10 ms·
The problem here is that life-threatening machines aren't air-gapped.
by kazinator 7y ago
The problem here is that life-threatening machines aren't air-gapped.
- tptacek 7y agoPeople say this in every IoT discussion (or rather, every IoT vulnerability invites litigation about the premise of IoT), but here's the thing: these systems are not air-gapped, nor will they be. The argument is pointless. The median HN reader would not f'ing believe what kinds of things you'd think would be air-gapped that are not; in fact, they'd probably be gobsmacked by what wasn't air-gapped in the 1990s, when you'd use X.25 NUAs to reach them instead of URLs.
- departure 7y agoAnd? It's kind of like how I've seen you comment multiple times about how software shouldn't be written in C. You even said it during the DNS fuzzing thread earlier today. You saying that is just as pointless. You would be very surprised at how much new stuff is written in C!
- tptacek 7y agoNo, software written in C is and will continue to be replaced by software written in modern memory safe languages; the trend is strong and growing, to the point where we tend to look askance at (1) new software written in C and (2) popular software written in C that doesn't need to be written in C. The opposite is the case for network connectivity: the trend is demonstrably and decisively towards increased connectivity, and "air-gapping" is not taken seriously in the industry. There is no indication of that changing. The comparison you're making is invalid. I'm not trying to score points; I'm observing that the litany of "this should be air-gapped" complaints isn't productive, because things are not going to be air-gapped. (My full-time job is assessing software security and my background is in C software vulnerability research, so it's less likely that I'd be "surprised" by a new C package than that I'd warn my clients to avoid it, and flunk it in vendorsec assessments.)
- ziddoap 7y ago>I'm observing that the litany of "this should be air-gapped" complaints isn't productive, because things are not going to be air-gapped. So, how would one be productive about it? Your post seems to say, and please correct me if I am wrong, that because things aren't currently happening and there are some barriers to making it happen, we should all give up on pushing for it? To me, that seems like a rather fatalist attitude to have. Do we apply this line of thinking to everything? Or just air-gapping?
- tptacek 7y agoWell, I guess I'm going to say something challenging here: give up on air-gapping, since it's not going to happen. Revise your premises to assume technology that can be connected will be connected, and proceed accordingly. I am not, by the way, happy about this, but I've also spent essentially a lifetime (minus maybe 13-14 years at the beginning) having all the surprise on this particular issue knocked out of me.
- ziddoap 7y agoIt's really a shame that a (relatively easy to implement) solution exists to a problem, that could potentially save lives in this case, should be left to the wayside and a new solution needs to be invented. Which, that solution may also not be implemented. I guess I have a little bit of surprise left in me on this issue.
- closeparen 7y agoIt's not a solution, it's a layer. Vulnerabilities still matter behind an airgap. A hospital is a large, semi-public facility. Patients are left alone in their rooms with network drops. There are legitimate business needs to transfer records in from and out to other institutions; who's to say they can't contain exploit payloads? There are contractors, vendors, and high-turnover low-skilled staff circulating every day. And even if there weren't, if you've been thinking of the airgap as a "solution" and not keeping up with patches, the first person to cross will have a ridiculously easy time with whatever's inside. It's good to raise the bar from drive-by internet strangers to people and organizations willing to take mild physical risks, but it's not a panacea.
- deogeo 7y agoSo because convincing manufacturers to air-gap devices is difficult, we should instead try for the easier goal of making bug-free software and hardware???
- tptacek 7y agoBecause convincing manufacturers to air-gap devices is intractable, we must instead work towards bug-free software and hardware.
- deogeo 7y agoAir-gapped systems far outnumber bug-free ones, so isn't that goal, by your own logic, even more pointless?
- tptacek 7y agoNo?
- deogeo 7y agoLet me put it this way - how would you achieve non-exploitable systems? Not just 'move towards them', but actually reach that goal? Because from what I can tell, it would require formal proof that the connected parts are safe (logic bugs can also be exploited, so just using a safe language is insufficient). If you can't get manufacturers to do the cheap, easy air-gapping, how will you get them to do the very expensive and time-consuming formal verification, that only a tiny, tiny fraction of developers is proficient in? Intractable doesn't even begin to describe it!
- tptacek 7y agoThere is nothing we're going to do that will immediately result in non-exploitable systems, and, as with all sorts of other kinds of risks, we're going to have to mitigate rather than eliminate this risk. Nobody is going to air-gap anything and I think there is ample evidence over the last 20 years that the trend goes in the opposite direction. Given the reality of the world we actually live in, productive conversations about securing embedded and IoT systems can't involve air gaps. Slightly later Here's another, simpler way to say the same thing: you might just as productively argue that these products shouldn't be built at all.
