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> I think a perhaps unclear part of the recent post "The PGP Problem" is that PGP is bad for email. If you don't use it for email, I don't see it as really a pr
> I think a perhaps unclear part of the recent post "The PGP Problem" is that PGP is bad for email. If you don't use it for email, I don't see it as really a problem.
You're apparently asserting that Latacora's "The PGP Problem" states PGP is only bad for email. I can only assume you didn't even bother the article? Because it states that PGP is bad:
* period and in its entirety, in fact most of the article (section 1 "The Problems") is the various ways PGP and GnuPG are broken at the core, specific scenarios are only mentioned (in section 2 "The Answers") to provide alternatives, because Latacora's assertion is that in cryptography one size does not fit all, and each scenario needs its own toolset
* for securing messenging
* for securing email messages
* for signing files and packages
* for encrypting files, whether to send, backups, application data, …
What it does state with respect to email is that encrypting emails is a fool's errand not just that using PGP to do so is a mistake. It does note that GnuPG is also specifically bad at it, but very clearly state the issue is not limited to PGP:
> This isn’t going to get fixed. To make actually-secure email, you’d have to tunnel another protocol over email (you’d still be conceding traffic analysis attacks). At that point, why bother pretending?
> Encrypting email is asking for a calamity. Recommending email encryption to at-risk users is malpractice.
So what's the alternative, for asymmetrically encrypting arbitrary binary data?
For sending such data to others, the Latacora article suggest a tool that I've never heard of or heard recommended by other experts called "Magic Wormhole". It's a new tool that (from what I call tell) has a whole crapload of limitations and assumptions that PGP does not have: https://magic-wormhole.readthedocs.io/en/latest/welcome.html#design https://magic-wormhole.readthedocs.io/en/latest/welcome.html...
One of the most severe is that it apparently requires both ends to have active internet connections to transfer the data over the wire between them. As I type this, I'm visiting my parents who have 5 Mbps internet. Let's hope that file isn't big or my contact has the time and patience to wait if it is! The other is that it apparently relies on a shared password, which just takes us back to encryption before the very problem PGP was designed to solve...
For simply "encrypting files", even Latacora gives up and says "use PGP"!!
As a side note, though I agree with them that PGP is not good for secure messaging, I don't find their alternatives convincing there either. Signal and Wire don't have solid group chat capabilities that don't rely on a single central server run by a third party and don't require private information like a phone number to use. I consider that absolutely basic for a good messenger. At least PGP, though very faulty in this area, is designed to be used over existing protocols like email to make them secure, so it doesn't have the last two limitations.
Wormhole isn't new, and if you haven't heard another "expert" recommend it, you don't hang out with a lot of cryptography engineers.
The point about "simply encrypting files" is that nobody is implementing something with PGP's "encrypt-a-file" interface because it's not that useful; rather, people purposefully design modern systems with cryptography tailored to tasks, like messaging or file transfer or backup.
Your last point about PGP vs. Signal is pretty funny, as it implies that PGP has "solid group chat capabilities".
> Wormhole isn't new, and if you haven't heard another "expert" recommend it, you don't hang out with a lot of cryptography engineers.
You're right, I don't. But the earliest thing I found about Wormhole after a quick look was from 2015, which I think is pretty recent in the crypto world. Maybe I missed something.
> Your last point about PGP vs. Signal is pretty funny, as it implies that PGP has "solid group chat capabilities".
I tried to be clear about the fact that I wasn't saying that. Its benefits over Signal and Wire (but not Matrix) are that it doesn't require a central server and doesn't require any PII to sign up. I consider those crucial for anyone who has extreme security / privacy needs. PGP completely sucks for group messaging, I agree. But the alternatives suggested are simply non-starters for many use cases.
Look, my point is this: If I open my text editor and type some text, save the file and sign it with GPG with my private key to prove authorship, then I don't see how you are going to break this. In that specific sense GPG is not broken.
There are countless online puzzles or cryptography use cases based on this. I am asserting that since GPG is not broken in this specific sense, you can't just say GPG is broken "in its entirety".
I'll tell you what I don't understand. I don't expect random engineers on HN to be especially crypto-literate, nor should they be: it's a super-specialized field that demands a lot of spare storage capacity in your brain, and a lot of us had enough algebra after Algebra II in 10th grade. Engineers who specialize have a whole huge variety of things to pick: machine learning, distributed systems, optimization, network algorithmics, graphics, systems security, you name it. There's no reason a significant number of people here should have to know what Noise or SPAKE2 is.
