I think the problem is looked at in a confusing way. On one hand, we use a scientific/empiric analysis of the success of science to explain consciousness on the

I think the problem is looked at in a confusing way. On one hand, we use a scientific/empiric analysis of the success of science to explain consciousness on the other we are ready to admit science may not be able to explain it but we don't apply the same rigorous mechanism to test the non-scientific explanation of it. I also think we are not seeing the forest from the trees and are too hooked up to some kind of "magic explanation" of consciousness that is defined by having people explain their experience. I'm a strong proponent of the "what acts like a duck is a duck" principle. If in the future we manage to create machines which will be, for a very large statistical value, indistinguishable from a human in terms of behavior (that is, make the Turing test seem like a childish joke), is it fair then to say that those are just machines made to emulate our behavior and don't really reflect "real" consciousness? Why is it fair to define consciousness just as something that humans and personal human experience can decide? Yes, machines may never have human consciousness, but if for all intends and purposes they behave as having one, then they have one, in my opinion. Also, saying that humans are more than biochemical machines is the same like saying that my home gaming PC is more than wires and electrons. Yes, the experience enabled by the software running on those wires and electrons goes beyond just the physical support for it but that doesn't mean, that at the end of the day it isn't just wires and electrons.