4 ms·
For e.g. a hash function, you'd want either a minimum or something like a 1st percentile. As far as I know, all cryptographic hash functions are sensitive to s
by userbinator 7y ago
For e.g. a hash function, you'd want either a minimum or something like a 1st percentile.
As far as I know, all cryptographic hash functions are sensitive to single bit-flips by design.
- derefr 7y agoYes, but sensitivity is the wrong measure to prove that. It’s the difference between a big-O and small-o complexity.
- rocqua 7y agoIt is definitely a design goal, but I would be very surprised if sha2 did not have 2 inputs that only differ by a single bit, and have the same output. Finding those inputs is essentially impossible, but for a true 'random oracle ' they are likely to exist.
- SilasX 7y agoNote: correct me if I’m wrong, but to be relevant to this theorem and definition of sensitivity, the two strings would have to be for the same circuit and therefore be the same length, which is much harder than finding hash collisions in general. And I thought they had ways to construct hash functions so that all the inputs of the same length have a different output?
- Leszek 7y ago> And I thought they had ways to construct hash functions so that all the inputs of the same length have a different output? That's trivially impossible for fixed-size hashes, by the pigeon hole principle.
- lonelappde 7y agoNot if the output is longer than the input, such as for passwords
- gitrebase 7y agoI doubt any study of hash functions restricts itself to studying a very tiny subset of all possible (infinite) inputs. The security of hash functions is always studied under the assumption of arbitrary inputs.
- SilasX 7y agoSorry, I meant all inputs whose length equals the output length. The point being, for at least that case you can guarantee a sensitivity of one bit.