Toward minimizing defection, the article offers these example solutions: > What if unions gave perks to employees including job references, health benefits, et

Toward minimizing defection, the article offers these example solutions: > What if unions gave perks to employees including job references, health benefits, etc BUT to participate in the union you had to put forth a $5k bond. This could be deducted slowly over time from your paycheck. > ... > Consumers could do something similar for corporations as well. Have reserved payments given out over time but only if the companies don’t create any externalities for which the consumer doesn’t approve. There are multiple practical problems with these approaches, which might be grouped into two broad categories: 1. How do you prevent collusion? I defect and pay you to keep quiet. Or I pay you to falsely accuse another member of having defected. 2. What due process determines whether defection has occurred? In the constrained world of a system like Bitcoin, this can be easy, but only if the outside world doesn't enter. The minute we start invoking oracles to inject external state, then the entire system begins to revolve around how to prevent the same kinds of collusion/misrepresentation behaviors in the oracles.