> Where's the flaw in this argument? Does the same flaw apply in the theological argument? You've matched the argument pretty well and I think it does serve as

> Where's the flaw in this argument? Does the same flaw apply in the theological argument? You've matched the argument pretty well and I think it does serve as a useful analogy > Therefore by proof of contradiction, Pennywise the Dancing Clown must exist. I see no problem with this: We know that Pennywise exists. We don't know much else about Pennywise, but we do know that if we are postulating a candidate for Pennywise it must be a clown that is postulated as existing. To see this, examine this rephrasing that more closely matches the original: > A Pennywise understood as real is scarier than a Pennywise understood as imaginary (2). Thus, if you grant the truth of "Pennywise The Dancing Clown is that clown for which no more horrifying clown could be conceived", you cannot be a Pennywise atheist. If you use the term "Pennywise" to refer to something that you believe doesn't exist, you are deliberately misusing the term. Note, that even this definition does not preclude the existence of a "Super Pennywise is the scariest clown that could ever exist" which has as potential candidates all the potentially real clowns whose true horror cannot be conceived.