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Thanks for that. From my own experience, service mode on a lot of embedded devices typically exposes some diagnostics maybe let's you load some things you cou

Thanks for that. From my own experience, service mode on a lot of embedded devices typically exposes some diagnostics maybe let's you load some things you couldn't otherwise load, I assume it's the same on the PS3. I also assume this doesn't compromise Sony's ability to sign software or allow third parties to sign software, however in service mode you might not need "signed" software. Heck, there are off the shelf solutions for this stuff, there are chips you can load a set of keys in to at manufacturing time and they contain all the crypto in the chip such that there is close to no way it could "leak" out. I'd assume IBM, Toshiba and Sony would use something like that and if they properly generate keys the only real way the "master key" could escape would be a rogue employee leaking it. They knew people would attack the platform.

bennysaurus 16y ago
No worries. Yep you're spot-on in this case, and as you say the software signing keys hasn't been compromised, though they aren't needed in service mode. There are definitely ways the dongle keys could have been better protected (and I'm sure a few people are having some very serious talks about why they weren't), but have to give Sony kudos for having a system last 3 years without being compromised, and even now it's only easily broken at ring 2; the gameOS level of the system.
- daeken 16y ago
  It's simple to protect the dongle keys better: sign the dongle ID. In this way, only the public key exists on the PS3, and the system is secure (if implemented properly). As it stands, their system is equivalent to having both the public and private key sitting on the PS3. No matter how well you protect this key, the system is still broken in theory.
  - bennysaurus 16y ago
    Agreed with the way it could be done better though they didn't actually have the private key on the system. They really badly implemented their crypto so they might as well have though.
    - daeken 16y ago
      I'm referring purely to the dongle attack. When you use an HMAC in that way, your secret is your "private" key. It also just happens to be the "public" key as well. That's why it's a terrible design.

bennysaurus 16y ago

No worries. Yep you're spot-on in this case, and as you say the software signing keys hasn't been compromised, though they aren't needed in service mode. There are definitely ways the dongle keys could have been better protected (and I'm sure a few people are having some very serious talks about why they weren't), but have to give Sony kudos for having a system last 3 years without being compromised, and even now it's only easily broken at ring 2; the gameOS level of the system.

daeken 16y ago
It's simple to protect the dongle keys better: sign the dongle ID. In this way, only the public key exists on the PS3, and the system is secure (if implemented properly). As it stands, their system is equivalent to having both the public and private key sitting on the PS3. No matter how well you protect this key, the system is still broken in theory.
- bennysaurus 16y ago
  Agreed with the way it could be done better though they didn't actually have the private key on the system. They really badly implemented their crypto so they might as well have though.
  - daeken 16y ago
    I'm referring purely to the dongle attack. When you use an HMAC in that way, your secret is your "private" key. It also just happens to be the "public" key as well. That's why it's a terrible design.