6 ms·

Privacy advocates always just say screw the feds but come on... if police work becomes effectively impossible, what's the point of having detectives? Is having

by umvi 7y ago

Privacy advocates always just say screw the feds but come on... if police work becomes effectively impossible, what's the point of having detectives? Is having absolute privacy worth an irreversible increase in unsolved murders/human trafficking/etc.? Why is it so hard to create a cryptographic solution that would allow E2E that works 99.9% of the time, is resistant to malicious actors, but is breakable with a warrant? Have people really even tried? For example, consider the following system: 1. E2E decryption keys are encrypted with vendor's device-specific asynchronous key 2. Keys are then stored in write-only non-volatile storage 3. Only way to read key is with expensive hardware that is difficult for civilians to obtain/replicate (scanning electron microscope, etc.) 4. Thus, only way to decrypt key is by a) physically obtaining device, b) using expensive hardware to extract encrypted key(s), c) serving encrypted key along with legal warrant to vendor who would then comply with the law (or not, if it is unlawful) Wouldn't such a system allow privacy yet also be resistant to attacks?

supergauntlet 7y ago
You left out b) vendor has the keys stolen or leaked by a disgruntled employee and now the encryption is useless. That's the problem with all these systems, you're increasing the size of the attack surface enormously.
- pcl 7y ago
  In practice, this happens frequently. We've seen this happen with TLS certificate authorities and with DRM solutions.
  - tialaramex 7y ago
    > We've seen this happen with TLS certificate authorities Have we? I'm going to assume that you mean CAs in the Web PKI and not just "My friend Bob runs TLS and this has happened to the CA he was running on his Windows 10 laptop". The last CA where we had a really grave problem was DigiNotar, in 2011. It seem _very_ unlikely that the problem at DigiNotar was full key compromise, instead bad guys appear to have penetrated the issuance infrastructure. This means they were able to (and did) issue themselves arbitrary certificates, but it did not give them the actual keys as you've said "happens frequently". Since then we've seen a variety of unacceptable behaviour, including issuing backdated certificates to conceal the (also problematic) choice to continue doing something that was no longer allowed in new certificates, and issuing "test" certificates which would have been trusted by real client software even though their contents were known to be false. All unacceptable, and all having consequences (for example Symantec is no longer a CA) but all far short of "vendor has the keys stolen or leaked by a disgruntled employee".
- jimbob45 7y ago
  Exactly what I was going to say. "The road to hell is paved with good intentions.".
- umvi 7y ago
  > You left out b) vendor has the keys stolen or leaked by a disgruntled employee and now the encryption is useless. e) If the keys are stolen, issue new keys to all devices The leaked keys are only good for physically compromised devices in the hands of people with access to the scanning electron microscopes, which I daresay is an extremely small attack surface. There is only a small window after the leak in which a device can be stolen, powered down, and compromised. On the other hand, you could mandate that such keys aren't allowed to be stored in databases (physical access only)
  - the_watcher 7y ago
    You don't always know that keys have been stolen. And an electron scanning microscope is hard to get now, but what about state-sponsored actors spending half a decade developing a pocket-sized tool? The whole point of E2E is that all of these scenarios are literally not possible.
    - umvi 7y ago
      Well, periodically reissue keys then regardless of if you think they've been compromised. Or don't store the private key in a database, store on physical media in a vault that is airgapped and hard to access. Make the read-only-ability of the storage chip more difficult and onerous with each generation like paper currency security. My point it that you could make it so difficult to break E2E for even the most elite hackers that the only realistic way to do it is with a warrant.
      - the_watcher 7y ago
        Not if you're sponsored by a hostile actor with functionally limitless resources. E2E isn't just about stopping legitimate law enforcement from conducting investigations.
        umvi 7y ago
        > Not if you're sponsored by a hostile actor with functionally limitless resources Like who? Russia? China? Here's how they can compromise my device: 1. Locate me within the USA (easy) 2. Send a spy onto US soil to find me and steal my phone (hard) 3. Send another spy to work for Apple (easy) 4. Spy needs to break into Apple's vault and retrieve airgapped media containing my device's private key without a warrant (super hard) 5. Send both back to the motherland and use scanning electron microscope to complete the process (easy) You really think that is viable? Seems extremely far fetched to me. Can you provide a more realistic scenario?
codedokode 7y ago
You cannot murder anyone with just a message. If you want less murders, maybe it makes sense to stricten regulation on firearms?
- SlowRobotAhead 7y ago
