crash before responding properly. Is the MCAS the only place they messed up? Will this fix truly be 100%? Remember that their first attempt at a fix was rejected. When you see one bug, that’s often an indication that more are nearby.
danjayh 7y ago
You clearly have absolutely no background in aerospace engineering. The 737 airframe is actually relatively stable compared to many other things that fly ... for instance, many high-performance jets will literally begin to oscillate and tear themselves apart without help from their flight computers. The flight computer is a part of the airframe, and it is perfectly valid for the flight computer to contribute to the airframe's handling characteristics. Boeing's mistake was in underestimating the burden placed on the pilots in a runaway trim situation, and assuming that pilots could execute a recovery procedure correctly that remained unchanged from prior iterations but that had also been rarely needed on prior iterations (vs. the MAX, where MCAS failures were common enough that an average pilot might actually need to execute the procedure).
- bobowzki 7y ago
  People like to bring up the instability of high performance jets, but I'd like to point out that they generally have ejection seats and don't carry passengers.
  - danjayh 7y ago
    Airbus jets carry passengers and have been fly-by-wire for decades. Cables and hydraulics have been replaced with software and computers. Like it or not, the software and hardware that make up the flight computer are an integral part of the airframe on most newly produced passenger jets, regardless of who makes them.
    - VBprogrammer 7y ago
      It's an interesting point. One of the reversion modes on Airbus is "direct law". Under that control mode the stick displacement is proportional to the control movements. If, hypothetically, an Airbus had a problem in the same region of flight would it even be detected in flight testing? As far as I'm aware it wouldn't be as direct mode is a reversionary mode intended to get the aircraft safely on the ground.
      - 7y ago
rrss 7y ago
> We know because hundreds of people died in the airframe. Since both crashes were caused by malfunctioning software, this doesn't tell you anything about the fundamental soundness of the airframe. > We know the MCAS was a workaround to an aerodynamics problem MCAS was a workaround to make the plane handle more like a 737. The existing handling was fine by itself (not 'fundamentally flawed'), it just didn't match the 737. > How do you argue what they did and are continuing to do is just in this situation? I don't see where I did that. I just don't think there is any evidence that the airframe is actually fundamentally unsafe.
- bronson 7y ago
  The software is a fundamental part of the airframe. You can’t separate the two and still have an airplane rated for flight.
  - rrss 7y ago
    > Keep talking about the software. Make it about the software, so no one knows the airframe is fundamentally flawed. It's pretty clear that the author of the comment I originally responded to was not considering software.
    - bronson 7y ago
      Their point was about the way Boeing is trying (and mostly succeeding) in steering media coverage about the MAX-8. (If Boeing keeps discussion on the micro issues, maybe they won't have to publicly address a macro problem). Their comment doesn't take a position on whether software is a fundamental part of the airframe or not. Yours does.

skybrian 7y ago

Uncrashable airplanes don't exist. The question isn't whether there were crashes (nobody disputes that). It's whether the problem can be fixed so that pilots can fly it safely. Given all the times the plane flew without incident (other than the two crashes), it seems this should be possible?

