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Premise 1: Pennywise The Dancing Clown is defined as the scariest clown that could possibly exist ("that for which no greater horror can be conceived" EDIT: "th

Premise 1: Pennywise The Dancing Clown is defined as the scariest clown that could possibly exist ("that for which no greater horror can be conceived" EDIT: "that clown for which no more horrifying clown could be conceived"). ("Pennywise the Dancing Clown" is usually defined as "the clown from It". I'm repurposing the name for the sake of this argument. We need a name for "scariest possible clown"; I'm choosing "Pennywise".) Premise 2: real things are scarier than imaginary things. We can imagine Pennywise The Dancing Clown (he exists in understanding---you're welcome). A real Pennywise is scarier than an imaginary Pennywise (2). Then, if Pennywise The Dancing Clown does not exist, we can conceive a scarier clown (a real Pennywise). This leads to a contradiction with respect to (1). Therefore by proof of contradiction, Pennywise the Dancing Clown must exist. Where's the flaw in this argument? Does the same flaw apply in the theological argument?

ARandomerDude 7y ago
Premise 1 is false. A clown is not "that for which no greater horror can be conceived". In order to be so, he would have to be omnipotent (less powerful = less scary), eternal (able to induce constant horror), necessarily self-existing (can't be killed), etc -- in short, God. This is actually proof for God and the doctrine of Hell.
- 481092 7y ago
  > A clown is not "that for which no greater horror can be conceived" I don't know, some people are really scared of clowns. Also as a reminder, your "proof" is something made up throughout history along with thousands of other denominations of thousands of other religions of thousands of other gods people have conceived through thousands of years. I can imagine many great things and it doesn't mean it exists, that's where this "proof" fails. Calling this "proof" is, if not a lie, but a big detriment to the notion of proofs already tested and held dear. As an addendum, if you follow your logic then you're still left with the old 'who created God' argument because although you might imagine some great entity, any entity that god can imagine should surely be greater than the god you imagine so their god must be true. You still have the infinite egress problem diluting your "proof".
_delirium 7y ago
Some variety of this is in fact the classical reply to Anselm's version of the ontological argument. A contemporary of Anselm's, Gaunilo, published a satirical proof that a maximally excellent lost island must exist: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaunilo_of_Marmoutiers#The_%22Lost_Island%22_refutation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaunilo_of_Marmoutiers#The_%22...
geofft 7y ago
This is the same as Anselm's argument. If the Lord of Hosts is not scarier to you than Pennywise, you have not thought very hard about the implications of an omnipotent, omniscient being. He isn't going to spook you like a movie clown; no, He is far more existentially terrifying, as befits Someone beyond Whom no greater horror can be conceived. And, after all, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." The more common formulation of your counterargument is something like imagining the most perfect possible ice cream sandwich, to which I would also say, is God not better than any ice cream sandwich? Are the splendors of heaven not far beyond any earthly dessert?
- justinpombrio 7y ago
  > If the Lord of Hosts is not scarier to you than Pennywise, [...] I don't mean to define Pennywise as the scariest possible being. I mean to define Pennywise as the scariest possible clown. The Lord is, I imagine you will agree, not literally a clown.
  - geofft 7y ago