  >If you want less murders, maybe it makes sense to stricten regulation on firearms? Why haven't they thought of that in Chicago, Stockton, Newark, Detroit, Memphis, Baltimore!? Oh wait, no. Stolen guns that actually make up the majority of crimes committed with, and straw purchases that "your plan" doesn't address. You know, reality of the situation, not what you heard on the news. I suppose there is also the fact it doesn't address that the murder rate in London is the same as NYC, despite an extreme lack of availability of guns surrounding London. Which strongly implies that guns aren't the only way murders are committed. I was ready to agree with you the problem was just "regulations" but then I thought about it.
  - codedokode 7y ago
    Does not New York have additional restrictions on carrying or buying weapon?
    - SlowRobotAhead 7y ago
      Yes. New York does have additional restrictions on carrying. A case is going to the Supreme Court right now, and is expected to find those unconstitutional, so much so that the state of NY recently tried desperately and failed to not let that happen by voluntarily changing their law to get ahead of a ruling. [0] [0] http://archive.is/2zMZF http://archive.is/2zMZF If you are arguing that NY and London shouldn’t have the same murder rate, well, I don’t see how that plays for three reasons. 1. Despite the laws, criminals break them. Guns aren’t allowed to be carried in NY, but people do it anyhow. Just as heroin and coke aren’t legal ANYWHERE but we have lots of crime with them. 2. The murders in London are mostly knife as the weapon. New York has knife laws too, but not as strong as London iirc. I know my everyday carry knives are all illegal in both places. 3. Very much on topic, Illinois, Delaware, New Jersey, and etc have some of the strongest antigun laws in the country and cities with highest crime and guns as murder weapons. Here is the thing... we know EXACTLY, down to the neighborhoods where our crime is, and our rural areas with all the guns are on-par with rural Europe murder rates 2-4 per 100,000.
fastball 7y ago
What's preventing the vendor from breaking the E2E whenever they want in that scenario?
- umvi 7y ago
  > What's preventing the vendor from breaking the E2E whenever they want in that scenario? The key is write-only... there is no way for the vendor to read it without physical access to the device
  - fastball 7y ago
    Except that the vendor wrote the key to the device, so they can just write it to the device and to their internal database.
    - umvi 7y ago
      Well they can already do that if they want to, so this system doesn't change that. Responsible vendors wouldn't do that though (and if they do, just don't buy their products)
      - fastball 7y ago
        They can already do that if their crypto system is designed around derivative keys that they control, but you can design a system that does not work that way. Apple, for instance, encrypts a lot of your data using your AppleID password, which they obviously don't know, so they have no way to decrypt that data.
rolltiide 7y ago
> if police work becomes effectively impossible, what's the point of having detectives? Police work has become lazy and they'll have to go back to finding evidence they can access For more detail on this, look at the musings of the 98th Congress during the 1980s who really speculated on what privacy would mean once everyone's files were digital. The period of digital files without encryption made it convenient for the governments to circumvent privacy protections. This convenience is being removed. Warrant or no warrant.
ars 7y ago
Been there done that: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip And note that it was the Clinton administration that proposed it, for all those who want to make this a Trump issue.
- umvi 7y ago
  With my proposed system though, there is no way for the chip to "transmit" anything. It's a passive, write-only storage chip that requires physical optical examination with expensive hardware to extract information from it.
ant512 7y ago
I can’t think of any state actors that would want to get their hands on easily-decrypted messages sent by government officials of your country.
madhadron 7y ago
> Why is it so hard to create a cryptographic solution that would allow E2E that works 99.9% of the time, is resistant to malicious actors, but is breakable with a warrant? Have people really even tried? Yup. Tried very hard. It's not possible. This isn't a restriction of our current tech. It's a fundamental part of the mathematics of cryptography. Asking for it is kind of like trying to legislate pi having a different value.
- umvi 7y ago
  Citation needed. It would be like saying a paper money system would be impossible/ineffective because paper money manufacturing techniques can theoretically be reverse engineered. In theory that is true, but in practice paper money works quite well.
  - jki275 7y ago
    In practice, paper money works fine -- in spite of the fact it is regularly and continually counterfeited. Your plan doesn't work.
  - madhadron 7y ago
    They are reverse engineered. Paper money has a limited downside. In the US, we know there aren't bills over $100 in general circulation, so you can, with effort, print up a few million dollars. The money supply of paper-ish money (M1) is around 3.4 trillion dollars. From the point of view of the principal actor US mint this is annoying and needs to be dealt with, but it's not a danger to the system unless it is allowed to run unchecked. The power imbalance involved is what makes it work. For crypto, the principal actor is whoever is encrypting. The downside of an activist in a repressive regime having their crypto broken is basically unlimited for them. Or the population that uses ecommerce as principal actor. The downside for them is enormous and the upside for someone who suborns a system incredible. Since we don't know tye power and incentive imbalance between the actors, crypto has to assume the worst.
