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Of course the password is in plaintext. Logins are done via HTTP, not via HTTPS. You know, there isn't that little yellow lock thingy in the bottom left corne
by cperciva 18y ago
Of course the password is in plaintext. Logins are done via HTTP, not via HTTPS. You know, there isn't that little yellow lock thingy in the bottom left corner of the window?
Is this really news to anyone?
- hsiung 18y agoThere are still ways to add a little extra security for non-ssl logins. One way is by hashing the password via javascript with a random number provided by the server before posting it via HTTP. (see http://pajhome.org.uk/crypt/md5/auth.html http://pajhome.org.uk/crypt/md5/auth.html)
- tptacek 18y agoThat adds no security at all. Security is not an obstacle course.
- simonw 18y agoWhy doesn't it add security? It means the password isn't being transmitted in cleartext (it's using an irreversible hash). For the record, Yahoo! use that exact technique on their login page (though I'm not sure why as it's served over https). UPDATE: I see from a post further down that you're talking about re-writing the JavaScript in transit. Fair point.
- gojomo 18y agoIt adds a little. It means that a passive eavesdropper has to mount a offline dictionary attack before knowing the plaintext password. That's better than nothing.
- tptacek 18y agoNo. Respectfully, you too have failed to think this through. Attackers with access to raw traffic can (and routinely do) change the traffic. Attackers will simply rewrite your hashing Javascript in transit.
- gojomo 18y agoThat's an active attack. My statement was clear and correct. The number of people who can passively eavesdrop on traffic (eg, on open wifi) is much larger than those who can dynamically change traffic in transit.
- tptacek 18y agoThere are no passive-only attackers. Attackers who can observe raw traffic can hijack it (if it's the '90s) or redirect it (if it's 5 years ago, and in Brazil, and money is involved --- just to make it specific). Look, we're locked in an Internet message board death struggle and neither of us are going to concede anything, so let me just finish with this tangent: If you tried to sell an app to a Fortune 1000 company that defended against passive-only attackers but left logins open to active attackers, and they contracted out a 1 week 1 person web pen test to make sure your app was safe for peripheral customer data to go inside, you'd get dinged for this and you'd cut a dot release. If, instead of cutting a dot release you explained why it was worth them moving ahead with a pilot that defended against passive attackers, you would Lose The Sale. Seen it happen. I don't much care about your Hacker News password, but lots of you write applications, and I've seen some of the most unlikely (message boards, bug trackers, blogs---err, content managers) wind up in security audit hell. My advice, take it or leave it: don't bother with these Javascript hash schemes.
- volida 18y agoyou are saying that if someone is encrypting the password using RSA in javascript and then using the hash to exchange the password between server/client, is volnerable because someone can interfere in the traffic and change the javascript served to the user, so that the password is sent in plaintext and therefore steal the password? then why meebo and other sites practise this method without security problems?
- eru 18y agoThe canned argument is: No known security problem does not mean no security problem.
- thorax 18y agoSecurity is nothing but an obstacle course. The only time security is not merely an obstacle course is when you completely destroy the thing you're trying to protect. This is fundamentally something everyone needs to understand about computer security-- it's all about creating bigger and harder obstacles (including literal, physical obstacles). You can never absolutely secure something while it exists.
- tptacek 18y agoThat's a fine argument for rejecting all of engineering. An asteroid could always strike the bridge we're building! Why bother making it structurally sound?
- thorax 18y agoI'm not sure why you're treating my comment as an argument to reject security (or to reject anything other than your specific wording choice). I'm just saying that security, fundamentally, is about making obstacles. There's nothing implied there regarding the importance/unimportance/quality of those obstacles. I don't think understanding its fundamental nature takes anything away from Security.
- tptacek 18y agoThat's really not true. I think you're conflating cryptography with security. In crypto, I suppose you could consider algorithms that increase attacker cost as "obstacles", though I think the word loses meaning when the "obstacle" involves summoning more CPU cores than there are atoms in the solar system. In practical security, closing a buffer overflow, sanitizing inputs, and proving code paths are not "obstacles". There are a finite number of vulnerabilities in any piece of code.
