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There's a few places where this engages in goalpost shifting that seems less than helpful even though I end up agreeing with the general thrust. Let's focus on
by tialaramex 7y ago
There's a few places where this engages in goalpost shifting that seems less than helpful even though I end up agreeing with the general thrust. Let's focus on one:
> Put a Signal number on your security page to receive bug bounty reports, not a PGP key.
We can reasonably assume in 2019 that this "security page" is from an HTTPS web site, so it's reasonably safe against tampering, but a "Signal number" is just a phone number, something bad guys can definitely intercept if it's worth money to them, whereas a PGP key is just a public key and so you can't "intercept" it at all.
Now, Signal doesn't pretend this can't happen. It isn't a vulnerability in Signal, it's just a mistaken use case, this is not what Signal is for, go ask Moxie, "Hey Moxie, should I be giving out Signal numbers to secure tip-offs from random people so that nobody can intercept them?".
[ Somebody might think "Aha, they meant a _Safety number_ not a Signal number, that fixes everything right?". Bzzt. Signal's Safety Numbers are per-conversation, you can upload one to a web page if you want, and I can even think of really marginal scenarios where that's useful, but it doesn't provide a way to replace PGP's public keys ]
Somebody _could_ build a tool like Signal that had a persistent global public identity you can publish like a PGP key, but that is not what Signal is today.
- Leace 7y ago> persistent global public identity Certificate Transparency could be reused/abused to host it. If, for example, you issued a cert for name <key>.contact.example.com and the tooling would check CT logs this could be a very powerful directory of contacts. Using CT monitors you could see if/when someone tampers with your domain name contact keys. Mozilla is planning something similar for signing software: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Binary_Transparency https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Binary_Transparency
- Natanael_L 7y agoThis is basically the keybase.io log system. Although they too rely on PGP currently
- Leace 7y agoMinus the network of independent logs as from what I remember only keybase.io runs their own log system. Although they do timestamp their Merkle tree roots into Bitcoin.
- dunkelheit 7y ago> > Put a Signal number on your security page to receive bug bounty reports, not a PGP key. Does anyone actually do this? Even Signal developers themselves don't! (see https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007320791-How-can-I-report-a-security-vulnerability- https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007320791-Ho...). Instead there is a plain old email address where you are supposed to send your Signal number so that you can chat.
- aljungberg 7y agoIf the people from Signal start a conversation with you on the number you emailed, how do you know it’s actually them? Couldn’t it be a third party who intercepted your email? You need to check their “safety number”, and now we’re back to the same idea as with PGP with web of trust and key sharing parties. At some point you still need some kind of pub-key identity check if you don’t want to accidentally report your vulnerability to PRC instead.
- dunkelheit 7y agoRight, that's insecure. Maybe they should, you know, put a PGP key on their website? :)
- tptacek 7y agoWe manage bug bounties for a bunch of different startups, and I can count on zero fingers the number of times I've had to use PGP in the past year for that. In practice, people just send bugs with plain 'ol email.
- dunkelheit 7y agoSo even Latacora-advised startups use plain old email for bug bounties. Why then does the blog post recommend using Signal for that?
- tptacek 7y agoBecause Signal would be better than the PGP theater. In practice, though, it doesn't matter; people are just going to use plain old email no matter what. They're not going to encrypt their findings to you.
- connorlanigan 7y agoThe safety number is only partly per-conversation. If you compare safety numbers of different conversations, you'll discover that one half of them is always the same (which half that is changes depending on the conversation). This part is the fingerprint of your personal key. The Signal blog states that "we designed the safety number format to be a sorted concatenation of two 30-digit individual numeric fingerprints." [1] The way I understand it, you could simply share your part of the number on your website, but Moxie recommends against it, since this fingerprint changes between reinstalls. [1] https://signal.org/blog/safety-number-updates/ https://signal.org/blog/safety-number-updates/
- tialaramex 7y agoAh! Yes, I see. You'd need to figure out which is "your" half, which the application as it exists today doesn't help you to do since that's not what they're going for. The person initiating would need to send something to establish a conversation, like "Er, hi?" and then once that conversation exists they can verify the number shown on your web page matches half of the displayed safety number as expected and actually proceed. It's clunky, but less so than I feared. I can actually imagine a person doing this. I mean, they won't, but like PGP this is something a person _could_ do if they were motivated and competent.
- Natanael_L 7y agoKeybase.io supports this usecase