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It's not just the checklist: the experience of MCAS-induced trim runaway is significantly different from that which NG pilots are trained for, to the point wher

It's not just the checklist: the experience of MCAS-induced trim runaway is significantly different from that which NG pilots are trained for, to the point where additional training seems necessary. Boeing set up the conditions for an accident by first hiding, and then downplaying, those differences, apparently to avoid additional training being required. I have seen some suggestions that this was also the reason for not having MCAS compare the two AofA sources to detect a fault, as the fault would have to be reported, and the documentation of that indicator would reveal the existence of MCAS.

sokoloff 7y ago
I agree with you, hence the "arguably, this may be a problem" parenthetical. Nevertheless, the provided checklist did work as evidenced by Lion Air 043.
- mannykannot 7y ago
  So the checklist worked sometimes, but the question is, could it have been improved if we put aside the issue of whether doing so would make a case for additional training? It is quite possible that it would have been an adequate checklist when backed up with sufficient training that emphasized the differences between MCAS-induced trim runaway and that which might have been experienced in other variants. Simulator practice of manually trimming might help as well, though there is some doubt whether current simulators can adequately model the difficulties that may be experienced. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4qDLR4s45U&t=296s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4qDLR4s45U&t=296s
- salawat 7y ago
  Note: the penultimate flight had the luxury of a third pilot in the cockpit with nothing else to do than to pay attention to anything the other two pilots couldn't. Also, that "checklist", and he existence of MCAS, was not even commonly known until after Lion Air went down. The secrecy behind this is largely attributed to Boeing trying to keep MCAS from intense scrutiny by the FAA, based on whistleblower testimony reported in the 60 Minutes Expose. https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwiPp72Ar57jAhXBK80KHQrCCZ4QwqsBMAB6BAgHEAU&usg=AOvVaw2APCLXMqKKxa5mxQOnsmvo https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwiPp...

sokoloff 7y ago

I agree with you, hence the "arguably, this may be a problem" parenthetical. Nevertheless, the provided checklist did work as evidenced by Lion Air 043.

mannykannot 7y ago
So the checklist worked sometimes, but the question is, could it have been improved if we put aside the issue of whether doing so would make a case for additional training? It is quite possible that it would have been an adequate checklist when backed up with sufficient training that emphasized the differences between MCAS-induced trim runaway and that which might have been experienced in other variants. Simulator practice of manually trimming might help as well, though there is some doubt whether current simulators can adequately model the difficulties that may be experienced. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4qDLR4s45U&t=296s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4qDLR4s45U&t=296s
salawat 7y ago
Note: the penultimate flight had the luxury of a third pilot in the cockpit with nothing else to do than to pay attention to anything the other two pilots couldn't. Also, that "checklist", and he existence of MCAS, was not even commonly known until after Lion Air went down. The secrecy behind this is largely attributed to Boeing trying to keep MCAS from intense scrutiny by the FAA, based on whistleblower testimony reported in the 60 Minutes Expose. https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwiPp72Ar57jAhXBK80KHQrCCZ4QwqsBMAB6BAgHEAU&usg=AOvVaw2APCLXMqKKxa5mxQOnsmvo https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwiPp...