3 ms·

All this is literally just concern for the first ~minute or two of the very first boot after disk cloning? It should be irrelevant for subsequent boots once the

All this is literally just concern for the first ~minute or two of the very first boot after disk cloning? It should be irrelevant for subsequent boots once they reseed on the next boot... hardly seems like such a huge deal.

throw0101a 7y ago
Except that SSH keys are often generated on first boot, so there's the risk that they're all the same--unless you put some code in your deployment recipes to regenerate them.
- mehrdadn 7y ago
  Isn't that the user's and the SSH devs' problem? SSH can just wait for new randomness if it sees that as a risk when generating keys. Key generation is already slow anyway. Why is systemd trying so hard to "fix" a problem that might by some chance come up in SSH during the first minute of the the first boot after an improper disk clone? Especially with the currently proposed solutions it seems like such a crazy way to attack somebody else's problem...
  - throw0101a 7y ago
    > Isn't that the user's and the SSH devs' problem? Per some of the comments in the Debian bug(s): if you tell users and devs simply "you deal with it", you will get a multitude of ad hoc, half-baked solutions that may nor may not be secure. You will have dozens of people trying to re-invent the wheel. The whole point of things like /dev/urandom and getentropy() is that the problem is solved once properly, and then you allow everyone to benefit. By having the above solutions not-work, we are basically going back to the days of where they did not exist--in which case what was the point of creating them? The BSDs seem to not have a problem with this, so I have no idea why the Linux folks can't seem to get their act together. > Key generation is already slow anyway. Define "slow". Key generation was slow in the early 1990s when I first started using PGP (nee GPG) back in the day. It is generally not-slow nowadays IMHO--as in, it takes less than ten minutes to find p and q for RSA 1024 (nevermind 2048+).

throw0101a 7y ago

Except that SSH keys are often generated on first boot, so there's the risk that they're all the same--unless you put some code in your deployment recipes to regenerate them.

mehrdadn 7y ago
Isn't that the user's and the SSH devs' problem? SSH can just wait for new randomness if it sees that as a risk when generating keys. Key generation is already slow anyway. Why is systemd trying so hard to "fix" a problem that might by some chance come up in SSH during the first minute of the the first boot after an improper disk clone? Especially with the currently proposed solutions it seems like such a crazy way to attack somebody else's problem...
- throw0101a 7y ago
  > Isn't that the user's and the SSH devs' problem? Per some of the comments in the Debian bug(s): if you tell users and devs simply "you deal with it", you will get a multitude of ad hoc, half-baked solutions that may nor may not be secure. You will have dozens of people trying to re-invent the wheel. The whole point of things like /dev/urandom and getentropy() is that the problem is solved once properly, and then you allow everyone to benefit. By having the above solutions not-work, we are basically going back to the days of where they did not exist--in which case what was the point of creating them? The BSDs seem to not have a problem with this, so I have no idea why the Linux folks can't seem to get their act together. > Key generation is already slow anyway. Define "slow". Key generation was slow in the early 1990s when I first started using PGP (nee GPG) back in the day. It is generally not-slow nowadays IMHO--as in, it takes less than ten minutes to find p and q for RSA 1024 (nevermind 2048+).