5 ms·

The irony is that, as near as I can retrace the public timeline, American was actually the carrier that bludgeoned Boeing into producing an up-engined 737 in th

by ethbro 7y ago

The irony is that, as near as I can retrace the public timeline, American was actually the carrier that bludgeoned Boeing into producing an up-engined 737 in the first place. http://news.aa.com/news/news-details/2011/AMR-Corporation-Announces-Largest-Aircraft-Order-In-History-With-Boeing-And-Airbus-07202011/default.aspx http://news.aa.com/news/news-details/2011/AMR-Corporation-An... In retrospect, a lesson in not letting your biggest customers drive your development pipeline.

WalterBright 7y ago
> In retrospect, a lesson in not letting your biggest customers drive your development pipeline. A new airplane program is not, and pretty much cannot be, started without having major commitments from airline customers. They are developed very much based on conversations with airlines and what they need and will pay for.
- rossdavidh 7y ago
  Still, the decision by Boeing to try to shoehorn the new, bigger engines onto a 737 body, was a mistake. Whose job was it to know that this was not a good idea, because it would make the plane difficult to fly, and thus difficult to train for? Hint: the one that employs a lot of aeronautical engineers, and whose CEO should have been listening to them.
  - WalterBright 7y ago
    > was a mistake No, it wasn't. The design of the MCAS system was faulty. Jet airliners have used augmentation to compensate for stability problems since the 707, and airliners not being flyable without the help of computers has been the norm for decades.
    - mjevans 7y ago
      They are implying that the fundamental design of the 737 MAX was a mistake due to the engines. MCAS is a like applying a poorly designed bandaid to a deep vein cut.
      - WalterBright 7y ago
        > They are implying that the fundamental design of the 737 MAX was a mistake due to the engines. That wasn't the mistake. The mistake is several problems with the implementation of MCAS, all straight-forwardly fixable, along with some minor additional pilot training. I think this will turn out to be a business case study in crisis mismanagement. I also believe pilot error was a significant factor in the crashes, because during the first instance of MCAS malfunction, the pilots dealt with it and landed safely, despite not knowing about MCAS. The latter two incidents were not handled properly by the pilots, indicating a gap in training.
        brokenmachine 7y ago
        > I also believe pilot error was a significant factor in the crashes, because during the first instance of MCAS malfunction, the pilots dealt with it and landed safely, despite not knowing about MCAS. The latter two incidents were not handled properly by the pilots, indicating a gap in training. This sounds disingenuous from my reading of the problem. The pilots were not trained in the new system or even told of its existence. Seems pretty unfair to blame them for not being able to respond correctly within 3 seconds to correct a system that they didn't even know existed and literally makes the plane not respond to pilot input. I think it's amazing that the other crew was able to survive TBH. Didn't they have to pull a fuse?
        carlmr 7y ago
        https://qz.com/1576597/off-duty-pilot-saved-lion-airs-737-max-the-day-before-its-fatal-flight/ https://qz.com/1576597/off-duty-pilot-saved-lion-airs-737-ma... It was another pilot who was on the flight that knew how to deactivate MCAS.
        brokenmachine 7y ago
        Hardly seems like "pilot error" when the crew that died didn't know how to deactivate a system they were never told existed.
  - cameldrv 7y ago
    This is a mischaracterization. The problem was everything was being squeezed simultaneously. There are lots of ways to make a 737 that's safe with new engines. A combination of schedule, desire to avoid transition training, and desire to avoid signifiant systems changes made it hard to do that though. The critical moment was in flight testing when a pitch instability was discovered at low speed and low angle of bank. MCAS originally was a hack, but would have been safe, using a G sensor and AoA to activate. The new low speed instability didn't trigger the G sensor, and needed a bigger trim correction, so they either had to redesign the augmentation system, or make MCAS much less reliable and more dangerous. They chose to ship and meet their deadline.
    - pdonis 7y ago
      > There are lots of ways to make a 737 that's safe with new engines. Yes, but all of the non-insane ways would have required the 737 MAX to be re-certified as a new aircraft type and pilots to be re-trained before flying it. Which Boeing did not consider to be a viable option. And that decision was probably driven by their airline customers, since they're the ones who pay the costs of recertifying their pilots.
- yarg 7y ago
  Sure, but there's an issue in business where people lacking the degree of technical understanding required to evaluate feasibility are the ones that give (or rather demand) the go ahead on a major change. The relentless promotion of cynically optimistic arse-kissing yes-men will one day doom us all.
- justsomeguy3591 7y ago
  Reminds me of the conversations between Pan American's Juan Trippe and Boeing's Bill Allen described in Skygods [0] (don't have exact quote but this blog [1] is close enough). > With the head of Boeing as captive audience, Trippe laid out his vision for an airliner that would multiply the astounding success of Boeing’s 707 by adding capacity for more than twice as many passengers. Allen, already sitting on the substantive plans of Boeing’s proposal for the USAF CX-Heavy Lift System (soon to be won by the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy), was more than interested. > The meeting is supposed to have concluded with his famous line ‘If you’ll buy it, I’ll build it.’ To which Trippe replied ‘If you build it, I’ll buy it’. > And the seed of the Boeing 747 was planted. [0] https://airscapemag.com/2018/09/25/if-you-build-it/ https://airscapemag.com/2018/09/25/if-you-build-it/ [1] https://www.amazon.com/Skygods-Fall-Pan-Robert-Gandt/dp/0615611834 https://www.amazon.com/Skygods-Fall-Pan-Robert-Gandt/dp/0615...
Cyph0n 7y ago
This is hugely industry dependent. In the service provider routing industry, for example, many new features are developed after customers request them for their networks.