xtian 7y ago
Has there been an increase in unsolved murders/human trafficking? Is there evidence that traditional police methods are no longer effective? Let's not infringe upon personal liberty for the sake of an extremely hypothetical worldview. Also you are proposing a solution where access to private information is gated by economics. I'd invite you to think about the connotations and ramifications of that model in our current society a little more.
the_watcher 7y ago
I'm not an expert, but my understanding is that encryption that is E2E in 99.9% of cases is, definitionally, _not_ E2E, as it is no longer required to be at either end point.
pdkl95 7y ago
> if police work becomes effectively impossible It hasn't. That's a lie. Police/etc have far more resources available to them than they've had at any point in history. The trail of digital exhaust we leave behind is only increasing, which makes OPSEC much harder[1]. End to end encryption doesn't prevent metadata analysis[2], network usage/timing analysis (e.g. [3]), or investigation of the massive amount of data that isn't end to end encrypted.. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1q4Ir2J8P8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1q4Ir2J8P8 [2] The NSA admits[4] metadata tells them far more than the message contents. [3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/world/how-the-nsa-is-tracking-people-right-now/634/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/world/how-the-nsa... edit: [4] "We kill people based on metadata" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdQiz0Vavmc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdQiz0Vavmc
- umvi 7y ago
  Then why do you always read stories about the police having a hard time getting into terrorist's phones and going to extreme lengths to get into the phone? Shouldn't the metadata be more than enough for them? Like the San Bernadino shooter, for example[1] (jump to decryption section) [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_San_Bernardino_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_San_Bernardino_attack
  - vaer-k 7y ago
    Once upon a time, people did not carry devices around that logged their every move, and police work was still regularly conducted. Currently, there does not exist any technology to read minds. If there were, do you think that the government should be allowed to surveil our thoughts? Do you, umvi, draw the line at encryption, or do you feel there should be no limit to government access to our personal lives?
    - umvi 7y ago
      I think there should be privacy by default, but that the government should be able to access our personal lives with a warrant.
jki275 7y ago
No. You can't have backdoors in encryption. What you think is "expensive" today will not be tomorrow, and there's little that would be "difficult to obtain/replicate" -- SEMs are not hard to get access to, for instance. There is no security if you leave a backdoor for the government or anyone else.
- umvi 7y ago
  That's why my proposed system doesn't rely on the difficulty of reading write-only chips alone... You need both: 1. Physical access to the device 2. Physical access to the vendor's key storage (this could be extremely difficult if not impossible if the company were responsible - consider an air gapped storage vault) I still think my system could work if implemented by, say, Apple. You have only shown weaknesses of individual parts, not weaknesses of the entire system.
  - jki275 7y ago
    You, like everyone else who has these ideas every few years when this government overreach bubbles up to the surface again, have made the mistake of believing that first the government is responsible enough to manage this kind of program -- they aren't and never will be, and second that engineering can stop engineering. If you can make it, someone can break it, and will. And companies are not responsible, that's not how this works. Also, a "weakness of the individual part" is a break, and the entire system collapses. You're essentially arguing for security by obscurity.
    - umvi 7y ago
      Who says the government has to manage it? Let Apple manage it so their reputation is on the line. Government just specifies that E2E is breakable with warrant; Apple can implement it how they want to preserve privacy. > And companies are not responsible, that's not how this works. Why not? If a company implements a government requirement poorly they are absolutely responsible for the ramifications, just like they are with existing regulations (like if I made a handheld gaming system that jams radios on accident, I'm responsible for not following FCC regulations properly). > Also, a "weakness of the individual part" is a break That's ridiculous. That's like saying you can't build a bridge out of pure rebar and you can't build a bridge out of pure concrete because individually they are too weak, so therefore you can't build a bridge out of rebar-reinforced concrete.
slavapestov 7y ago
> Is having absolute privacy worth an irreversible increase in unsolved murders/human trafficking/etc.? Yes.

