3 ms·
> Isn't that the user's and the SSH devs' problem? Per some of the comments in the Debian bug(s): if you tell users and devs simply "you deal with it", you wil
by throw0101a 7y ago
> Isn't that the user's and the SSH devs' problem?
Per some of the comments in the Debian bug(s): if you tell users and devs simply "you deal with it", you will get a multitude of ad hoc, half-baked solutions that may nor may not be secure. You will have dozens of people trying to re-invent the wheel.
The whole point of things like /dev/urandom and getentropy() is that the problem is solved once properly, and then you allow everyone to benefit. By having the above solutions not-work, we are basically going back to the days of where they did not exist--in which case what was the point of creating them?
The BSDs seem to not have a problem with this, so I have no idea why the Linux folks can't seem to get their act together.
> Key generation is already slow anyway.
Define "slow". Key generation was slow in the early 1990s when I first started using PGP (nee GPG) back in the day. It is generally not-slow nowadays IMHO--as in, it takes less than ten minutes to find p and q for RSA 1024 (nevermind 2048+).