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I think you are also guilty of over constraining the solution space ... airlines want a new more fuel efficient plane with a certain size and passenger carrying

I think you are also guilty of over constraining the solution space ... airlines want a new more fuel efficient plane with a certain size and passenger carrying capacity. Building a new plane for this need either involves training pilots on this new plane type or inherently unsafe engineering to deliver the new product without requiring the pilot retraining expense. You suggest that we should sacrifice the rigor of pilot training to allow delivering planes without safety compromises ... I think there’s absolutely no justification for safety compromise in this scenario - the new plane will pay for retraining costs in a slightly longer amount of time than it would’ve had retraining not been required — oh well. That’s the cost of doing business and it’s absolutely without doubt that in this case - designing a plane that wasn’t inherently flawed would’ve been a better strategy for Boeing and for all of their 737 Max customers ... The real question to learn from this tragedy is not how can we make it slightly less expensive to produce a new air frame — it’s how can we ensure that safety is not allowed to be compromised during the design phase of new passenger aircraft in service of _truly_ minor cost savings ... if we had a real regulator that was not captured - they should’ve had the flexibility to say no to the 737 Max very very early in the proposal process — and if necessary they should’ve been allowed to offer a tax incentive to offset some of the pilot retraining cost required by them not budging on safety requirements. Building and deploying safe airplanes into real world use is more expensive than building unsafe airplanes — but that doesn’t mean it’s not worth the cost to society...

AnthonyMouse 7y ago
> You suggest that we should sacrifice the rigor of pilot training to allow delivering planes without safety compromises Describing this as "sacrifice the rigor of pilot training" is illegitimate. If someone is already certified on a similar plane, the training they need is really only on the difference between the planes. > I think there’s absolutely no justification for safety compromise in this scenario - the new plane will pay for retraining costs in a slightly longer amount of time than it would’ve had retraining not been required — oh well. The problem is that monetary costs are still safety costs. Now the new thing costs more and people choose alternatives that may be less safe. If new planes are more expensive then older planes that are more likely to suffer wear-based mechanical failures stay in service longer. If air travel costs more then more people drive. Boeing obviously screwed this up, but we gave them the incentive to screw it up, and that's on us too. > The real question to learn from this tragedy is not how can we make it slightly less expensive to produce a new air frame — it’s how can we ensure that safety is not allowed to be compromised during the design phase of new passenger aircraft in service of _truly_ minor cost savings But that is how you do it. You figure out how to achieve the cost savings without compromising safety. There is no law of nature that says they're mutually exclusive, and without forcing them to be at odds there is no longer an incentive to choose the wrong one.
- cmurf 7y ago
  The aircraft type rating is exactly difference training. You don't start from scratch just because a type certificate differs between two airplanes. The whole point is to require that difference training, and for it to be specifically laid out. Whereas without that, what did Boeing do? They gave pilots an iPad for difference training, and kept them in the dark about the differences between 737 NG and 737 MAX. That was their choice. The lie of omission by manufacturers is the whole reason why we have type certifications in the first place.
  - AnthonyMouse 7y ago
    > The aircraft type rating is exactly difference training. You don't start from scratch just because a type certificate differs between two airplanes. The whole point is to require that difference training, and for it to be specifically laid out. You're talking about training for completely different planes. Type training is commonly multiple weeks long. What I'm suggesting is something intermediate for two variants of a plane that are much more alike than that ("subtype training"), so that it's hours or days rather than weeks because there aren't as many differences to cover between two 737 variants than between a 737 and a 787. > Whereas without that, what did Boeing do? They gave pilots an iPad for difference training, and kept them in the dark about the differences between 737 NG and 737 MAX. Right, exactly. So they have the tiers too far apart. There is too big a jump between "here's an iPad" and tens of hours of training over multiple weeks, so there's a need for something in between for smaller variations.
    - cmurf 7y ago
      I'm not talking about completely different planes. If you have a Boeing 737 type rating, obtaining a 757/767 type rating is more expedient than it is for someone who has no prior Boeing 737 type rating. Further the regulations say whether a type certificate is required, and what goes into it, is up to the administrator. It's not strictly defined. You can in in effect have subtype ratings. FAA regulations are very much dependent on delegating authority rather than detailing every nitpicky thing. They really aren't that complicated.

AnthonyMouse 7y ago

> You suggest that we should sacrifice the rigor of pilot training to allow delivering planes without safety compromises Describing this as "sacrifice the rigor of pilot training" is illegitimate. If someone is already certified on a similar plane, the training they need is really only on the difference between the planes. > I think there’s absolutely no justification for safety compromise in this scenario - the new plane will pay for retraining costs in a slightly longer amount of time than it would’ve had retraining not been required — oh well. The problem is that monetary costs are still safety costs. Now the new thing costs more and people choose alternatives that may be less safe. If new planes are more expensive then older planes that are more likely to suffer wear-based mechanical failures stay in service longer. If air travel costs more then more people drive. Boeing obviously screwed this up, but we gave them the incentive to screw it up, and that's on us too. > The real question to learn from this tragedy is not how can we make it slightly less expensive to produce a new air frame — it’s how can we ensure that safety is not allowed to be compromised during the design phase of new passenger aircraft in service of _truly_ minor cost savings But that is how you do it. You figure out how to achieve the cost savings without compromising safety. There is no law of nature that says they're mutually exclusive, and without forcing them to be at odds there is no longer an incentive to choose the wrong one.

cmurf 7y ago
The aircraft type rating is exactly difference training. You don't start from scratch just because a type certificate differs between two airplanes. The whole point is to require that difference training, and for it to be specifically laid out. Whereas without that, what did Boeing do? They gave pilots an iPad for difference training, and kept them in the dark about the differences between 737 NG and 737 MAX. That was their choice. The lie of omission by manufacturers is the whole reason why we have type certifications in the first place.
- AnthonyMouse 7y ago
  > The aircraft type rating is exactly difference training. You don't start from scratch just because a type certificate differs between two airplanes. The whole point is to require that difference training, and for it to be specifically laid out. You're talking about training for completely different planes. Type training is commonly multiple weeks long. What I'm suggesting is something intermediate for two variants of a plane that are much more alike than that ("subtype training"), so that it's hours or days rather than weeks because there aren't as many differences to cover between two 737 variants than between a 737 and a 787. > Whereas without that, what did Boeing do? They gave pilots an iPad for difference training, and kept them in the dark about the differences between 737 NG and 737 MAX. Right, exactly. So they have the tiers too far apart. There is too big a jump between "here's an iPad" and tens of hours of training over multiple weeks, so there's a need for something in between for smaller variations.
  - cmurf 7y ago
    I'm not talking about completely different planes. If you have a Boeing 737 type rating, obtaining a 757/767 type rating is more expedient than it is for someone who has no prior Boeing 737 type rating. Further the regulations say whether a type certificate is required, and what goes into it, is up to the administrator. It's not strictly defined. You can in in effect have subtype ratings. FAA regulations are very much dependent on delegating authority rather than detailing every nitpicky thing. They really aren't that complicated.