- DougBTX 18y agoIn practical security, closing a buffer overflow, sanitizing inputs, and proving code paths are not "obstacles". I think you're being a bit picky over wording, an "obstacle" is just something which makes it harder for some to break your system, examples of which are closing buffer overflows and sanitizing inputs. You could, possibly, use it as an argument against engineering, but I think you'd be wrong. The same as someone arguing "we're all going to die anyway so lets get it over with now" is wrong: it means that you have to make the most of what you do have.
- mfenniak 18y agoThe downside to this is that it requires the server to store the password unencrypted and unhashed. The server must have access to the original password to hash with the random number for comparison. In my opinion, this wouldn't be an improvement in the overall security of the system. Avoid sending a plaintext password by using HTTPS. It's the easiest way.
- hsiung 18y agoYou store the password hashed with a salt in the database (just keep track of the salt you used). The server can send the salt to the client, in addition to the random number. So the client is performing two hashes: md5(md5(password+salt)+random_token).
- breck 18y agoAgreed--not news. However, this is a common security problem that doesn't get enough attention. I would guess the easiest way to crack anyone's bank account is to create some flimsy website that requires users to register. Chances are good they will use the same user/password combo that they would use for their bank. Or you could crack one of the thousands of existing login websites to get passwords, which would be a lot easier than hacking a bank's database. If I'm writing a minor login website, I'll assign a random password to users. I don't want to be liable if one of my servers is hacked and someone's bank account gets accessed because of it. What do people out there generally do about this problem? Do you take a similar approach or make additional efforts to secure your servers?
- cperciva 18y agoI don't want to be liable if one of my servers is hacked and someone's bank account gets accessed because of it. Don't store user passwords in plaintext.
- adamsmith 18y agoand hash the passwords on the browser.
- anewaccountname 18y agoI agree that that will be safe, provided you use the same browser-side hash function that the bank uses
- theg 18y agoYou can't have it both ways. If you are hashing the password before it is sent from the client to the server, you need the raw password on the server side. (Assuming you are concatenating it with a server-provided random value before the hashing.)
- tptacek 18y agoYou're assuming they're using a secure challenge response protocol. They're not. They're sending password-equivalent hashes over the wire, so they can say they're not sending passwords. You'd be right to point out that this is a lot of silly acrobatics to go through to avoid a single SSL login page.
- irrelative 18y agoSeriously, this isn't your bank account... what if someone breaks in and steals all your karma! I'm surprised that the crowd here would even blink when hearing this. cperciva is right with his rhetorical question: this shouldn't be news to anyone, especially hackers.
- jacobbijani 18y agoLooks like the point of the post was more to not use the same password you use here as on other sites, and less to worry about your HN account getting hacked.
- kwdowicz 18y agousers have million sites where they have logins and passwords - they can't have million password - even pattern can be guessed. If the risk is to low it's ok to not use HTTPS. But some blurring would give positive results - as like some hackers commented already.
- rplevy 18y agoOne approach is to invent a mnemonic system for constructing secure passwords. The passwords should be systematically related to the specific site (including variables that are only known or relevant to you), but the patten should not be obvious to anyone but yourself (and memorable enough that the passwords & method of constructing do not need to be explicitly recorded). This makes it possible to have a unique password for every site. As a further foil to anyone who might somehow crack the pattern, use different mental password construction algorithms for sites with different levels of perceived security importance (although then it is easier to get confused).
- jsteele 18y agoA million's a big number. As a User, I'd have to say that a hundred or so passwords sounds about right - and I live online 24/7. For most users - a dozen, tops.
- thaumaturgy 18y ago| For most users - a dozen, tops. "Most" users have trouble remembering even one password. Rightly or wrongly, it's hard to get the average computer user interested in security.