Well: The bonus tax wasn't actually a tax on the amount of risk-taking that a bank was doing (with the understanding that some of that risk would land on the go

Well: The bonus tax wasn't actually a tax on the amount of risk-taking that a bank was doing (with the understanding that some of that risk would land on the government balance sheet because of the too-big-to-fail effect). It was neither designed to be that, nor was the income that the exchequer earned from that in any way related to what it costs the government to cover that risk. It could be argued that by discouraging remuneration models whereby decision makers share in profits (and therefore also in downside risks), this tax might have even had the opposite effect of increasing risk-taking by increasing moral hazard. So, really, what it was was plainly and simply: "Here are a bunch of people who are disliked by the majority of the electorate. Therefore, let's have them give us some money." EDIT: This was the story I was talking about: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/business/global/10pound.html https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/business/global/10pound.h...