3 ms·

This is the same as Anselm's argument. If the Lord of Hosts is not scarier to you than Pennywise, you have not thought very hard about the implications of an om

by geofft 7y ago

This is the same as Anselm's argument. If the Lord of Hosts is not scarier to you than Pennywise, you have not thought very hard about the implications of an omnipotent, omniscient being. He isn't going to spook you like a movie clown; no, He is far more existentially terrifying, as befits Someone beyond Whom no greater horror can be conceived. And, after all, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." The more common formulation of your counterargument is something like imagining the most perfect possible ice cream sandwich, to which I would also say, is God not better than any ice cream sandwich? Are the splendors of heaven not far beyond any earthly dessert?

justinpombrio 7y ago
> If the Lord of Hosts is not scarier to you than Pennywise, [...] I don't mean to define Pennywise as the scariest possible being. I mean to define Pennywise as the scariest possible clown. The Lord is, I imagine you will agree, not literally a clown.
- geofft 7y ago
  Doesn't the fact that He's not a clown make it particularly unnerving that He's in fact the scariest possible clown? Or, in what sense is God not a clown when He created not only every clown but the entire concept of clowning? Or, being a little more serious, that constraint isn't compatible with the problem Anselm stated. There's no reason for the scariest possible clown to exist: there's no reason that, of the clowns both real and imaginary, the scariest real one should be scarier than the scariest imaginary one. (I think we could argue quite convincingly that, say, Pennywise has scared more people than any real clown.) So the argument "A clown is scarier if it exists" isn't obviously true. Or put yet another way, the greatest possible mortal (existent or not) is obviously not immortal, but you could plausibly argue that the greatest possible being is. If you want to maximize on one axis the most superlative being, though, you can probably get to God. I suspect Anselm's conception of God is the ultimate realization of any axis of comparison we can think of: the supreme delight, the supreme fear, the most resplendent, the most hidden, etc. And in particular I think Anselm's axis of greatness is much more defensible, that is, "A being is greater if it exists" sounds much more like a reasonable assumption (even if I'm not sure I accept it) than "A being is scarier if it exists."
TomMckenny 7y ago
>the implications of an omnipotent, omniscient being There is nothing in the premise or conclusion about omnipotent or omniscient. Just "most powerful". If there is nothing which is omnipotent then the most powerful being is not omnipotent. said another way: while I can (sort of) imagine omnipotentence, it does not follow that there is an omnipotent being in the same way. That is to say, there is necessarily a most powerful object in existence but there is not necessarily an omnipotent object in existence. Indeed we can infer no attributes of this most powerful object except its power: we may just be talking about the largest black hole or something.
- geofft 7y ago
  Anselm's argument was about "greater," not "more powerful." Specifically, was about the existence of "a being than which nothing greater can be conceived." Since you just conceived of a potential being with omnipotence, it follows that Anselm's being must have omnipotence, at least if we assume having omnipotence is greater than not having it. More practically, Anselm was thinking within the Christian tradition, which also attributes omniscience, omnipotence, and fearworthiness to God. Had Anselm understood his argument to refer to a "greater" entity that potentially lacked these characteristics, he would not have called that being "God." I do generally agree that the argument is not particularly useful because it doesn't describe interesting properties of God and God's relationship with / desires for humanity, but at least for understanding the argument as Anselm understood it, we can fairly easily conclude that Anselm saw nothing in the being of the argument that was inconsistent with the God of his religion.
  - TomMckenny 7y ago
    Very true, Anselm refers to greater, not more powerful. And is describing God entirely in the Christian tradition. But another problem is, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. 1) Imagine/conceive of the greatest possible thing. (This premise is more than true, it's a directive.) 2) Real things are greater than imaginary things. (This premise is un-controversially true.) So we can imagine an extraordinary being omnipotent and great. And we must imagine him existing because if we imagine he does not exist, we're imagining something less great. The problem is, in his own premise, _any_ existing being is greater than _any_ imagined being. So it's very true that a real God is greater than an imagined God. But, from premise 2, so is any physical real thing including the most humble being. At the risk of wandering outside of my expertise, I would think this would not bother the faithful either way since I understand faith is central to the religion. I'm guessing that Anselm's argument is a "nice to have" but if it fails it does not disturb anyone. And incidentally, I hope I have not said anything offensive.

