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Taking you seriously for a moment. You don't need to understand elliptic curve mathematics. As with any other public key crypto system there will be a Private K
by tialaramex 7y ago
Taking you seriously for a moment. You don't need to understand elliptic curve mathematics. As with any other public key crypto system there will be a Private Key which you must never reveal to anyone else, and a Public Key which everybody can be told. They're bits. You don't need to care what those bits mean, if you find yourself using software which expects you to care what the bits mean that's too low level, bail out and find higher level software.
Unfortunately Coda Hale's post makes a bunch of assumptions. Reasonable assumptions for a lot of the audience, but they're still assumptions. So an equivalent post has to either make equally broad assumptions OR it has to ask you a bunch of questions.
Not crypto questions, but just questions about what you actually want to achieve by having public key crypto. That's going to dictate what you should do. In particular Public Key crypto almost invariably ends up with questions about Identity because of the Public Keys, how do I know this is Bob's Public Key? Do I care about that? Who is "Bob" anyway?
Example #1: For a Web Browser the answer is Identity means the Internet DNS hierarchy decides what hosts are named, the Web PKI provides us with an Authority that says this public key belongs to news.ycombinator.com. It's up to the end user to decide whether that's Hacker News or the Disney Company.
Example #2: For Signal the answer is that Identity is defined only locally by a user's own "address book" or similar features and they get to decide whether this contact is really "Dad" or "skrebbel" or "Jenny Smith", Signal promises to tell you if "Dad" doesn't have the same public key any more (which is suspicious), but paternity tests or verifying in person that "Dad" isn't just a proxy are your problem.
If in fact you "want to allow my customers to send me encrypted data via an untrusted channel" in 2019 you should just set up a secure Web Server, with a Fully Qualified Domain Name your customers know (e.g. write it on business cards, or the sides of vans, or a huge building) with a form on it, where they can submit things. Done. Choose a web server you like and go look at Mozilla's instructions for securing Web Servers.
- cesarb 7y ago> If in fact you "want to allow my customers to send me encrypted data via an untrusted channel" in 2019 you should just set up a secure Web Server, with a Fully Qualified Domain Name your customers know (e.g. write it on business cards, or the sides of vans, or a huge building) with a form on it, where they can submit things. That assumes the customer's browser is trusted, and not configured to silently allow all encrypted connections to be intercepted, decrypted and potentially modified by someone else in the network, which is unfortunately still too common.
- saagarjha 7y agoDo you have ideas for a more secure platform than this that the average person can actually use?
- Proven 7y agoThat's laughable... Common to whom? Employees of 3 letter agencies? If that's your supposed adversary you may as well give up and switch to unencrypted emails.
- londons_explore 7y ago> by someone else in the network That just means someone else on the network securely sent you stuff...
- giaour 7y agoWish I could upvote this twice. A form on a secure web page covers both recipient authentication and secure ingress pretty well. Definitely way more approachable for both users and developers than encrypted email or other such channels.
- mevile 7y ago> Mozilla's instructions for securing Web Servers. I believe you're talking about: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS and/or https://infosec.mozilla.org/guidelines/web_security https://infosec.mozilla.org/guidelines/web_security