by ethbro 7y ago

WalterBright 7y ago

> In retrospect, a lesson in not letting your biggest customers drive your development pipeline. A new airplane program is not, and pretty much cannot be, started without having major commitments from airline customers. They are developed very much based on conversations with airlines and what they need and will pay for.

rossdavidh 7y ago
Still, the decision by Boeing to try to shoehorn the new, bigger engines onto a 737 body, was a mistake. Whose job was it to know that this was not a good idea, because it would make the plane difficult to fly, and thus difficult to train for? Hint: the one that employs a lot of aeronautical engineers, and whose CEO should have been listening to them.
- WalterBright 7y ago
  > was a mistake No, it wasn't. The design of the MCAS system was faulty. Jet airliners have used augmentation to compensate for stability problems since the 707, and airliners not being flyable without the help of computers has been the norm for decades.
  - mjevans 7y ago
    They are implying that the fundamental design of the 737 MAX was a mistake due to the engines. MCAS is a like applying a poorly designed bandaid to a deep vein cut.
    - WalterBright 7y ago
      > They are implying that the fundamental design of the 737 MAX was a mistake due to the engines. That wasn't the mistake. The mistake is several problems with the implementation of MCAS, all straight-forwardly fixable, along with some minor additional pilot training. I think this will turn out to be a business case study in crisis mismanagement. I also believe pilot error was a significant factor in the crashes, because during the first instance of MCAS malfunction, the pilots dealt with it and landed safely, despite not knowing about MCAS. The latter two incidents were not handled properly by the pilots, indicating a gap in training.
      - brokenmachine 7y ago
        > I also believe pilot error was a significant factor in the crashes, because during the first instance of MCAS malfunction, the pilots dealt with it and landed safely, despite not knowing about MCAS. The latter two incidents were not handled properly by the pilots, indicating a gap in training. This sounds disingenuous from my reading of the problem. The pilots were not trained in the new system or even told of its existence. Seems pretty unfair to blame them for not being able to respond correctly within 3 seconds to correct a system that they didn't even know existed and literally makes the plane not respond to pilot input. I think it's amazing that the other crew was able to survive TBH. Didn't they have to pull a fuse?
        carlmr 7y ago
        https://qz.com/1576597/off-duty-pilot-saved-lion-airs-737-max-the-day-before-its-fatal-flight/ https://qz.com/1576597/off-duty-pilot-saved-lion-airs-737-ma... It was another pilot who was on the flight that knew how to deactivate MCAS.
        brokenmachine 7y ago
        Hardly seems like "pilot error" when the crew that died didn't know how to deactivate a system they were never told existed.
- cameldrv 7y ago
  This is a mischaracterization. The problem was everything was being squeezed simultaneously. There are lots of ways to make a 737 that's safe with new engines. A combination of schedule, desire to avoid transition training, and desire to avoid signifiant systems changes made it hard to do that though. The critical moment was in flight testing when a pitch instability was discovered at low speed and low angle of bank. MCAS originally was a hack, but would have been safe, using a G sensor and AoA to activate. The new low speed instability didn't trigger the G sensor, and needed a bigger trim correction, so they either had to redesign the augmentation system, or make MCAS much less reliable and more dangerous. They chose to ship and meet their deadline.
  - pdonis 7y ago
    > There are lots of ways to make a 737 that's safe with new engines. Yes, but all of the non-insane ways would have required the 737 MAX to be re-certified as a new aircraft type and pilots to be re-trained before flying it. Which Boeing did not consider to be a viable option. And that decision was probably driven by their airline customers, since they're the ones who pay the costs of recertifying their pilots.
yarg 7y ago
Sure, but there's an issue in business where people lacking the degree of technical understanding required to evaluate feasibility are the ones that give (or rather demand) the go ahead on a major change. The relentless promotion of cynically optimistic arse-kissing yes-men will one day doom us all.
justsomeguy3591 7y ago
Reminds me of the conversations between Pan American's Juan Trippe and Boeing's Bill Allen described in Skygods [0] (don't have exact quote but this blog [1] is close enough). > With the head of Boeing as captive audience, Trippe laid out his vision for an airliner that would multiply the astounding success of Boeing’s 707 by adding capacity for more than twice as many passengers. Allen, already sitting on the substantive plans of Boeing’s proposal for the USAF CX-Heavy Lift System (soon to be won by the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy), was more than interested. > The meeting is supposed to have concluded with his famous line ‘If you’ll buy it, I’ll build it.’ To which Trippe replied ‘If you build it, I’ll buy it’. > And the seed of the Boeing 747 was planted. [0] https://airscapemag.com/2018/09/25/if-you-build-it/ https://airscapemag.com/2018/09/25/if-you-build-it/ [1] https://www.amazon.com/Skygods-Fall-Pan-Robert-Gandt/dp/0615611834 https://www.amazon.com/Skygods-Fall-Pan-Robert-Gandt/dp/0615...

Cyph0n 7y ago

This is hugely industry dependent. In the service provider routing industry, for example, many new features are developed after customers request them for their networks.