by umvi 7y ago

supergauntlet 7y ago

You left out b) vendor has the keys stolen or leaked by a disgruntled employee and now the encryption is useless. That's the problem with all these systems, you're increasing the size of the attack surface enormously.

pcl 7y ago
In practice, this happens frequently. We've seen this happen with TLS certificate authorities and with DRM solutions.
- tialaramex 7y ago
  > We've seen this happen with TLS certificate authorities Have we? I'm going to assume that you mean CAs in the Web PKI and not just "My friend Bob runs TLS and this has happened to the CA he was running on his Windows 10 laptop". The last CA where we had a really grave problem was DigiNotar, in 2011. It seem _very_ unlikely that the problem at DigiNotar was full key compromise, instead bad guys appear to have penetrated the issuance infrastructure. This means they were able to (and did) issue themselves arbitrary certificates, but it did not give them the actual keys as you've said "happens frequently". Since then we've seen a variety of unacceptable behaviour, including issuing backdated certificates to conceal the (also problematic) choice to continue doing something that was no longer allowed in new certificates, and issuing "test" certificates which would have been trusted by real client software even though their contents were known to be false. All unacceptable, and all having consequences (for example Symantec is no longer a CA) but all far short of "vendor has the keys stolen or leaked by a disgruntled employee".
jimbob45 7y ago
Exactly what I was going to say. "The road to hell is paved with good intentions.".
umvi 7y ago
> You left out b) vendor has the keys stolen or leaked by a disgruntled employee and now the encryption is useless. e) If the keys are stolen, issue new keys to all devices The leaked keys are only good for physically compromised devices in the hands of people with access to the scanning electron microscopes, which I daresay is an extremely small attack surface. There is only a small window after the leak in which a device can be stolen, powered down, and compromised. On the other hand, you could mandate that such keys aren't allowed to be stored in databases (physical access only)
- the_watcher 7y ago
  You don't always know that keys have been stolen. And an electron scanning microscope is hard to get now, but what about state-sponsored actors spending half a decade developing a pocket-sized tool? The whole point of E2E is that all of these scenarios are literally not possible.
  - umvi 7y ago
    Well, periodically reissue keys then regardless of if you think they've been compromised. Or don't store the private key in a database, store on physical media in a vault that is airgapped and hard to access. Make the read-only-ability of the storage chip more difficult and onerous with each generation like paper currency security. My point it that you could make it so difficult to break E2E for even the most elite hackers that the only realistic way to do it is with a warrant.
    - the_watcher 7y ago
      Not if you're sponsored by a hostile actor with functionally limitless resources. E2E isn't just about stopping legitimate law enforcement from conducting investigations.
      - umvi 7y ago
        > Not if you're sponsored by a hostile actor with functionally limitless resources Like who? Russia? China? Here's how they can compromise my device: 1. Locate me within the USA (easy) 2. Send a spy onto US soil to find me and steal my phone (hard) 3. Send another spy to work for Apple (easy) 4. Spy needs to break into Apple's vault and retrieve airgapped media containing my device's private key without a warrant (super hard) 5. Send both back to the motherland and use scanning electron microscope to complete the process (easy) You really think that is viable? Seems extremely far fetched to me. Can you provide a more realistic scenario?

codedokode 7y ago

You cannot murder anyone with just a message. If you want less murders, maybe it makes sense to stricten regulation on firearms?

SlowRobotAhead 7y ago
>If you want less murders, maybe it makes sense to stricten regulation on firearms? Why haven't they thought of that in Chicago, Stockton, Newark, Detroit, Memphis, Baltimore!? Oh wait, no. Stolen guns that actually make up the majority of crimes committed with, and straw purchases that "your plan" doesn't address. You know, reality of the situation, not what you heard on the news. I suppose there is also the fact it doesn't address that the murder rate in London is the same as NYC, despite an extreme lack of availability of guns surrounding London. Which strongly implies that guns aren't the only way murders are committed. I was ready to agree with you the problem was just "regulations" but then I thought about it.
- codedokode 7y ago
  Does not New York have additional restrictions on carrying or buying weapon?
  - SlowRobotAhead 7y ago
    Yes. New York does have additional restrictions on carrying. A case is going to the Supreme Court right now, and is expected to find those unconstitutional, so much so that the state of NY recently tried desperately and failed to not let that happen by voluntarily changing their law to get ahead of a ruling. [0] [0] http://archive.is/2zMZF http://archive.is/2zMZF If you are arguing that NY and London shouldn’t have the same murder rate, well, I don’t see how that plays for three reasons. 1. Despite the laws, criminals break them. Guns aren’t allowed to be carried in NY, but people do it anyhow. Just as heroin and coke aren’t legal ANYWHERE but we have lots of crime with them. 2. The murders in London are mostly knife as the weapon. New York has knife laws too, but not as strong as London iirc. I know my everyday carry knives are all illegal in both places. 3. Very much on topic, Illinois, Delaware, New Jersey, and etc have some of the strongest antigun laws in the country and cities with highest crime and guns as murder weapons. Here is the thing... we know EXACTLY, down to the neighborhoods where our crime is, and our rural areas with all the guns are on-par with rural Europe murder rates 2-4 per 100,000.