visarga 7y ago
Yeah, it was perfectly safe except for two crashes. But that's two crashes more than I can tolerate. The problem is now the lack of public trust in their work. They might fix the software, but how to prove they're not lying again?
- ethbro 7y ago
  The same way you prove Airbus isn't lying?
  - callalex 7y ago
    Presumably Airbus is still being watched by a regulator or two. Unlike Boeing which has not been watched as the FAA has clearly been gutted.
    - _ph_ 7y ago
      The 737 MAX will be watched by all regulators world-wide. So it will be checked as carefuly, or actually even way more carefully than any competing aircraft.
      - AnthonBerg 7y ago
        We must remember that repeated checking does not make a bad design good. It’s completely clear now what Boeing’s priorities and methods were.
        _ph_ 7y ago
        The 737 is a very successful design and it is clear with practical experience, what its strengths and weaknesses are.
        AnthonBerg 7y ago
        Boeing build processes that build aeroplanes. Those processes swiftly mutilated and killed hundreds of people when the product was unleashed. The response from Boeing was 100% sociopathic. You may find that OK, if you wish. You may choose to do nothing. We don’t, and won’t.
      - ulfw 7y ago
        Which NOONE bothered to do before millions of people were made to fly in them. THAT is the very issue at hand.
est31 7y ago
The plane still crashed twice which is many many times higher than the non-purely-human-cause crash rate of other airplane types. Probably even then 737 MAX is still safer overall than cars, but airplanes have a higher safety expectation than cars do.
- _ph_ 7y ago
  But it crashed 2 times for the same reason. Take away that reason and you have a completely different situation to estimate its reliability.
  - mtgx 7y ago
    But what if the real reason isn't what Boeing tells us it is and it's completely different?
  - michaelt 7y ago
    The crash rate is zero if you ignore the crashes, it's true.
    - _ph_ 7y ago
      It is not about ignoring the crashes. But as both crashes were caused by MCAS, you cannot make a safety statement about a 737 without MCAS or rather with a fixed one.
      - bronson 7y ago
        Yes you can. Clearly Boeing Is suffering serious process failure, especially in letting two crash before responding properly. Is the MCAS the only place they messed up? Will this fix truly be 100%? Remember that their first attempt at a fix was rejected. When you see one bug, that’s often an indication that more are nearby.

danjayh 7y ago

You clearly have absolutely no background in aerospace engineering. The 737 airframe is actually relatively stable compared to many other things that fly ... for instance, many high-performance jets will literally begin to oscillate and tear themselves apart without help from their flight computers. The flight computer is a part of the airframe, and it is perfectly valid for the flight computer to contribute to the airframe's handling characteristics. Boeing's mistake was in underestimating the burden placed on the pilots in a runaway trim situation, and assuming that pilots could execute a recovery procedure correctly that remained unchanged from prior iterations but that had also been rarely needed on prior iterations (vs. the MAX, where MCAS failures were common enough that an average pilot might actually need to execute the procedure).

bobowzki 7y ago
People like to bring up the instability of high performance jets, but I'd like to point out that they generally have ejection seats and don't carry passengers.
- danjayh 7y ago
  Airbus jets carry passengers and have been fly-by-wire for decades. Cables and hydraulics have been replaced with software and computers. Like it or not, the software and hardware that make up the flight computer are an integral part of the airframe on most newly produced passenger jets, regardless of who makes them.
  - VBprogrammer 7y ago
    It's an interesting point. One of the reversion modes on Airbus is "direct law". Under that control mode the stick displacement is proportional to the control movements. If, hypothetically, an Airbus had a problem in the same region of flight would it even be detected in flight testing? As far as I'm aware it wouldn't be as direct mode is a reversionary mode intended to get the aircraft safely on the ground.
    - 7y ago

rrss 7y ago

> We know because hundreds of people died in the airframe. Since both crashes were caused by malfunctioning software, this doesn't tell you anything about the fundamental soundness of the airframe. > We know the MCAS was a workaround to an aerodynamics problem MCAS was a workaround to make the plane handle more like a 737. The existing handling was fine by itself (not 'fundamentally flawed'), it just didn't match the 737. > How do you argue what they did and are continuing to do is just in this situation? I don't see where I did that. I just don't think there is any evidence that the airframe is actually fundamentally unsafe.

bronson 7y ago
The software is a fundamental part of the airframe. You can’t separate the two and still have an airplane rated for flight.
- rrss 7y ago
  > Keep talking about the software. Make it about the software, so no one knows the airframe is fundamentally flawed. It's pretty clear that the author of the comment I originally responded to was not considering software.
  - bronson 7y ago
    Their point was about the way Boeing is trying (and mostly succeeding) in steering media coverage about the MAX-8. (If Boeing keeps discussion on the micro issues, maybe they won't have to publicly address a macro problem). Their comment doesn't take a position on whether software is a fundamental part of the airframe or not. Yours does.