> I understand that because of this, browsers are moving towards running untrusted JavaScript code in separate processes, so that confidentiality is provided by

> I understand that because of this, browsers are moving towards running untrusted JavaScript code in separate processes, so that confidentiality is provided by process boundaries. Google was moving on that feature before Spectre. Confidentiality is a rather strong word here. Web pages literally include random 3rd party code to run within the same process and that isolation on top of process boundaries doesn't address that, it's only addressing some hypothetical threat of a tab or a child frame stealing data and I'm not sure whether they even isolate child frames (EDIT: they try). A tab stealing data is too remote of a possibility if at all practical and 3rd party child frames are usually created by 3rd party javascript already running within process boundaries, so no confidentiality there. It's possible that some 3rd parties may want to sandbox the code they let other 3rd parties run in your browser, but that does nothing to guarantee any confidentiality. It's not that bad for newly designed languages or for languages willing to break compatibility. There are multiple approaches that can be used to protect from Spectre within the same process, plenty of ideas floating around.