3 ms·
The best place to find the answer to this question that I know of it David Z. Albert's excellent book, "Quantum Mechanics and Experience." But the short answer
by lisper 7y ago
The best place to find the answer to this question that I know of it David Z. Albert's excellent book, "Quantum Mechanics and Experience." But the short answer to your question is that Bohmian mechanics has two problems:
1. In order to account for the outcome of Bell-type experiments on entangled particles it has to assign a temporal ordering to space-like separated events. The technical term for this is that you have to choose a "preferred foliation of space-time". There has to be a preferred reference frame. But you can never actually know what the preferred reference frame actually is.
2. Yes, particles "have positions", but you can never actually know what those position are (which is why I put "have positions" in scare quotes). This is where all the quantum randomness hides in Bohmian mechanics. It's all "pre-computed" in the infinite precision of a particle's position, but that position is necessarily hidden from observation. I call this an IPU, an Invisible Pink Unicorn. It's exactly the same thing as universe-weights in MWI -- a set of numbers that are part of the theory but rendered immune from observation not by practical limitations on technology, but by the theory itself.
This is the fundamental problem with all attempts to make quantum mechanics look deterministic. The simple fact of the matter is that it's not deterministic, so any attempt to make it look deterministic that makes the same predictions as QM has to hide the randomness somewhere. Bohm hides it in particle positions, and MWI hides it in universe weights. But it doesn't matter what you call the place in the theory where you've hidden the randomness. What matters is that there is a place in the theory where you've hidden the randomness, where it must forever remain hidden from the prying eyes of experiment. So the claims that both Bohm and MWI make of being deterministic are misleading at best.
- hackinthebochs 7y ago>but that position is necessarily hidden from observation. I call this an IPU, an Invisible Pink Unicorn. But why expect that all state of the universe be open to observation? This seems counter-intuitive to me. It seems far more reasonable that there necessarily are facts about an implementation that no supervening system can determine from within that system. For example, there are facts about a physical computer that no software running on that computer could deduce. So the fact that a QM theory posits state that is in principle off-limits to observation doesn't seem like a reductio, but the expected case.
- lisper 7y agoThat's a good point, but remember, this is about rhetoric, not physics. The question is not whether hidden state exists (it clearly does) but what kind of story you want to tell about it. If you find it enlightening to think about hidden state as position, and you don't mind accepting all of the difficulties that entails (like having to choose a preferred foliation), then by all means go for it. But that is very different from saying that this story is actually true. The only reason to prefer Bohm over a similar story that ascribes the randomness to a literal invisible pink unicorn making decisions about experimental outcomes is aesthetics.
- jostylr 7y agoWhat EPR and Bell's arguments showed is that if you have definite results of experiments at the space-time locations where/when we think the results happened, then there has to be something non-local going on and a foliation is the simplest way to orchestrate that. So either give up a certain kind of definiteness (MW) or introduce a foliation (BM). A foliation is somewhat unpleasant, but there are ways to tease them out of the existing structures of relativity + wave function [0]. As for determinism, that is not the main point for many proponents of BM. Rather, it was about having a clear theory. Let's start at the beginning. We decide to have a theory about particles. What does that mean? Well, there is some stuff with positions and those positions change in time. And that's what BM gives. It explains, immediately, why a wave function is on a configuration space of particles. Having this leads to a variety of important notions. For example, having a position leads to clarity on identical particles, namely, use a space without labels on the particles and the wave functions just work out[1] (disclaimer: I am an author on that one and did part of my PhD thesis on that [4]; my thesis also derives spin as well as the Dirac equation from a Bohmian perspective). Another example is QFT and divergences. From a Bohmian perspective, QFT is best thought of as about wave functions over a configuration space consisting of different disjoint sectors involving different number of particles. To do this, there is a random jump process created (not deterministic!). Thinking about wave functions that work with that, one is led to wave functions where the probability moves from one sector to another appropriately based on this jumping. And that solves, at least in some simple cases, the UV divergence of QFT.[2] The randomness of BM is actually quite interesting. It is all about the Quantum Equilibrium Hypothesis, something which is justified in similar ways to thermodynamics kinds of arguments. In fact, it makes it clear that what is interesting is not why we can't know some things, but why we can know stuff at all. [3] Also, in case you have not seen it, you might want to take a look at a version of MW by some of the Bohmians behind the papers.[4] As with most things, there is a lot of clarity in their perspective. Finally, as for why BM is not more popular, well, let's just say it is rather hard to stay in academia as a Bohmian. I barely tried, largely because academia is unpleasant for a variety of other reasons, but it simply is very hard to get hired when working on unfashionable material. Grants and all that. This is on top of the problem of getting people to change some fundamentally long held beliefs. This goes hand in hand with the fact that standard QM is the thermodynamics version of BM and so QM agrees with BM empirically to the extent that QM makes predictions. That is to say, BM provides the rigorous foundation for the collapse rules. [0]: Can Bohmian Mechanics be Made Relativistic? http://arxiv.org/pdf/1307.1714 http://arxiv.org/pdf/1307.1714 [1]: Fermionic Wavefunctions on Unordered Configuration Space. http://arxiv.org/pdf/1403.3705 http://arxiv.org/pdf/1403.3705 [2]: Bohmian Trajectories for Hamiltonians with Interior–Boundary Conditions. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.10235.pdf https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.10235.pdf [3]: Quantum Equilibrium and the Origin of Absolute Uncertainty. http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0308039 http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0308039 [4]: Many Worlds and Schrodinger's First Quantum Theory. http://arxiv.org/pdf/0903.22111 http://arxiv.org/pdf/0903.22111 [5]: Connections with Bohmian Mechanics. http://jostylr.com/thesis.pdf http://jostylr.com/thesis.pdf