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The ontological argument is about a specific definition of "God" as having certain properties. You cannot counter that argument by assuming a different definiti

by goto11 7y ago

The ontological argument is about a specific definition of "God" as having certain properties. You cannot counter that argument by assuming a different definition of "God". Your "God" can be two contradictory things at once which seems fundamentally different than the "God" defined in the ontological proof. So basically you are talking about two different things. (But OK, if logic doesn't exist then who cares?)

coldtea 7y ago
>The ontological argument is about a specific definition of "God" as having certain properties. You cannot counter that argument by assuming a different definition of "God". Of course you can. The ontological argument arrived at the "specific definition" (of axioms about God) under the assumption that those are required and true attributes of any entity that can be called God. If those are just a random selection of attributes merely thought necessary by Anselm (or Godel here), and not inherently necessarily tied to the notion of God in general, then the whole argument is moot, nothing more than a logical deduction based on some arbitrary axioms that tells us nothing about God existing or not. The purpose of Anselm and Godel is not to show that (a) "a specific definition of God having [those] certain properties exists". It is to assert that "those certain properties" are necessary properties of a God entity, and (b) "a God having those properties must exist", (c) "God exists". >Your "God" can be two contradictory things at once which seems fundamentally different than the "God" defined in the ontological proof. So basically you are talking about two different things. No, we're just talking about two different assertions of what properties God can and cannot have. God as a notion pre-exists any attributes assigned to it in a specific logical argument (for example, Godel and Anselm have both heard about the notion of God before they've picked their axioms). When trying to match an existing notion it's not enough that one picks axioms: they should also make sure those axioms are the proper ones to capture the notion properly. Else it's just a new arbitrary definition of an entity, which they called "God" but could just as easily have called "Bob" or "Jane".
- jhanschoo 7y ago
  You are talking past the comment you are replying to, and Goedel's argument altogether. That is, you are referring to an entity that may have contradictory properties in the way you mentioned, but Goedel's philosophical God isn't such an entity. > Else it's just a new arbitrary definition of an entity, which they called "God" but could just as easily have called "Bob" or "Jane". It exactly is arbitrary. The argument works for every referent that satisfies the properties.
  - coldtea 7y ago
    >You are talking past the comment you are replying to, and Goedel's argument altogether. That is, you are referring to an entity that may have contradictory properties in the way you mentioned, but Goedel's philosophical God isn't such an entity. Which is the point exactly. Even if Goedel's argument didn't have logical jumps based on non-essential assumptions, it still doesn't prove the existence of God per se, only the existence of something Goedel calls God, which satisfies Goedel's axioms ("every referent that satisfies the properties"). But the problem is that Goedel doesn't say he tries to prove the existence of "any referent that satisfies the properties" but of God. Well, who (apart from Goedel himself) said that those are the properties of God, and not others?
    - jhanschoo 7y ago
      > it still doesn't prove the existence of God You mean the God of your religion. If Goedel believed his argument that would make him a kind of deist. > Even if Goedel's argument didn't have logical jumps based on non-essential assumptions Goedel's argument is tight given the axioms, though. It's been formally verified. The God that you mention that may have contradictory properties isn't that interesting for logical analysis, since it's likely that logicians only want to consider "Gods" whose existence do not render useless their logical system (contradiction leads to the principle of explosion). Hence you won't find primarily logical works discussing such a God. > which satisfies Goedel's axioms to be pedantic, his "God" doesn't satisfy Goedel's axioms, his "God" satisfies his definition of "God". Then the argument has that you accept its existence once you accept the axioms of the argument. > Well, who (apart from Goedel himself) said that those are the properties of God, and not others? Well, in most cultures, you call a kind of sufficiently magical or spiritual or ineffable entity a god. Nobody has a monopoly on the word "God", and many cultures use the word to refer to entities unrecognizable as the one you call God.

by goto11 7y ago

coldtea 7y ago

>The ontological argument is about a specific definition of "God" as having certain properties. You cannot counter that argument by assuming a different definition of "God". Of course you can. The ontological argument arrived at the "specific definition" (of axioms about God) under the assumption that those are required and true attributes of any entity that can be called God. If those are just a random selection of attributes merely thought necessary by Anselm (or Godel here), and not inherently necessarily tied to the notion of God in general, then the whole argument is moot, nothing more than a logical deduction based on some arbitrary axioms that tells us nothing about God existing or not. The purpose of Anselm and Godel is not to show that (a) "a specific definition of God having [those] certain properties exists". It is to assert that "those certain properties" are necessary properties of a God entity, and (b) "a God having those properties must exist", (c) "God exists". >Your "God" can be two contradictory things at once which seems fundamentally different than the "God" defined in the ontological proof. So basically you are talking about two different things. No, we're just talking about two different assertions of what properties God can and cannot have. God as a notion pre-exists any attributes assigned to it in a specific logical argument (for example, Godel and Anselm have both heard about the notion of God before they've picked their axioms). When trying to match an existing notion it's not enough that one picks axioms: they should also make sure those axioms are the proper ones to capture the notion properly. Else it's just a new arbitrary definition of an entity, which they called "God" but could just as easily have called "Bob" or "Jane".

jhanschoo 7y ago
You are talking past the comment you are replying to, and Goedel's argument altogether. That is, you are referring to an entity that may have contradictory properties in the way you mentioned, but Goedel's philosophical God isn't such an entity. > Else it's just a new arbitrary definition of an entity, which they called "God" but could just as easily have called "Bob" or "Jane". It exactly is arbitrary. The argument works for every referent that satisfies the properties.
- coldtea 7y ago
  >You are talking past the comment you are replying to, and Goedel's argument altogether. That is, you are referring to an entity that may have contradictory properties in the way you mentioned, but Goedel's philosophical God isn't such an entity. Which is the point exactly. Even if Goedel's argument didn't have logical jumps based on non-essential assumptions, it still doesn't prove the existence of God per se, only the existence of something Goedel calls God, which satisfies Goedel's axioms ("every referent that satisfies the properties"). But the problem is that Goedel doesn't say he tries to prove the existence of "any referent that satisfies the properties" but of God. Well, who (apart from Goedel himself) said that those are the properties of God, and not others?
  - jhanschoo 7y ago
    > it still doesn't prove the existence of God You mean the God of your religion. If Goedel believed his argument that would make him a kind of deist. > Even if Goedel's argument didn't have logical jumps based on non-essential assumptions Goedel's argument is tight given the axioms, though. It's been formally verified. The God that you mention that may have contradictory properties isn't that interesting for logical analysis, since it's likely that logicians only want to consider "Gods" whose existence do not render useless their logical system (contradiction leads to the principle of explosion). Hence you won't find primarily logical works discussing such a God. > which satisfies Goedel's axioms to be pedantic, his "God" doesn't satisfy Goedel's axioms, his "God" satisfies his definition of "God". Then the argument has that you accept its existence once you accept the axioms of the argument. > Well, who (apart from Goedel himself) said that those are the properties of God, and not others? Well, in most cultures, you call a kind of sufficiently magical or spiritual or ineffable entity a god. Nobody has a monopoly on the word "God", and many cultures use the word to refer to entities unrecognizable as the one you call God.