    Doesn't the fact that He's not a clown make it particularly unnerving that He's in fact the scariest possible clown? Or, in what sense is God not a clown when He created not only every clown but the entire concept of clowning? Or, being a little more serious, that constraint isn't compatible with the problem Anselm stated. There's no reason for the scariest possible clown to exist: there's no reason that, of the clowns both real and imaginary, the scariest real one should be scarier than the scariest imaginary one. (I think we could argue quite convincingly that, say, Pennywise has scared more people than any real clown.) So the argument "A clown is scarier if it exists" isn't obviously true. Or put yet another way, the greatest possible mortal (existent or not) is obviously not immortal, but you could plausibly argue that the greatest possible being is. If you want to maximize on one axis the most superlative being, though, you can probably get to God. I suspect Anselm's conception of God is the ultimate realization of any axis of comparison we can think of: the supreme delight, the supreme fear, the most resplendent, the most hidden, etc. And in particular I think Anselm's axis of greatness is much more defensible, that is, "A being is greater if it exists" sounds much more like a reasonable assumption (even if I'm not sure I accept it) than "A being is scarier if it exists."
shkkmo 7y ago
> Where's the flaw in this argument? Does the same flaw apply in the theological argument? You've matched the argument pretty well and I think it does serve as a useful analogy > Therefore by proof of contradiction, Pennywise the Dancing Clown must exist. I see no problem with this: We know that Pennywise exists. We don't know much else about Pennywise, but we do know that if we are postulating a candidate for Pennywise it must be a clown that is postulated as existing. To see this, examine this rephrasing that more closely matches the original: > A Pennywise understood as real is scarier than a Pennywise understood as imaginary (2). Thus, if you grant the truth of "Pennywise The Dancing Clown is that clown for which no more horrifying clown could be conceived", you cannot be a Pennywise atheist. If you use the term "Pennywise" to refer to something that you believe doesn't exist, you are deliberately misusing the term. Note, that even this definition does not preclude the existence of a "Super Pennywise is the scariest clown that could ever exist" which has as potential candidates all the potentially real clowns whose true horror cannot be conceived.
taneq 7y ago
> Where's the flaw in this argument? Does the same flaw apply in the theological argument? The only thing scarier than the scariest clown that could possibly exist anywhere, is that clown right here and now. Therefore Pennywise is under your desk right now. But if you check, I'm guessing you'll find he's not. Disproved by contradiction! Edit: Wait, unless clowns are scarier when they're invisible... :S
SlayAe 7y ago
I don't understand the problem here. There is a scariest clown and you chose to name him Pennywise.
- CamperBob2 7y ago
  There is something that is greater than everything else, and you chose to call it "God." Great. What else can be said about this "God?"
  - SlayAe 7y ago
    I guess the list of names of god un islam, could be a start.
- goto11 7y ago
  The problem is that anything which would make this scary clown scarier would necessarily be true. So if having claws and being able to fly would make this scary clown scarier, then a flying clown with claws would necessarily exist. At least if you follow the logic of the ontological argument.
jhanschoo 7y ago
The argument leaves unspecified where "Pennywise the Dancing Clown" must exist, or in what form, or in what places. Even though we say that it is real, it may not exist in any form that we recognize. This is as much an argument for a Lovecraftian reality as the original argument is for God.

