The latter half of the article makes specific claims to how lack of FAA expertise and manpower, and increasing deference and complacency to the industry's self-

The latter half of the article makes specific claims to how lack of FAA expertise and manpower, and increasing deference and complacency to the industry's self-reporting, led to missed signals. For example: > When company engineers analyzed the change, they figured that the system had not become any riskier, according to two people familiar with Boeing’s discussions on the matter...So the company never submitted an updated safety assessment of those changes to the agency. In several briefings in 2016, an F.A.A. test pilot learned the details of the system from Boeing. But the two F.A.A. engineers didn’t understand that MCAS could move the tail as much as 2.5 degrees, according to two people familiar with their thinking. > Under the impression the system was insignificant, officials didn’t require Boeing to tell pilots about MCAS. When the company asked to remove mention of MCAS from the pilot’s manual, the agency agreed. The "change" mentioned is Boeing overhauling MCAS to have a four-fold increase in magnitude of control over the stabilizer (2.5 degrees vs 0.6 degrees). Your belief is that the FAA, even with a better-staffed review team, and less of a culture of rubber-stamping industry engineer assessments, would have reached the same conclusion? And/or do you think the MCAS change is actually not a problem it's scapegoated to be, and that Boeing was right to tell FAA to remove it from the pilot's manual?