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It's interesting that this would even be surprising: do people really expect every high-level, qualitative human mental state and behavior to be caused by a rea
by _delirium 16y ago
It's interesting that this would even be surprising: do people really expect every high-level, qualitative human mental state and behavior to be caused by a really simple element of brain wiring or chemistry, like a particular neurotransmitter being imbalanced, or presence/absence of a particular structure? Much of pop-neuroscience seems to, believing that for every/almost-every interesting high-level X, there's a "gene for X" or "neurotransmitter that causes X", and therefore a cure (in the case where X is bad) that consists of a fairly simple blunt instrument, like a pill that changes levels of one neurotransmitter.
But even in intro math classes studying relatively simple dynamical systems, it quickly becomes nontrivial to try to trace back high-level, qualitative behavior of a system to specific elements of the system that cause that behavior--- much less to point to which parts you should tweak to cause a particular desired high-level change. Craig Reynolds sometimes calls it the "reverse emergence problem" in computer graphics and agent simulations: our system is doing high-level-thing A, we want it to do B, which of our low-level rules are causing that and how do we fix it? There often isn't a simple answer or clean change to make, because the answer is "lots of rules interacting causes this, and any change you make will change lots of other things too". It would be pretty surprising if the common case in neuroscience, dealing with a hugely complex dynamical system, really turned out to be much cleaner and simpler than that.