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Whent talking about alternatives, Signal and WhatsApp get mentioned because they're easy to use. They are. Signal is pretty secure. WhatsApp probably is as well
by jeroenhd 7y ago
Whent talking about alternatives, Signal and WhatsApp get mentioned because they're easy to use. They are. Signal is pretty secure. WhatsApp probably is as well but we can't be sure. That is, until it isn't anymore.
WhatsApp already has a key extraction protocol built right in for its Web interface. Signal has a web (Electron) interface as well, and a shitty one at that, where the messages also get decrypted. For WhatsApp, this means you're one line of code away from Facebook extracting your private keys.
Signal is different, in that they're not a for profit company. However, they've shown in the past that they are under no circumstances willing to allow support of any unofficial client or federate with another. In fact, they've taken steps against alternative clients on the past, making it clear that only their client is allowed to use the signal system. The moment the signal servers go out, Signal becomes unusable. This also leaves signal in the same position as WhatsApp, where we are dependent on one person compiling the app and publishing it on whatever app store you prefer. If signal has any Australian contributors and their code review fails sufficiently this means you're basically toast the moment the Australian government gets annoyed at a particular signal user enough.
Very few real alternatives to PGP exist. PGP is not just a message encryption format, it's a _federated_ message encryption format. There are very few actual federated message standards that come close to the features PGP supports. There's S/MIME, but that's only available after paying an expensive company for it to be of any use because it's validated as a normal TLS certificate and the free vert providers don't do S/MIME.
If all of these "real cryptographers" disagreeing with PGP's design would design a new system that can be used the same way PGP is used, I'm sure we'd see that getting some good usage figures quite quickly. But all alternatives seem to focus on either signing OR encrypting OR the latest secure messaging app instead of a PGP replacement.
- AmericanChopper 7y agoI think the real problem is that nobody has ever created a decent PKI, and I doubt a sufficiently secure PKI is even possible. CAs require you to trust people that aren’t supposed to be party to the communication (trust both not to be hostile, and not to be insecure themselves). All other forms of PKI offer entirely impractical authentication mechanisms. With signal and the like, your options are 1) Verify keys by being in the same room as the other party before communication, and after every key rotation 2) Just hope that the keys are genuine... The only thing that you can trust is that the party you’re communicating with is one of potentially many holders of the correct key.
- afiori 7y agowith signal I believe you can have already trusted contacts vouch for new contacts
- Natanael_L 7y agoYou're thinking of PGP web of trust, Signal doesn't have that
- afiori 7y agoyou can have contacts send you another contact. There is no way to set up a server of public identities, but you should be able to share your own contacts.
- Natanael_L 7y agoSignal won't validate the session key via that mechanism, each pair of communicating users have to do that themselves
- afiori 7y agoTIL; does this also mean that you can "fake" forwarded messages?
- tialaramex 7y agoI would regard the Web PKI as the only decent global public PKI, but sure, whatever. You don't seem to have understood what's going on in Signal. Ordinary key rotations, which happen automatically, do not change the verified status. What can happen is that another participant changes phone or wipes it, and so obviously trust can't survive that change. The problem isn't that somebody else may know the correct key, the Double Ratchet takes care of that. The problem is that a Man-in-the-middle is possible. Alice thinks Mallory is Bob, and Bob thinks Mallory is Alice. Mallory can pass messages back and forth seamlessly, reading everything. Only actually verifying can prevent this. You don't verify the encryption keys, that's useless because those change constantly, the verification compares the long term identity value ("Safety Number") for the conversation between two parties, which will be distinct for every such conversation. Mallory can't fake this, so if Alice and Bob do an in person verification step Mallory can't be in their conversation.
- fouc 7y agoI'm a little confused as to why you mention Signal and WhatsApp but not Telegram?
- Avamander 7y agoTelegram invented it's own crypto, without an audit it's untrustworthy. There's only Signal and Keybase that has been audited, so Whatsapp should be excluded from the list of trustworthy IM apps as well.
- tialaramex 7y agoWhatsapp uses the exact same technology as Signal. If you consider that Signal is fine based on an audit of what is clearly an older version (do audits come out every day with new Signal releases? No, so the code you're running wasn't covered by the audit) then Whatsapp is fine based on being the same protocols with different branding.
- Avamander 7y agoAn audited piece of software with relatively minor changes is definitely far more trustworthy than a piece of software that is much much more different. Whatsapp is garbage compared to Signal.
- riking 7y ago"without an audit" It would be more accurate to say that they have failed every attempted audit of the protocol.
- Avamander 7y agoI'd love to read more about this, could you please provide a few links?
- kokx 7y agoMost cryptographers do not see Telegram as a secure encrypted protocol. This is for two reasons: the first one is that Telegram doesn't do end-to-end encryption by default (and if you enable it, functionality is limited). And secondly, they roll their own cryptographic protocol.
- svckr 7y ago> But all alternatives seem to focus on either signing OR encrypting OR the latest secure messaging app instead of a PGP replacement. OP mentions exactly this point in the "The Answers" (https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html#the-answers https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html#...) section.
- txcwpalpha 7y ago>WhatsApp already has a key extraction protocol built right in for its Web interface. I don't believe this is correct. WhatsApp (and Signal AFAIK) web works by decrypting the original message on your phone, re-encrypting it with a different key that is shared with your web interface (this is what is being shared via the QR code when connecting to WhatsApp Web), sending it to the web client, and having your web client use the second key to decrypt. This is why your phone must continue to be powered on/connected to the network for the web service to work. The original key is never "extracted", and AFAIK can't be extracted by normal means. There are a few apps that attempt to exploit a few security vulnerabilities to recreate your key for you if you lose it and need to access backups, but that isn't the same as what you're describing.
- jeroenhd 7y agoFair enough, I suppose it's more of a plaintext extraction protocol. Still, it would take just one decision by Facebook to completely disable e2e or add an actual key extraction method to WhatsApp and there's nothing you can do about it. While WhatsApp is the most secure of all conventional chat apps, it's certainly not a replacement for PGP in most use cases.
- pca 7y agoSignal-Desktop works even when your phone is turned off.
- newscracker 7y agoWhatsApp always requires your phone to be around, whereas Signal needs it only when you link it. After linking, the desktop client is independent of the phone (being online or in your vicinity or the number being in your possession).
- txcwpalpha 7y agoYep, you're right. I just looked more into it and WhatsApp and Signal operate differently. WhatsApp works as I described, but Signal actually does share the original key between all devices through some sort of key sharing mechanism.
- chakalakasp 7y agoJust FYI, Actalis will mint you a free S/MIME cert. https://www.actalis.it/products/certificates-for-secure-electronic-mail.aspx https://www.actalis.it/products/certificates-for-secure-elec...
- GuqLyr 7y agoWhere they generate your private key :(. I rather let them sign my own key