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> Signal uses standard cellular mobile numbers as identifiers This is a big no. Even Wire uses metadata but only requires an e-mail account. I would like to se
by johnisgood 7y ago
> Signal uses standard cellular mobile numbers as identifiers
This is a big no. Even Wire uses metadata but only requires an e-mail account. I would like to see Ricochet (https://ricochet.im/ https://ricochet.im/) picked up by someone. Tor hidden services have been improved with added features which Ricochet does not utilize. I skimmed through the codebase and I came across some issues, heck, even the design is a bit obsolete as we have better algorithms with better parameters. Regardless, the idea is great and this is definitely doable, even by modifying Ricochet's codebase.
There is Cwtch (https://cwtch.im/ https://cwtch.im/) that extends Ricochet to support multi-party messaging. I did not dig deep into it, but it may use the same algorithms. Additionally, it uses a language with a GC.
I think a Ricochet-like IM software written in Ada/SPARK using libsparkcrypto (https://github.com/Componolit/libsparkcrypto https://github.com/Componolit/libsparkcrypto) would be ideal.
- dngray 7y ago> Signal uses standard cellular mobile numbers as identifiers Exactly and what's to say I want some random guy on the internet being able to call my phone. Keep in mind tptacek quite literally pastes replies gushing about Signal/Wire in any thread related to PGP or instant messaging. They even paste it in threads which mention PGP but talk about other issues such as file encryption, signing etc, ie the uses not covered by an instant messaging platform. I have come to just skimming over anything they say because of it. Come on, put a bit of effort into your reply. > Wire uses metadata but only requires an e-mail account. It also doesn't offer federation. At this point I think Matrix is the best hope if you're okay with minimal metadata. It is also making huge strides of progress if you keep up to date with their development, so that's exciting. https://matrix.org/blog/posts https://matrix.org/blog/posts > There is Cwtch (https://cwtch.im/ https://cwtch.im/) that extends Ricochet to support multi-party messaging. I did not dig deep into it, but it may use the same algorithms. Additionally, it uses a language with a GC. I have high hopes for Cwtch. It seems to be a common thing people don't want to address: metadata. That said you can have a fairly meta-dataless experience with Matrix if you run a server and don't federate. Ideally I'd like to see this get solved https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/2320#issuecomment-485227466 https://github.com/vector-im/riot-web/issues/2320#issuecomme...
- pvg 7y agoquite literally pastes replies Can you find a concrete example of that?
- dngray 7y ago> Can you find a concrete example of that? I should have been more clear on that. Their own replies, look at their post history. It's usually something like "Use Signal/Wire blah blah they are so good and will solve all the worlds problems". Someone then always points out that Signal requires you to share your phone number. Who wants to do that publicly? Then people usually say the desktop client is pretty bad experience and you need Signal on your phone anyway to be able to use it. Even if you use a disposable SIM, the issue comes up with the number going back into the carrier distribution pool to be issued to new customers. Phone numbers are a terrible way to identify people. Unlike email, where you can have spam filters, phone numbers have virtually no user controls for stopping unsolicited communications. Hell even IRC has that it's called /ignore. Often then the next thing that gets mentioned is Signal does not like people making third party clients, so that means no nice TUI client or something that is native for your platform. I dunno about you, but I go out of my way to avoid Electron. I am thankful that at least with Matrix, there are other clients being developed, and tools like Pantalaimon that will allow for easy encryption everywhere. https://github.com/matrix-org/pantalaimon https://github.com/matrix-org/pantalaimon I have blind friends and they say Electron applications are terrible. By that I mean non-functional with their screen readers, so that's a 0/10 for accessibility. And then someone else always points out Wire has metadata and isn't even federated like Matrix so you're back to square one.
- pvg 7y agoIt's usually something like "Use Signal/Wire blah blah they are so good and will solve all the worlds problems". But it's not that or something like it. Nor is it "literally pastes replies". You can take issue with both the opinions and the way they're presented. You can't mis-represent them, though, and that's what you're doing.
- 7y ago
- tptacek 7y agoI've read this 3 times and I don't know what your argument is. Surely, you can't be arguing that people should use email in preference to Wire because "Wire uses metadata but only requires an e-mail account", since Wire has strictly less metadata than e-mail, even encrypted email, and leaks far less of it than encrypted e-mail does to plaintext. People have visceral reactions to particular secure messengers. I really don't care. Use whichever one. Just don't pretend email is secure. I don't like Wire, but I'll recommend it if it means people will stop pretending that PGP is protecting them.
- johnisgood 7y agoCorrect, I am not arguing that. I implied that Wire is a lesser evil of the two, but none of them are ideal. I am not sure what made you believe that I pretended e-mail is secure. I said Wire requires an e-mail address (to use), while Signal requires a phone number. No way I was ever trying to imply that e-mail is secure, because it is certainly not.
- tptacek 7y agoIt's possible we just don't have a disagreement. As long as we're not recommending encrypted email, acknowledge that email is a form of messaging, and that messaging demands a particular kind of cryptography (one not present in PGP), we could just be on the same page. I think that you'll find that among the "secure" messengers, all of the reasonable ones use a variant of Signal's constructions --- which is why Moxie and Trevor won the Levchin RWC prize for it --- boiling down to the "Axolotl" double ratchet over curves and AEAD ciphers. I endorse Signal, but when I say "secure messengers that use the Signal protocol", it's that broader cryptographic blueprint to which I refer, not the particular application. It's likely that within the next few years we'll have other reasonable blueprints from which to work; Facebook's cryptographers are hard at work on Message Layer Security, which is a group messaging construction quite different from Signal Protocol, but, again, purpose-built for messaging. For now, though, all the reasonable choices use Signal's underlying design.