What's weird is: if you don't know what any of this stuff is, why would you feel the need to express strong opinions about it? Is it really your belief that intuition and a drive-by reading of some slides on Github page can bring you up to speed with the field? I read every "Call Me Maybe" post and I absolutely do not think I'd have a chance in hell at getting a distributed commit protocol right. Hell: I "specialize" in cryptography and feel the same way about crypto protocols!
My thoughts about Signal and Wire are that I did a good job of relating in the post you're talking about what I think about Signal and Wire.
I'm not sure what this is in response to, actually. I'm not expressing any particular opinion about cryptography. I have no opinions and I defer to experts. One thing that I have heard experts say is that we should be very hesitant to use new protocols and software in areas in which a maximum of security is needed.
So I have no opinion of Wormhole, other than to say that (1) it is new, and experts I have listened to in the past say to be wary of new approaches, and (2) it (according to its own documentation) has some rather extreme limitations that make it arguably not a good fit as a general purpose solution to encrypted file transfer.
> My thoughts about Signal and Wire are that I did a good job of relating in the post you're talking about what I think about Signal and Wire.
As I don't think I have referred to any post by you, I don't know what you think about those solutions. If you are referring to the Latacora article (I think you wrote it, but I'm not sure because it doesn't specify its authors), it says (IMO) very little about the merits of Signal and Wire compared to other systems, and nothing at all about the specific criticisms I made in my comment you originally replied to.
I'm sorry for being snippy this morning. Read the /r/linux response to the PGP post to get an idea of what my baseline assumptions are about technologist disengaged with cryptography who have strong opinions about which cryptosystems people should use. But I shouldn't be projecting that on random people on HN, and I apologize for doing that to you.
My take is this (unless otherwise stated, "you" is the rhetorical "you", not you specifically):
1. PGP is bad and should be disfavored. Moreover, for some of its use cases, most especially "secure email", PGP flat-out doesn't work, and people need to be warned away from it. Most users will never see this HN thread and are getting their advice third- or fourth-hand. It's important that the "source" node for game-of-telephone graph have clear, sound advice. "Stop using PGP ASAP" is the most responsible advice I can offer.
2. The mainstream modern secure messengers are better than anything else technologists have provided to end users. If you're protecting serious things --- and the PGP team certainly claims to be doing that, so when you dip into conversations about PGP and its alternatives, you need to keep in mind that you're dipping into a game of telephone that ends with dissidents in countries like Venezuela where there are death squads --- Signal or something like it is the best you're going to do. You can be annoyed by this, and you're entitled to your opinion, but not to your own facts.
3. Nerds (I am one of those, btw) generally want something that (1) doesn't bootstrap off phone numbers and (2) lets people run their own servers. My interest in strong privacy engineering means, frankly, I don't give a shit about federation. I'm convinced that Moxie is right: federation means lowest-common-denominator protections; see Matrix, which has for years now been operating a network of off-by-default opt-in-only poorly-supported end-to-end encryption while at the same time being a darling of message board nerds. You don't have to disavow Matrix to be serious about security and privacy; I wish the project the best, too. But you can't be recommending it to immigration lawyers and foreign activists and demand to be taken seriously about security/privacy engineering (you didn't do that, but the modal "lol signal" nerd does), and I will strike down with great vengeance and furious anger anyone who tries to interpose themselves as an authoritative "source" of cryptographic advice and broadcasts to the world that Matrix is a reasonable option for those people.
4. I'm not a cryptographer, but one of my partners is, and I am myself a cryptographic vulnerability researcher (I'm comfortable assessing and breaking systems but wouldn't ask anyone to sign off on a system I designed). I feel pretty reasonably engaged with the cryptographic engineering community, which is extremely distinct from "people with strong opinions and affiliations with one or more well-known open source crypto-adjacent projects". It is "challenging" for me to hear things like (paraphrasing) "the experts I pay attention to say that you should wait a decade before using new cryptography". There is no such rule and, really, no way to escape the fact that if you're going to evaluate cryptosystems, you either need to develop the domain knowledge to do so based on intrinsic arguments, or enough domain knowledge to know whose recommendations are credible.
So my take is: I think you would have trouble coming up with a cryptography domain expert who will tell you our recommendations are "bad" (and, in fairness, one of the reasons that's the case is that our recommendations are vetted). Wormhole is fine --- pretty great, in fact. Be happy there's a system you can realistically use; it's good news. Ordinary people, like immigration lawyers, can't yet realistically use it, because it's a command line tool. I think that's going to change this year, but in the meantime, Signal does file transfers more safely than PGP does, so they should use that. Meanwhile, nerds like us can send files to people without keyservers and without giving up phone numbers. Or, if you don't have, like, access to the Internet, you can do something else.