by geofft 7y ago

justinpombrio 7y ago

> If the Lord of Hosts is not scarier to you than Pennywise, [...] I don't mean to define Pennywise as the scariest possible being. I mean to define Pennywise as the scariest possible clown. The Lord is, I imagine you will agree, not literally a clown.

geofft 7y ago
Doesn't the fact that He's not a clown make it particularly unnerving that He's in fact the scariest possible clown? Or, in what sense is God not a clown when He created not only every clown but the entire concept of clowning? Or, being a little more serious, that constraint isn't compatible with the problem Anselm stated. There's no reason for the scariest possible clown to exist: there's no reason that, of the clowns both real and imaginary, the scariest real one should be scarier than the scariest imaginary one. (I think we could argue quite convincingly that, say, Pennywise has scared more people than any real clown.) So the argument "A clown is scarier if it exists" isn't obviously true. Or put yet another way, the greatest possible mortal (existent or not) is obviously not immortal, but you could plausibly argue that the greatest possible being is. If you want to maximize on one axis the most superlative being, though, you can probably get to God. I suspect Anselm's conception of God is the ultimate realization of any axis of comparison we can think of: the supreme delight, the supreme fear, the most resplendent, the most hidden, etc. And in particular I think Anselm's axis of greatness is much more defensible, that is, "A being is greater if it exists" sounds much more like a reasonable assumption (even if I'm not sure I accept it) than "A being is scarier if it exists."

TomMckenny 7y ago

>the implications of an omnipotent, omniscient being There is nothing in the premise or conclusion about omnipotent or omniscient. Just "most powerful". If there is nothing which is omnipotent then the most powerful being is not omnipotent. said another way: while I can (sort of) imagine omnipotentence, it does not follow that there is an omnipotent being in the same way. That is to say, there is necessarily a most powerful object in existence but there is not necessarily an omnipotent object in existence. Indeed we can infer no attributes of this most powerful object except its power: we may just be talking about the largest black hole or something.

geofft 7y ago
Anselm's argument was about "greater," not "more powerful." Specifically, was about the existence of "a being than which nothing greater can be conceived." Since you just conceived of a potential being with omnipotence, it follows that Anselm's being must have omnipotence, at least if we assume having omnipotence is greater than not having it. More practically, Anselm was thinking within the Christian tradition, which also attributes omniscience, omnipotence, and fearworthiness to God. Had Anselm understood his argument to refer to a "greater" entity that potentially lacked these characteristics, he would not have called that being "God." I do generally agree that the argument is not particularly useful because it doesn't describe interesting properties of God and God's relationship with / desires for humanity, but at least for understanding the argument as Anselm understood it, we can fairly easily conclude that Anselm saw nothing in the being of the argument that was inconsistent with the God of his religion.
- TomMckenny 7y ago
  Very true, Anselm refers to greater, not more powerful. And is describing God entirely in the Christian tradition. But another problem is, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. 1) Imagine/conceive of the greatest possible thing. (This premise is more than true, it's a directive.) 2) Real things are greater than imaginary things. (This premise is un-controversially true.) So we can imagine an extraordinary being omnipotent and great. And we must imagine him existing because if we imagine he does not exist, we're imagining something less great. The problem is, in his own premise, _any_ existing being is greater than _any_ imagined being. So it's very true that a real God is greater than an imagined God. But, from premise 2, so is any physical real thing including the most humble being. At the risk of wandering outside of my expertise, I would think this would not bother the faithful either way since I understand faith is central to the religion. I'm guessing that Anselm's argument is a "nice to have" but if it fails it does not disturb anyone. And incidentally, I hope I have not said anything offensive.