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IMO, device addresses are irrelevant - the real pressure is whether end users can get at least one public IP. NAT is actually a security feature. Not because i
by mindslight 7y ago
IMO, device addresses are irrelevant - the real pressure is whether end users can get at least one public IP.
NAT is actually a security feature. Not because it necessitates a stateful firewall (as is often believed), but rather because it hides specific client host addresses from servers. The last thing anybody should want is to leak even more information to the surveillance companies.
The problems of IPv6's larger address space can be mitigated similarly to v4 while retaining some advantage - for example NAT onto random "host" address for 16+64 bits of saddr+sport rather than just 16 of sport. The point is that a flat address space isn't the RPC-panacea it was when protocols like "active FTP" were invented. In the modern world, blithely taking one's supposed L2 address and stuffing it into a higher level PDU is basically a layering violation.
- lathiat 7y agoAn inbound firewall for all traffic has exactly the same security level as NAT. There's a very small argument for privacy but (a) we have privacy addresses and (b) even behind NAT many of your devices are probably already identifiable in many other fingerprinted ways that obscuring the address for this sake would be pointless
- emmelaich 7y agoI wouldn't say _exactly_ the same security level. https://samy.pl/pwnat/ https://samy.pl/pwnat/ > pwnat, pronounced "poe-nat", is a tool that allows any number of clients behind NATs to communicate with a server behind a separate NAT with no port forwarding no DMZ setup, and no 3rd party involvement. The server does not need to know anything about the clients trying to connect.
- mindslight 7y ago> exactly the same security level as NAT. > There's a very small argument for privacy You can't say it has the "same security", while also saying there is a "small" difference. Privacy is an integral part of security, especially for natural persons. > we have privacy addresses AFAIK "privacy extensions" merely pick a random host address rather than naively using the ethernet MAC (!!). This still allows identifying discrete hosts. The NAT scheme I described is strictly better than this. So yes, I can envision an IPv6 future where we have convenient global addresses for incoming traffic, but outgoing traffic gets NATted to a single address (single probability distribution, really). It's just not going to be a return to the trustful 1970's air-out-your-genitals simplicity that is widely envisioned. > behind NAT many of your devices are probably already identifiable in many other fingerprinted ways that obscuring the address for this sake would be pointless Those other ways are also security vulnerabilities. We shouldn't excuse vulnerabilities because other vulnerabilities exist, especially in the direction of the foundation. While it is appropriate for a higher protocol to simply accept a weakness of a lower layer that it is built on, going the other way is unjustifiably throwing in the towel.
- gruez 7y ago>(a) we have privacy addresses and AFAIK those get rotated every day or so. While this is better than fixed addresses, it's still worse than NAT, especially if you use some sort of tool obscure your sessions (eg. container tabs or private browsing). >(b) even behind NAT many of your devices are probably already identifiable in many other fingerprinted ways that obscuring the address for this sake would be pointless That sounds exactly like Google's excuse not to implement fingerprinting hardening on Chrome[1]. [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=49075 https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=49075
- cesarb 7y ago> An inbound firewall for all traffic has exactly the same security level as NAT. I've seen at another of these discussions an argument that an inbound firewall is actually stronger. Suppose you have a NAT router with 192.168.1.0/24 as its "inside" network, and 203.0.113.0/24 as its "outside" network, doing NAT between them. Now suppose another host at the 203.0.113.0/24 network sends a packet to this router, with a destination address within the 192.168.1.0/24 network. A router which only does NAT would accept and deliver this packet, while a router with a correctly configured firewall would reject it.
- pdkl95 7y ago> whether end users can get at least one public IP. That only gets harder as address space limits[1] squeeze more and more people onto Carrier Grade NAT and similar workarounds. > NAT is actually a security feature. No, it's not. All supposed security features are actually from some other source, because NAT is only ever about changing addresses (or port) fields in the IP header. > it hides specific client host addresses from servers. NAT usually makes your local addresses very predictable. Is yours 192.168.[01].[1-4]? Often guessing isn't needed; the other IP fields that NAT does not touch can be used to differentiate[2] between hosts behind a NAT. > The last thing anybody should want is to leak even more information to the surveillance companies. That's why it's so important that we move to IPv6 asap. The theoretical problem of a few bits of identifiable entropy (differentiating between a few hosts on a private LAN) is trivial in comparison to the centralization that NAT has forced us into. NAT forces network software development into the client/increasingly-centralized-server model[3]. > The point is that a flat address space isn't the RPC-panacea A flat address space is the most important feature of the original internet, because it makes all hosts equal in the eyes of the protocol. You don't need an imprimatur[4] - an authority's permission to publish - to publish from your own IP. You don't need a centralized server's permission to develop new network software that uses new network protocols. Of course we don't want to leak information to a serer, especially those owned by surveillance companies. The way to do that is to write software that doesn't involve that server, which is only possible with a flat address space. Arguing otherwise is arguing we should keep using party lines[3]. [1] http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/index.html [2] (section 0x03-2) http://phrack.org/issues/63/3.html#article http://phrack.org/issues/63/3.html#article [3] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20169372 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20169372 [4] https://www.fourmilab.ch/documents/digital-imprimatur/ https://www.fourmilab.ch/documents/digital-imprimatur/
- mindslight 7y ago> That only gets harder as address space limits[1] squeeze more and more people onto Carrier Grade NAT and similar workarounds. Warning: we're awfully close to violent agreement here. I'm saying that the demand for more IPs is primarily for end users needing their first public IP, compared to end users needing public subnets for their devices. > NAT is only ever about changing addresses (or port) fields in the IP header Ya, the changing of which has the security benefit of a remote server not receiving it! I suspect you've become too used to responding to "I like NAT because it blocks connections to my network" to read what I've actually written. > NAT usually makes your local addresses very predictable. Is yours 192.168.[01].[1-4] Sure, for MACs (and guests) that are listed to receive 192.168 addresses because their treacherous software (eg Android, WebRTC, etc) is likely to turn around and leak it... That is the concern I am talking about here, not my local network being actively probed from outside. But most substantively I do not agree with the point in your [3], based on relative significance. I believe the overriding dynamic is that serverless software is much harder to fund. Implementing UPnP and NAT punching is trivial compared to developing, polishing, and marketing software for mass adoption. Meanwhile centralized surveillance is lucrative, attracting massive investment. And don't be confused by the brief popularity blip of end-user hosted websites using DNS, because DNS is a terrible user-facing namespace. It essentially mandates a high availability server standing ready to answer requests for every specific entity. There is no ability to retrieve the latest version of a given object from an untrusted peer.