3 ms·
Yeah, but that's a pretty obscure attack. All bank customers have the same length account number. All the videos on YouTube have the same length identifier an
by jrockway 7y ago
Yeah, but that's a pretty obscure attack. All bank customers have the same length account number. All the videos on YouTube have the same length identifier and usually last about 10 minutes and 1 second. Some information is leaked through packet size and timing. But a lot isn't.
I am also guessing that 1 capture doesn't give you a very good signal to noise ratio. Sure, if you capture someone's keyboard-interactive ssh exchange 100 times a day for 6 months, you have a lot of data. For your porn searches or whatever, I doubt the sample size is enough to leak a ton of information. And it's certainly better than just letting the person capturing packets read them and see what's in there.
- arkadiyt 7y ago> Yeah, but that's a pretty obscure attack. I'm certain nation states work on developing these attacks. Also a commercial company just has to build it once, then they can sell it to ISPs who make money selling your data. > All bank customers have the same length account number. This isn't the only problem with packet size data, there have been compression attacks that can recover plaintext using packet sizes, like CRIME and BREACH. > All the videos on YouTube have the same length identifier and usually last about 10 minutes and 1 second Here's a research paper from 2017 where someone in a MITM position could detect exactly what netflix video you were watching by looking at packet sizes: https://mjkranch.com/docs/pubs/CODASPY17_Kranch_Reed_IdentifyingHTTPSNetflix.pdf https://mjkranch.com/docs/pubs/CODASPY17_Kranch_Reed_Identif... Of course TLS still provides a critical level of security and privacy, but there is room for improvement.
- saurik 7y agoYou still don't understand. While the average time length of a YouTube video might be 10m1s, the time length of a specific video isn't. Worse, the file sizes are all quite different even if the time length is the same due to video compression. The way these sites work is you download segments of the video of fixed time length (such as two seconds), roughly in order, and so it becomes trivial to fingerprint which video you are watching by what sequence of specific file sizes someone downloads. This is absolutely not an "obscure" attack: it has been used, successfully, to build a tool to guess what city you are looking at with Google Maps. There, tiles are downloaded to render a map (similar to the segments used to render a video on YouTube). While each tile may have a fixed dimension, again, due to image compression, each tile has a different file size. Since tiles are downloaded in clusters, you can pretty readily fingerprint different regions of the map a user is looking at (and if it weren't for local caching, it would work almost instantly 100% of the time, live). With type-ahead searching, as each character you type returns a different list, given the file size response sequence you should be able to determine exactly what search query someone made with almost total accuracy almost all of the time when they type it, with the only reason it ever not working well being due to caches and delayed queries (if you type fast enough on many type-ahead query boxes it will avoid sending queries for the prefixes, to reduce load for something that by the time the result is fetched won't even render).
- jrockway 7y agoI'm just saying, it's outside the scope of TLS to fix this problem. Map tiles are different sizes because it makes the page load faster and costs less money to run the service and uses less data on your mobile plan. You CAN prevent this attack, but it's too expensive and nobody cares. TLS is a comfortable medium; adding additional security, while not adding too much additional cost.