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I challenge the assertion that something immaterial (other than information) is at play here. Consciousnesses as we experiment it is exactly what would appear

by Iv 7y ago

I challenge the assertion that something immaterial (other than information) is at play here. Consciousnesses as we experiment it is exactly what would appear if you were to instruct an intelligent system into thinking it had a subjective "I". My theory is that consciousness is what appears when your mind theories (your model of other people's mind) become elaborate enough that you need to embed in them a model of your own mind into the model of their mind (aka "how do they see me" ?). Once you reach that point, you have the ability of having a model of your own mind superimposed on your own perceptions. You also have your animal brain shouting to you that survival is essential and that you are unique (which are obvious beneficial traits to have) and lets your rational mind rationalize as it can. Consciousness is just the (limited) ability to introspect your thoughts and model an "I". There is nothing happening there that can't be explained through information processing.

pavas 7y ago
This article is talking about the question of consciousness as "experience" itself, not necessarily as the state of having some sort of intelligent subject (the "I"). You're very likely right that the functional characteristics of introspection and self-identification can be solved without anything "immaterial", but that still leaves open the question of how experience itself arises.
- Iv 7y ago
  Experience is even less mysterious than consciousness. A recording is experience. Information you recall and inspect is experience. Experience of consciousness is recollection of mental states.
  - pavas 7y ago
    I'm talking about experience as in "what it is like to be something"[1] which is different than learning or memory. [1] This is the most well known paper on this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_it_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_it_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F
    - Iv 7y ago
      Well, I am arguing that no, it is not. And I don't see what makes qualia mysterious and different from raw sensor values. "An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism". I would argue that something that has a memory that can contain representations of its own internal states exhibits conscious mental states.

by Iv 7y ago

pavas 7y ago

This article is talking about the question of consciousness as "experience" itself, not necessarily as the state of having some sort of intelligent subject (the "I"). You're very likely right that the functional characteristics of introspection and self-identification can be solved without anything "immaterial", but that still leaves open the question of how experience itself arises.

Iv 7y ago
Experience is even less mysterious than consciousness. A recording is experience. Information you recall and inspect is experience. Experience of consciousness is recollection of mental states.
- pavas 7y ago
  I'm talking about experience as in "what it is like to be something"[1] which is different than learning or memory. [1] This is the most well known paper on this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_it_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_it_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F
  - Iv 7y ago
    Well, I am arguing that no, it is not. And I don't see what makes qualia mysterious and different from raw sensor values. "An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism". I would argue that something that has a memory that can contain representations of its own internal states exhibits conscious mental states.