2 ms·
A big issue I remember from my last time reading about this system was that the printed paper ballot it prints out isn't similar to scantron; instead, it prints
by judge2020 7y ago
A big issue I remember from my last time reading about this system was that the printed paper ballot it prints out isn't similar to scantron; instead, it prints out your choices and then also has a barcode for the tallying machine to use.
The issue is that this barcode can't be easily deciphered by the voter. Nothing is stopping the machine from being hacked to print out a barcode that's marked [candidate 1] while the paper otherwise says they voted [candidate 2] (who the voter actually voted for).
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One thing I'd really like to ask is why no big SV companies have came in to provide a "this is actually secure" solution. Is it really impossible to make an 'unhackable' physical machine? iPads (with guided access/MDM/etc) for DIY-ordering stations seem to be secure enough for PCI use, so why aren't they considered for elections?