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Here's a breakdown of the attack: https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-british-airways-breach/ https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-british-airways-br
by leejo 7y ago
Here's a breakdown of the attack: https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-british-airways-breach/ https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/magecart-british-airways-br...
- Anthony-G 7y agoThanks. That was really interesting. I concluded from the article that as a noScript/uBlock user, I wouldn’t have been protected from this attack. In general, I’ve noticed that for many ecommerce sites, I have to enable some third-party script and refresh the page a number of times. Not only do you have to guess which third-party script is the one providing the functionality to complete the transaction but it’s an iterative process where the loaded third-party scripts have a further dependency on yet another third-party. Even as a technically aware user, I don’t have time to go examining whois records and TLS certificates to attempt to determine if baways.com (or baplc.com or bacdn) are genuine. In any case, I doubt either of these extensions would protect use from “trusted” JavaScript from making a POST request to a third-party site. (BTW, I’m not arguing against the use of these browser extension as they do a great job of protecting against other threats). I’m glad the ICO fined BA a non-trivial amount because users/customers shouldn’t have to be constantly on the alert, exercising a high degree of vigilance – and staying up-to-date with ever-changing and increasingly complex stacks of web technology.