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There seems to be a fundamental assumption here that's just completely wrong, and that is that there's a way to guarantee that your chat logs /email /search his
by fencepost 7y ago
There seems to be a fundamental assumption here that's just completely wrong, and that is that there's a way to guarantee that your chat logs /email /search history /whatever can ever be 100% secure from disclosure. This is as wrong as assuming you don't need backup because you have RAID, excellent malware protection, are fully patched, have great sprinklers, are geologically stable, not in a flood plain, etc.
You need to start from the assumption that it can happen here and take steps to ensure that damage is minimal /recoverable. Part of that is policy, part culture, another part is technical but none are sufficient by themselves. On the tech side, look at systems designed to comply with data protection laws.
- Bartweiss 7y agoI didn't get that assumption from the article at all. (Unless you meant "on HN" instead?) To me, the article's focus on permanently deleting old messages specifically avoids that error - it's not about avoiding disclosure but as defense-in-depth since disclosure is always a possibility. Beyond that, avoiding Slack (even with data deletion) is unlikely to increase security, but it does decrease priority for smaller users who might be swept up in an attack on Slack in general.