3 ms·

It doesn't matter if the apps try to be secure. If any point in the communication holds the key-data in memory and is not on a //user// trusted device then the

It doesn't matter if the apps try to be secure. If any point in the communication holds the key-data in memory and is not on a //user// trusted device then the key is compromised. Since cellphones have a BMC that isn't user owned, which does have access to the full system memory (rather than being an isolated peripheral modem), and since OTA firmware updates can be pushed by the "infrastructure" (including fake 'towers' setup by TLAs, criminal hackers of other sorts, and hobbyists) containing code to compromise and silently ex-filtrate any data (including those keys, or even just the conversation directly); it is an inherently insecure environment.

passivepinetree 7y ago
What should the average security-conscious person do then? Resort to one-time pads? Is there any way to be truly secure, or should we just stop trying?
- mjevans 7y ago
  If we want secure tools for democracy then that's going to mean a completely open and thus verifiable (audit-able) platform. This needs to be from the PCB traces, all of the component tolerances, all of the chips, all of the firmware (even the ROMs that are actually baked in ROMs on the chips), the bootloader, OS, and entire userland. This is required not just for the host system but also the human interfaces and peripherals. I hope we will be able to reach that point with a RISKV system at some point; but the various proprietary interfaces that require licences for implementation/etc might make this problematic. I am for standards, preferably completely free, but FRAND and non-restrictive on meeting the above goals might be good enough. The platform has to be fully open-book, but some of that book can be covered by reproduction limitations for a limited time. (I'd prefer standard patent duration at most, as this stuff NEEDS to become the digital version of paper at some point; and within my lifetime would be nice.)

passivepinetree 7y ago

What should the average security-conscious person do then? Resort to one-time pads? Is there any way to be truly secure, or should we just stop trying?

mjevans 7y ago
If we want secure tools for democracy then that's going to mean a completely open and thus verifiable (audit-able) platform. This needs to be from the PCB traces, all of the component tolerances, all of the chips, all of the firmware (even the ROMs that are actually baked in ROMs on the chips), the bootloader, OS, and entire userland. This is required not just for the host system but also the human interfaces and peripherals. I hope we will be able to reach that point with a RISKV system at some point; but the various proprietary interfaces that require licences for implementation/etc might make this problematic. I am for standards, preferably completely free, but FRAND and non-restrictive on meeting the above goals might be good enough. The platform has to be fully open-book, but some of that book can be covered by reproduction limitations for a limited time. (I'd prefer standard patent duration at most, as this stuff NEEDS to become the digital version of paper at some point; and within my lifetime would be nice.)