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What the courts said went like this: _If_ you have a mechanism that you've put together to block some content (in this case the IWF to block child porn porn) t
by tialaramex 7y ago
What the courts said went like this:
_If_ you have a mechanism that you've put together to block some content (in this case the IWF to block child porn porn) then you must also use this mechanism to block stuff the court wants blocked, in this case everything Hollywood has arbitrarily decided it might be a copyright infringement.
But if you don't have a mechanism to block stuff (which A&A does not because why would you want to spend money on that nonsense?) then obviously the court shouldn't order you to go around making Hollywood's life easier and you can ignore it.
- DanBC 7y agoNo, this is nonsense. The IWF blocks are completely separate (and use a different mechanism) to the court ordered piracy blocks. The court ordered piracy blocks only apply to the "big 6" ISPs. A&A doesn't have to comply because they're an insignificant ISP with very few customers.
- rndgermandude 7y agoNot non-sense. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100427/1437179198.shtml https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100427/1437179198.shtml
- tialaramex 7y agoA different _legal_ mechanism these days, but the only affordable and effective technical countermeasure is DNS blocking, which is why this whole anti-DPRIVE thing happened. Cleanfeed as originally designed is irrelevant in 2019. It worked by doing transparent HTTP proxying on port 80 and then comparing URLs to a blacklist of hashes. But in 2019 the site can just upgrade you to HTTPS and then you vanish off the radar in Cleanfeed. What's left is yet more DNS blocking. You might think wait, surely they could do IP blocking? Well, no. Fast flux combined with the address exhaustion means if you do this you'll either underblock so badly you might as well not bother trying, or you'll overblock and get yourselves a reputation as the ISP whose Internet doesn't work. SNI lets your opponents do this to you as much as they want even though very few of their customers are doing anything you actually want to block. So the other working (but far too expensive) option is "Deep packet inspection" or "Transparent TLS proxies" where you'll watch the ClientHello and drop clients asking for forbidden names in SNI before the connection is encrypted. The UK government's White Paper in 2018 showed no appetite for this extra cost, but even if they go there that's exactly what eSNI fixes - so they'd spend all that money and by the time they ship anything probably it doesn't work anyway.