3 ms·
> The middlebox cannot detect this happening, regardless of whether TLS 1.3 or earlier are used, it works the same and the "security" features in the middlebox
by indigo945 7y ago
> The middlebox cannot detect this happening, regardless of whether TLS 1.3 or earlier are used, it works the same and the "security" features in the middlebox don't prevent it.
Can't the middlebox just connect to the same endpoint, verify the certificate itself by checking that it is signed by a proper CA, and then, if it is not, drop the connection?
- tialaramex 7y ago"Checking that it is signed by a proper CA" isn't relevant, the certificate presented is the real one, like I said they're public documents, there's no reason to use fakes. But the middlebox can, indeed, verify that when it connects to this same (IP, port) pair that endpoint is able to prove it's the real thing. I have never seen one that does this, and it won't prove anything about other connections, since our "rogue" TLS server can proxy everything to the real whitelisted server and that will pass, but yes you could do that. You can invent arbitrarily sophisticated schemes and counter-schemes in this space. The 32 bytes of ClientHello random in particular mean you can never tell whether the client is signalling to the server or not if you even sometimes choose not to interpose.