5 ms·

Is there somewhere I could read some more on this point? I was under the impression that iMessage was end-end encrypted. So unless Apple has a secret backdoor

by rank0 7y ago

Is there somewhere I could read some more on this point? I was under the impression that iMessage was end-end encrypted. So unless Apple has a secret backdoor built into their systems, nobody should be able to access those messages correct? Wireless carriers are just sending my encrypted messages over their networks. What am I missing? Do you believe my cell service provider could decrypt my HTTPS connections to my bank?

robdachshund 7y ago
Why bother trying to break encryption when you have backdoors in the hardware and OS? It's far easier to just use a keylogger on your OS keyboard, take a screenshot, access RAM buffers, etc.
vermilingua 7y ago
I think the point is that the govt can sidestep https by just going to the bank; as they can to most services.
mjevans 7y ago
It doesn't matter if the apps try to be secure. If any point in the communication holds the key-data in memory and is not on a //user// trusted device then the key is compromised. Since cellphones have a BMC that isn't user owned, which does have access to the full system memory (rather than being an isolated peripheral modem), and since OTA firmware updates can be pushed by the "infrastructure" (including fake 'towers' setup by TLAs, criminal hackers of other sorts, and hobbyists) containing code to compromise and silently ex-filtrate any data (including those keys, or even just the conversation directly); it is an inherently insecure environment.
- passivepinetree 7y ago
  What should the average security-conscious person do then? Resort to one-time pads? Is there any way to be truly secure, or should we just stop trying?
  - mjevans 7y ago
    If we want secure tools for democracy then that's going to mean a completely open and thus verifiable (audit-able) platform. This needs to be from the PCB traces, all of the component tolerances, all of the chips, all of the firmware (even the ROMs that are actually baked in ROMs on the chips), the bootloader, OS, and entire userland. This is required not just for the host system but also the human interfaces and peripherals. I hope we will be able to reach that point with a RISKV system at some point; but the various proprietary interfaces that require licences for implementation/etc might make this problematic. I am for standards, preferably completely free, but FRAND and non-restrictive on meeting the above goals might be good enough. The platform has to be fully open-book, but some of that book can be covered by reproduction limitations for a limited time. (I'd prefer standard patent duration at most, as this stuff NEEDS to become the digital version of paper at some point; and within my lifetime would be nice.)
tfha 7y ago
Apple showed that they are capable and willing to perform silent over the air updates to operating systems to address security concerns. The specific incident I am referring to is with Zoom. If you can read your message history from an iPhone, Apple is just one silent update away from reading it as well.
ChrisCinelli 7y ago
Not sure why this comment by robdachshund is dead: "Why bother trying to break encryption when you have backdoors in the hardware and OS? It's far easier to just use a keylogger on your OS keyboard, take a screenshot, access RAM buffers, etc." To answer to that. Maybe the problem is in those hardwares and operating systems that do not have backdoors?
aaron_m04 7y ago
You're missing that Apple has the ability to put backdoors in kernel updates, and these can reach right into process memory and get your unencrypted messages.
ender89 7y ago
I'm pretty sure he's just referring to the fact that if someone can push an ota update and you have something like iMessage that has encryption keys on the device, there's nothing stopping a company from pushing an update out that compromises your security. End to end isn't compromised, it's potentially compromised. Smartphones are the schrodinger's cat of security because while they're considered "secure" right now, they could be blown wide open via automatic update any second. Telegram is encrypted end-to-end, but if you have automatic updates on, there's nothing from stopping the developer or rogue actors (or states, like russia) from pushing an update out that uploads all of the encryption keys to their servers and decrypts everyone's messages. Automatic updates are fundamentally insecure because they can instantly compromise your security. If you want true security, go with open source and review (or wait for reviews) of all code changes that happen in the apps you use, and you want a distro that either doesn't have an os ota system or allows you to disable it. Also, there is potential for baseband attacks because we're all at the mercy of telecoms and no one runs custom firmware or opensource code on their baseband processor so who knows what vulnerabilities lie there.

by rank0 7y ago

robdachshund 7y ago

Why bother trying to break encryption when you have backdoors in the hardware and OS? It's far easier to just use a keylogger on your OS keyboard, take a screenshot, access RAM buffers, etc.

vermilingua 7y ago

I think the point is that the govt can sidestep https by just going to the bank; as they can to most services.

mjevans 7y ago

It doesn't matter if the apps try to be secure. If any point in the communication holds the key-data in memory and is not on a //user// trusted device then the key is compromised. Since cellphones have a BMC that isn't user owned, which does have access to the full system memory (rather than being an isolated peripheral modem), and since OTA firmware updates can be pushed by the "infrastructure" (including fake 'towers' setup by TLAs, criminal hackers of other sorts, and hobbyists) containing code to compromise and silently ex-filtrate any data (including those keys, or even just the conversation directly); it is an inherently insecure environment.

passivepinetree 7y ago
What should the average security-conscious person do then? Resort to one-time pads? Is there any way to be truly secure, or should we just stop trying?
- mjevans 7y ago
  If we want secure tools for democracy then that's going to mean a completely open and thus verifiable (audit-able) platform. This needs to be from the PCB traces, all of the component tolerances, all of the chips, all of the firmware (even the ROMs that are actually baked in ROMs on the chips), the bootloader, OS, and entire userland. This is required not just for the host system but also the human interfaces and peripherals. I hope we will be able to reach that point with a RISKV system at some point; but the various proprietary interfaces that require licences for implementation/etc might make this problematic. I am for standards, preferably completely free, but FRAND and non-restrictive on meeting the above goals might be good enough. The platform has to be fully open-book, but some of that book can be covered by reproduction limitations for a limited time. (I'd prefer standard patent duration at most, as this stuff NEEDS to become the digital version of paper at some point; and within my lifetime would be nice.)

tfha 7y ago

Apple showed that they are capable and willing to perform silent over the air updates to operating systems to address security concerns. The specific incident I am referring to is with Zoom. If you can read your message history from an iPhone, Apple is just one silent update away from reading it as well.

ChrisCinelli 7y ago

Not sure why this comment by robdachshund is dead: "Why bother trying to break encryption when you have backdoors in the hardware and OS? It's far easier to just use a keylogger on your OS keyboard, take a screenshot, access RAM buffers, etc." To answer to that. Maybe the problem is in those hardwares and operating systems that do not have backdoors?

aaron_m04 7y ago

You're missing that Apple has the ability to put backdoors in kernel updates, and these can reach right into process memory and get your unencrypted messages.

ender89 7y ago

I'm pretty sure he's just referring to the fact that if someone can push an ota update and you have something like iMessage that has encryption keys on the device, there's nothing stopping a company from pushing an update out that compromises your security. End to end isn't compromised, it's potentially compromised. Smartphones are the schrodinger's cat of security because while they're considered "secure" right now, they could be blown wide open via automatic update any second. Telegram is encrypted end-to-end, but if you have automatic updates on, there's nothing from stopping the developer or rogue actors (or states, like russia) from pushing an update out that uploads all of the encryption keys to their servers and decrypts everyone's messages. Automatic updates are fundamentally insecure because they can instantly compromise your security. If you want true security, go with open source and review (or wait for reviews) of all code changes that happen in the apps you use, and you want a distro that either doesn't have an os ota system or allows you to disable it. Also, there is potential for baseband attacks because we're all at the mercy of telecoms and no one runs custom firmware or opensource code on their baseband processor so who knows what vulnerabilities lie there.