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What exactly does that 96% mean, though? It means that on some fixed dataset you're achieving 96% accuracy. I'm baffled by this stupidity of claiming results (e
by Alas1 7y ago
What exactly does that 96% mean, though? It means that on some fixed dataset you're achieving 96% accuracy. I'm baffled by this stupidity of claiming results (even high-profile researchers do this) based on datasets with models that are nowhere near as robust as the actual intelligence that we take as reference: humans. Take the model that makes you think "sentiment analysis is at 96%", come up with your own examples to apply a narrow Turing test to the model, and see if you still think sentiment analysis (or any NLP task) is anywhere near being solved. Also see: [1].
I think continual Turing testing is the only way of concluding whether an agent exhibits intelligence or not. Consider the philosophical problem of the existence of other minds. We believe other humans are intelligent because they consistently show intelligent behavior. Things that people claim to be examples of AI right now lack this consistency (possibly excluding a few very specific examples such as AlphaZero). It is quite annoying to see all these senior researchers along with graduate students spend so much time pushing numbers on those datasets without paying enough attention to the fact that pushing numbers is all they are doing.
[1]: As a concrete example, consider the textual entailment (TE) task. In the deep learning era of TE there are two commonly used datasets on which the current state-of-the-art has been claimed to be near or exceeding human performance. What these models are performing seemingly exceptionally well is not the general task of TE, it is the task of TE evaluated on these fixed datasets. A recent paper by McCoy, Pavlick, and Linzen (https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.01007 https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.01007) shows how brittle these systems are that at this point the only sensible response to those insistent on claiming we are nearing human performance in AI is to laugh.
- Veedrac 7y ago> I think continual Turing testing is the only way of concluding whether an agent exhibits intelligence or not. So you think it's impossible to ever determine that a chimpanzee, or even a feral child, exhibits intelligence? This seems rather defeatist.
- Alas1 7y agoNo, interpreting "continual" the way you did would mean I should believe that we can't conclude our friends to be intelligent either (I don't believe that). Maybe I should've said "prolonged" rather than "continual". Let me elaborate on my previous point with an example. If you look at the recent works in machine translation, you can see that the commonly used evaluation metric of BLEU is being improved upon at least every few months. What I argue is that it's stupid to look at this trend and conclude that soon we will reach human performance in machine translation. Even when comparing against the translation quality of humans (judged again by BLEU on a fixed evaluation set) and showing that we can achieve higher BLEU than humans is not enough evidence. Because you also have Google Translate (let's say it represents the state-of-the-art), and you can easily get it to make mistakes that humans would never do. I consider our prolonged interaction with Google Translate to be a narrow Turing test that we continually apply to it. A major issue in research is that, at least in supervised learning, we're evaluating on datasets that are not different enough from the training sets. Another subtle point is that we have strong priors about the intelligence of biological beings. I don't feel the need to Turing test every single human I meet to determine whether they are intelligent, it's a safe bet at this point to just assume that they are. The output of a machine learning algorithm, on the other hand, is wildly unstable with respect to its input, and we have no solid evidence to assume that it exhibits consistent intelligent behavior and often it is easy to show that it doesn't. I don't believe that research in AI is worthless, but I think it's not wise to keep digging in the same direction that we've been moving in for the past few years. With deep learning, while accuracies and metrics are pushed further than before, I don't think we're significantly closer to general, human-like AI. In fact, I personally consider only AlphaZero to be an unambiguous win for this era of AI research, and it's not even clear whether it should be called AI or not.
- Veedrac 7y agoMy comment was not on ‘continual’ but on ‘Turing test’. If you gave 100 chimps of the highest calibre 100 attempts each, not a single one would pass a single Turing test. Ask a feral child to translate even the most basic children's book, and their mistakes will be so systematic that Google Translate will look like professional discourse. ‘Humanlike mistakes’ and stability with respect to input in the sense you mean here are harder problems than intelligence, because a chimp is intelligent and functionally incapable of juggling more than the most primitive syntaxes in a restricted set of forms. I agree it is foolish to just draw a trend line through a single weak measure and extrapolate to infinity, but the idea that no collation of weak measures has any bearing on fact rules out ever measuring weak or untrained intelligence. That is what I called defeatist.
- Alas1 7y agoI see your point, but you're simply contesting the definition of intelligence that I assumed we were operating with, which is humanlike intelligence. Regardless of its extent, I think we would agree that intelligent behavior is consistent. My main point is that the current way we evaluate the artificial agents is not emphasizing their inconsistency. Wikipedia defines Turing test as "a test of a machine's ability to exhibit intelligent behaviour equivalent to, or indistinguishable from, that of a human". If we want to consider chimps intelligent, then in that context the definition of the Turing test should be adjusted accordingly. My point still stands: if we want to determine whether a chimp exhibits intelligence comparable to a human, we do the original Turing test. If we want to determine whether a chimp exhibits chimplike intelligence, we test not for, say, natural language but for whatever we want our definition of intelligence to include. If we want to determine whether an artificial agent has chimplike intelligence, we do the second Turing test. Unless the agent can display as consistent an intelligence as chimps, we shouldn't conclude that it's intelligent. Regarding your point on weak measures: If I can find an endless stream of cases of failure with respect to a measure that we care about improving, then whatever collation of weak measures we had should be null. Wouldn't you agree? I'm not against using weak measures to detect intelligence, but only as long as it's not trivial to generate failures. If a chimp displays an ability for abstract reasoning when I'm observing it in a cage but suddenly loses this ability once set free in a forest, it's not intelligent.