3 ms·

> An attacker controlling another terminal How about controlling not another, but the same root terminal via send keys without tmux with another xorg terminal

• jchw 7y ago
  Wayland fixes that and is rapidly phasing out Xorg. It is long understood that X is not secure in this kind of scenario, it is NOT long understood that tmux isn’t (Or at least, I certainly have never heard this.)
  • buildzr 7y ago
    That threat model essentially prohibits "tmux attach", which allows an attacker running as your user to connect to your terminal session, so I don't think it's a particularly useful threat model here. That's basically exactly what we signed up for by using tmux.
    • jchw 7y ago
      This is definitely a useful threat model because people are running tmux on servers and almost certainly do not realize that this can happen. You do appear to be correct that it's exploitable via other, also trivial, means. That does not make the situation any less bad.
      • buildzr 7y ago
        Running on a server doesn't change anything, you'd need to be running on a server where you routinely give people who shouldn't have root access, access to an account with sudo privileges with a password. And be relying on your attacker to not say, simply put aliases into your shell, replace your shell, modify your path, add an LD_PRELOAD, ptrace your processes, etc. That should be absolutely no one.