5 ms·
Forcing iMessage to open will immediately result in MITM iMessage proxies that users can use to store iMessages that are meant to auto-delete, so that they can
by floatingatoll 7y ago
Forcing iMessage to open will immediately result in MITM iMessage proxies that users can use to store iMessages that are meant to auto-delete, so that they can violate the wishes of the other party. These do not exist today because Apple binds iMessage to your hardware and bans your entire device when anyone is found to be operating such a service, either for themselves or others.
Do you want open source clients that can be altered to ignore all privacy criteria — or do you want closed-source clients that make a good faith effort to adhere to auto-deletion protocols?
Pick one. There is no middle ground.
- olliej 7y agoiMessage doesn't have any kind of auto deleted messages - it's a feature that messages are persistent across all your devices.
- floatingatoll 7y agoIncorrect. Audio messages are deleted two minutes after playback by default.
- toxik 7y agoWhich is a receiver-side setting and can be set to one year. Your point is moot.
- lorenzhs 7y agoFor me, the two choices in settings are "after two minutes" and "never", nothing in between. As you said, this is not a security setting, it's a storage space-saving setting.
- fipar 7y agoThis is unrelated to the current discussion and not meant to contradict your "Your point is moot", but instead just as a hopefully useful anecdote: In my experience, this requires the sender to choose 'Keep' too. I have been bitten several times by me sending an audio message to my wife because I was in a situation in which typing was complicated for me (outdoors, plenty of sunshine, I don't have the best eyesight), only to find that she never even got to see it because it got self-deleted after a few minutes. My conjecture from looking at how this has worked for me is that the sender must choose 'Keep' so that the audio message stays on the receiver's phone until listened, and the recipient must choose 'Keep' so that the audio message stays on their phone after listening. I, of course, have no proof of this other than my own experience on devices a few years old (iphones 5 and 6).
- toxik 7y agoI also had some odd occurrences like this, and I simply stopped using voice messages over iMessage. It hasn't really penetrated the local phone culture so to speak, so it isn't a problem. Those that I do use it with happen to be on WhatsApp, which retains messages forever or something.
- galad87 7y agoThat's a client side feature meant to save disk space.
- nightfly 7y agoYou can violate the wishes of the other party by taking a screenshot or, in the extreme, a photo of the screen. You're only preventing the very lazy/unmotivated from retaining messages.
- floatingatoll 7y agoCorrect, screenshots are a viable attack against both closed and open source platforms. Preventing casual retention is the best you can hope for, and is a worthy goal regardless that it does not result in the perfection of a Faraday cage’d clean room
- darawk 7y agoSo, your threat model includes MITM servers, but not cameras? It seems a little silly to worry about the MITM problem when you can simply snap a photo already.
- geocar 7y agoIf you have to get into a legal battle with someone about misuse of information, it's much better that you are able to focus on the sender and the recipient of the information as potential sources for that information instead of also having to go after every potential network hop as well.
- bigiain 7y agoThey are both valid threat models, but ones which for me have different meanings. Screenshotting or photographing the screen of a device owned my my intended message recipient is a reasonably small problem to me. If my recipient wants to expose a message I've sent them, they're going to be able to do that. I never expected any more privacy for that message than I'd have accepted based on my trust in that person. MITM servers are a whole other thing. Large scale surveillance of all users of a specific server, "full take" collection and searchable databases of messages available effectively forever to unknown current and future opponents? Different threats. Yeah, I'm happy enough to accept the risk of cameras in the hands of my correspondents. Way happier than I'd be with MITMable servers (or services that can add "ghost users" as the UK seems to be proposing).
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- tinus_hn 7y agoJust like with Snapchat, Auto-delete is a fantasy and is not worth sacrificing security or privacy for.