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> A ban on end-to-end-encryption would make it easier for law enforcement and intelligence agents to access suspects' data. But such a measure would also make i
by tzs 7y ago
> A ban on end-to-end-encryption would make it easier for law enforcement and intelligence agents to access suspects' data. But such a measure would also make it easier for hackers and spies to steal Americans' private data, by creating loopholes in encryption that are designed for the government but accessible to anyone who reverse-engineers them. Watering down encryption would also endanger people who rely on scrambled communications to hide from stalkers and abusive ex-spouses.
It does increase the chances that your communications will get out to third parties besides the government, but not for the reasons given in that paragraph.
The way you would actually implement this is not by putting a "loophole" in or "watering down" the encryption between the parties. You'd do it by adding the government as another party. E.g., two party end-to-end encrypted messaging channels become three party end-to-end encrypted chats. N party end-to-end encrypted chat channels becomes N+1 party end-to-end encrypted chat channels.
To a third party, such as a stalker or abusive ex-spouse, who is trying to eavesdrop on your messages these N+1 party systems are as secure as the previous N party version.
The increased risk comes from the risk that the government won't be able to keep its copies of your messages secure after it securely receives them. Presumably they will go into a database somewhere, from with they will be made available to law enforcement and intelligence services. That means that there will be a bureaucracy around operating and accessing the database, and given the number of different jurisdictions involved and the likely frequency of access requests my guess is that this would need to be a large bureaucracy. A large bureaucracy dealing with a large amount of sensitive data is just asking for trouble.
- mattnewton 7y agoOr, other possible problems: the implementation is bungled because it involves 3 parties all not making mistakes instead of 2. Maybe 3+n vendors all being perfect. Example, The keys the government has are compromised because they or a vendor they used had poor opsec.
- feanaro 7y ago> The increased risk comes from the risk that the government won't be able to keep its copies of your messages secure after it securely receives them. Or how about simply not wanting the government, a third party, to be able to scrutinize your private conversations?
- stirfrykitty 7y agoOr we'll all end up making Gorky Park-esque dead drops under the cover of darkness.
- EthanHeilman 7y ago>The way you would actually implement this is not by putting a "loophole" in or "watering down" the encryption between the parties. You'd do it by adding the government as another party. E.g., two party end-to-end encrypted messaging channels become three party end-to-end encrypted chats. Adding the government as a passive 3rd party to an e2e encrypted messaging service is pretty hard to do technically ... and it wouldn't necessarily give the government access to the messages. To read the traffic the government would need to recognize that a targeted party is communicating and have the right infrastructure in the right parts of the internet to intercept the traffic. 1. What happens if the government starts recording after the session has started. Do you build the crypto so that the government can join at any moment or only during session establishment. 2. All this intercept equipment would be expensive and unreliable. ASes may use encrypted tunnels between POPs or change which ASes it routes the messages around. Using China as an example the way this would proibably work is that the company that offers the messaging service would have all messages pass through their servers and then they would read messages in plaintext and save them in a database (think gmail). The government would be given API access to the database of all messages. Of course these datasets would then also be shared for marketing purposes, employees would read or steal the messages and hackers/foreign governments would also get access.
- codedokode 7y agoHow are you going to enforce using such a scheme? What would stop people from downloading software with real encryption? Also, how do you oversight that the government is not abusing the system to track political activists for example?
- astrobe_ 7y ago> How are you going to enforce using such a scheme? What would stop people from downloading software with real encryption? Does "anti-circumvention clauses" ring a bell? Or illegal numbers? > Also, how do you oversight that the government is not abusing the system to track political activists for example? There's something called "separation of powers" for that. That means the executive power (the government or the cops) normally have to ask permission to the judiciary power (the judges) for that kind of thing.