- tedunangst 7y agoActually, this seems like an area where some very literal litigation may make a difference? If your anesthesia machine is discovered to be plugged into the wrong network, your surgery license is revoked. I am generally opposed to liabilities for software defects, but system integration seems a more reasonable place to apply rules.
- AnimalMuppet 7y agoThere's two problems with airgapping. First, how does the machine get updates? Do you mail a DVD to the anesthesia techs? Do they know how to install such a thing, or are they going to mess up the machine in the attempt? Or do you roll a service tech in a truck - to all the machines installed worldwide? (Yes, I know, if the alternative to rolling trucks is letting J Random Hacker play with your machine while it's keeping a patient alive, you'd better roll trucks. But updates are one reason why stuff winds up connected to the net rather than airgapped.) The second reason why stuff is not airgapped is that it almost certainly connects to the hospital's patient records system. They have to keep a record of everything that happened until all potential lawsuits time out. Just in case there are complications from the surgery, they need all the records from the anesthesia machine uploaded after every use. So the anesthesia machine has to be on the same network as the patient records system - and so does every other medical device in the entire hospital. That network should be completely isolated from outside, but to do so, you have to airgap the network, not just one machine. Yes, it should be done, but that's harder to do, and harder to maintain. For that matter, I've wondered, when you visit someone in the hospital, if you plug your laptop into the ethernet jack in their room and start looking around, what do you see?
- seiferteric 7y agoHospitals have IT people.
- idbehold 7y agoBoth those problems are not my problem. I am perfectly fine with putting those problems on the hospitals and medical device manufacturers.
- bsder 7y agoNo, the problem is that these machines aren't read-only. There should be zero way to do anything remotely to these machines without someone at the local console pressing a button.
- kazinator 7y agoIf you look at the application and network stack from top to bottom, the implementation of a read-only operation (to get something from the device) is rife with mutations of memory and machine state. Everything from receiving the datagram in the driver, to passing it through the higher layers, to forming the response. Network stacks have been attacked at the data link or network layer with maliciously crafted packets.
- mrob 7y agoWhy do you need a network stack? Send the data over an RS-422 connection with the RX lines physically disconnected. Send a sequence number and checksum with each transmission so data loss and corruption can be detected, and store a local copy of everything you send, so that it can be retrieved manually if something went wrong with the transmission (which is unlikely, because RS-422 is simple and reliable).
- bsder 7y agoYou can use things like broadcast-only CAN from the anesthesia apparatus to the network server. Now, you can compromise the network server, but the hardware link prevents your system from being able to do anything else. In fact, if I had to design such a system, this is how I would do it--network server, GUI server, and anesthesia administration would be 3 very separate "instances" with hard communcation links in-between. The GUI->apparatus would be a bidirectional link (probably CAN for reliability) and the GUI->network server would be a separate, unidirectional link only from the GUI to the network server (probably CAN again). It would simply be far too difficult to verify the reliability of a system that had the network, the console UI and the anesthesia administration apparatus commingled.
- wl 7y agoThese machines cannot be airgapped. The anesthesia record from these machines populates into the patient's electronic medical record. A data diode would be appropriate, though.
- fifteenforty 7y agoAgreed. Anaesthesia machine control should be air-gapped. Unfortunately, in the modern world of electronic medical records, we do need access to a stream of measurement data. Historically this has been obtained using one-way serial port data streams, which is probably safer than having a network stack accessible to the web. The users (anaesthesiologists and hospital administrators) don’t understand these problems. (I’m an anaesthesiologist)
- ryacko 7y agoCould still be achieved through low data rate UDP with manual acknowledgements of sent data, with inbound data blocked.
- sjg007 7y agomanual ack udp? What?
- Gibbon1 7y agoI think it's a systems issue not really a software one. You need some sort of gap between the control unit (which can kill people) and the monitoring system which shouldn't be able to. Would be perfectly reasonable to pass monitoring data from the control unit via a tx only channel to a networked monitoring device. For instance using a digital opto-coupler to galvanically isolate the two units.
- ryacko 7y agoI believe it would be cheaper, and thus more likely to be adopted if tx only was implemented in software, such as a iptable rule. Hardware tx only would only make sense if you avoid side channels as well.