ARandomerDude 7y ago

Premise 1 is false. A clown is not "that for which no greater horror can be conceived". In order to be so, he would have to be omnipotent (less powerful = less scary), eternal (able to induce constant horror), necessarily self-existing (can't be killed), etc -- in short, God. This is actually proof for God and the doctrine of Hell.

481092 7y ago
> A clown is not "that for which no greater horror can be conceived" I don't know, some people are really scared of clowns. Also as a reminder, your "proof" is something made up throughout history along with thousands of other denominations of thousands of other religions of thousands of other gods people have conceived through thousands of years. I can imagine many great things and it doesn't mean it exists, that's where this "proof" fails. Calling this "proof" is, if not a lie, but a big detriment to the notion of proofs already tested and held dear. As an addendum, if you follow your logic then you're still left with the old 'who created God' argument because although you might imagine some great entity, any entity that god can imagine should surely be greater than the god you imagine so their god must be true. You still have the infinite egress problem diluting your "proof".

_delirium 7y ago

Some variety of this is in fact the classical reply to Anselm's version of the ontological argument. A contemporary of Anselm's, Gaunilo, published a satirical proof that a maximally excellent lost island must exist: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaunilo_of_Marmoutiers#The_%22Lost_Island%22_refutation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaunilo_of_Marmoutiers#The_%22...

geofft 7y ago

This is the same as Anselm's argument. If the Lord of Hosts is not scarier to you than Pennywise, you have not thought very hard about the implications of an omnipotent, omniscient being. He isn't going to spook you like a movie clown; no, He is far more existentially terrifying, as befits Someone beyond Whom no greater horror can be conceived. And, after all, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." The more common formulation of your counterargument is something like imagining the most perfect possible ice cream sandwich, to which I would also say, is God not better than any ice cream sandwich? Are the splendors of heaven not far beyond any earthly dessert?

justinpombrio 7y ago
> If the Lord of Hosts is not scarier to you than Pennywise, [...] I don't mean to define Pennywise as the scariest possible being. I mean to define Pennywise as the scariest possible clown. The Lord is, I imagine you will agree, not literally a clown.
- geofft 7y ago
  Doesn't the fact that He's not a clown make it particularly unnerving that He's in fact the scariest possible clown? Or, in what sense is God not a clown when He created not only every clown but the entire concept of clowning? Or, being a little more serious, that constraint isn't compatible with the problem Anselm stated. There's no reason for the scariest possible clown to exist: there's no reason that, of the clowns both real and imaginary, the scariest real one should be scarier than the scariest imaginary one. (I think we could argue quite convincingly that, say, Pennywise has scared more people than any real clown.) So the argument "A clown is scarier if it exists" isn't obviously true. Or put yet another way, the greatest possible mortal (existent or not) is obviously not immortal, but you could plausibly argue that the greatest possible being is. If you want to maximize on one axis the most superlative being, though, you can probably get to God. I suspect Anselm's conception of God is the ultimate realization of any axis of comparison we can think of: the supreme delight, the supreme fear, the most resplendent, the most hidden, etc. And in particular I think Anselm's axis of greatness is much more defensible, that is, "A being is greater if it exists" sounds much more like a reasonable assumption (even if I'm not sure I accept it) than "A being is scarier if it exists."

shkkmo 7y ago

> Where's the flaw in this argument? Does the same flaw apply in the theological argument? You've matched the argument pretty well and I think it does serve as a useful analogy > Therefore by proof of contradiction, Pennywise the Dancing Clown must exist. I see no problem with this: We know that Pennywise exists. We don't know much else about Pennywise, but we do know that if we are postulating a candidate for Pennywise it must be a clown that is postulated as existing. To see this, examine this rephrasing that more closely matches the original: > A Pennywise understood as real is scarier than a Pennywise understood as imaginary (2). Thus, if you grant the truth of "Pennywise The Dancing Clown is that clown for which no more horrifying clown could be conceived", you cannot be a Pennywise atheist. If you use the term "Pennywise" to refer to something that you believe doesn't exist, you are deliberately misusing the term. Note, that even this definition does not preclude the existence of a "Super Pennywise is the scariest clown that could ever exist" which has as potential candidates all the potentially real clowns whose true horror cannot be conceived.

taneq 7y ago

> Where's the flaw in this argument? Does the same flaw apply in the theological argument? The only thing scarier than the scariest clown that could possibly exist anywhere, is that clown right here and now. Therefore Pennywise is under your desk right now. But if you check, I'm guessing you'll find he's not. Disproved by contradiction! Edit: Wait, unless clowns are scarier when they're invisible... :S

SlayAe 7y ago

I don't understand the problem here. There is a scariest clown and you chose to name him Pennywise.

CamperBob2 7y ago
There is something that is greater than everything else, and you chose to call it "God." Great. What else can be said about this "God?"
- SlayAe 7y ago
  I guess the list of names of god un islam, could be a start.
goto11 7y ago
The problem is that anything which would make this scary clown scarier would necessarily be true. So if having claws and being able to fly would make this scary clown scarier, then a flying clown with claws would necessarily exist. At least if you follow the logic of the ontological argument.

jhanschoo 7y ago

The argument leaves unspecified where "Pennywise the Dancing Clown" must exist, or in what form, or in what places. Even though we say that it is real, it may not exist in any form that we recognize. This is as much an argument for a Lovecraftian reality as the original argument is for God.