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Science hasn't found or even begin to find a way to talk about this. It's not like a physicist looking at an amoeba. That's a very complicated physical system,
by paulddraper 7y ago
Science hasn't found or even begin to find a way to talk about this.
It's not like a physicist looking at an amoeba. That's a very complicated physical system, but it seems obvious that each of the parts can be progressively broken down into the fundamental physical forces and particles.
Consciousness....we can't even begin to talk about that in a fundamental physical way. The operation of the brain? Sure. But as far as we know, you could have an otherwise identical brain/computer firing circuits, producing actions, etc
without consciousness. Which gets to the heart of the issue: we have no way to observe consciousness outside our own.
- greiskul 7y ago> But as far as we know, you could have an otherwise identical brain/computer firing circuits, producing actions, etc without consciousness. We don't know that at all. Can you describe how that would be like? Would a person with no consciousness not talk about their own consciousness? But talking about the self is an action. It seems pretty clear that the reason brains talk about their consciousness is their consciousness.
- throwanem 7y agoNothing of the sort is clear. If you train a GPT-2 instance on a corpus of the philosophy of consciousness which has been rewritten into the first-person singular, and you then ask it a question which it answers with a discourse on "my consciousness", is it conscious? Your argument here says that it is. You're assuming without evidence that consciousness is, and is only, an epiphenomenon of a sufficiently complex neural net, which you are of course welcome to do. But attempting to cloak that assumption in positive language, as you do here and elsewhere, is a bit of linguistic chicanery that doesn't deserve to pass entirely without comment.
- greiskul 7y agoOk, so is there anything at all that a brain "with consciousness" can do that a brain "without consciousness" can't? If not, your definition of consciousness is entirely meaningless.
- paulddraper 7y agoThis is miserably unsatisfying, but like I stated previously, consciousness cannot be externally observed with any known method. > is there anything at all The "what can it do" refers entirely to an internal characteristic known only to itself (or at least not known to me). Is that then a meaningless concept? Perhaps. But in that case, I would suggest there simply isn't a "meaningful" definition of consciousness. It's just the Turning Test.
- Retra 7y agoConsciousness has been observed externally many times using a very well known method: a vast number of analogous reactions to a large variety of stimuli. This is the very reason we aren't all solipsists and believe in human consciousness in others. And that's all that any agreed upon measurements and observations have ever been. Just because you can't (yet) quantify it or model it formally doesn't mean you can't observe it.
- throwanem 7y agoCreatures which we’d all agree do not possess consciousness also display “a vast number of analogous reactions to a large variety of stimuli”. What do you imagine it proves about consciousness that we do, too?
- Retra 7y agoI was being succinct. It is not the quantity of reactions that is important, but the type and nature. The quantity is simply what makes it a reliable measure.
- throwanem 7y agoThe type and nature don’t seem like mattering, either. How does external observation of behavior shed any light on a phenomenon only perceptible through internal experience? Can you cite a source for this argument? I’d be interested in better understanding it, but your presentation of it has thus far not aided this goal.