fastball 7y ago

What's preventing the vendor from breaking the E2E whenever they want in that scenario?

umvi 7y ago
> What's preventing the vendor from breaking the E2E whenever they want in that scenario? The key is write-only... there is no way for the vendor to read it without physical access to the device
- fastball 7y ago
  Except that the vendor wrote the key to the device, so they can just write it to the device and to their internal database.
  - umvi 7y ago
    Well they can already do that if they want to, so this system doesn't change that. Responsible vendors wouldn't do that though (and if they do, just don't buy their products)
    - fastball 7y ago
      They can already do that if their crypto system is designed around derivative keys that they control, but you can design a system that does not work that way. Apple, for instance, encrypts a lot of your data using your AppleID password, which they obviously don't know, so they have no way to decrypt that data.

rolltiide 7y ago

> if police work becomes effectively impossible, what's the point of having detectives? Police work has become lazy and they'll have to go back to finding evidence they can access For more detail on this, look at the musings of the 98th Congress during the 1980s who really speculated on what privacy would mean once everyone's files were digital. The period of digital files without encryption made it convenient for the governments to circumvent privacy protections. This convenience is being removed. Warrant or no warrant.

ars 7y ago

Been there done that: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip And note that it was the Clinton administration that proposed it, for all those who want to make this a Trump issue.

umvi 7y ago
With my proposed system though, there is no way for the chip to "transmit" anything. It's a passive, write-only storage chip that requires physical optical examination with expensive hardware to extract information from it.

ant512 7y ago

I can’t think of any state actors that would want to get their hands on easily-decrypted messages sent by government officials of your country.

madhadron 7y ago

> Why is it so hard to create a cryptographic solution that would allow E2E that works 99.9% of the time, is resistant to malicious actors, but is breakable with a warrant? Have people really even tried? Yup. Tried very hard. It's not possible. This isn't a restriction of our current tech. It's a fundamental part of the mathematics of cryptography. Asking for it is kind of like trying to legislate pi having a different value.

umvi 7y ago
Citation needed. It would be like saying a paper money system would be impossible/ineffective because paper money manufacturing techniques can theoretically be reverse engineered. In theory that is true, but in practice paper money works quite well.
- jki275 7y ago
  In practice, paper money works fine -- in spite of the fact it is regularly and continually counterfeited. Your plan doesn't work.
- madhadron 7y ago
  They are reverse engineered. Paper money has a limited downside. In the US, we know there aren't bills over $100 in general circulation, so you can, with effort, print up a few million dollars. The money supply of paper-ish money (M1) is around 3.4 trillion dollars. From the point of view of the principal actor US mint this is annoying and needs to be dealt with, but it's not a danger to the system unless it is allowed to run unchecked. The power imbalance involved is what makes it work. For crypto, the principal actor is whoever is encrypting. The downside of an activist in a repressive regime having their crypto broken is basically unlimited for them. Or the population that uses ecommerce as principal actor. The downside for them is enormous and the upside for someone who suborns a system incredible. Since we don't know tye power and incentive imbalance between the actors, crypto has to assume the worst.

xtian 7y ago

Has there been an increase in unsolved murders/human trafficking? Is there evidence that traditional police methods are no longer effective? Let's not infringe upon personal liberty for the sake of an extremely hypothetical worldview. Also you are proposing a solution where access to private information is gated by economics. I'd invite you to think about the connotations and ramifications of that model in our current society a little more.

the_watcher 7y ago

I'm not an expert, but my understanding is that encryption that is E2E in 99.9% of cases is, definitionally, _not_ E2E, as it is no longer required to be at either end point.

pdkl95 7y ago

> if police work becomes effectively impossible It hasn't. That's a lie. Police/etc have far more resources available to them than they've had at any point in history. The trail of digital exhaust we leave behind is only increasing, which makes OPSEC much harder[1]. End to end encryption doesn't prevent metadata analysis[2], network usage/timing analysis (e.g. [3]), or investigation of the massive amount of data that isn't end to end encrypted.. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1q4Ir2J8P8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1q4Ir2J8P8 [2] The NSA admits[4] metadata tells them far more than the message contents. [3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/world/how-the-nsa-is-tracking-people-right-now/634/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/world/how-the-nsa... edit: [4] "We kill people based on metadata" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdQiz0Vavmc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UdQiz0Vavmc

umvi 7y ago
Then why do you always read stories about the police having a hard time getting into terrorist's phones and going to extreme lengths to get into the phone? Shouldn't the metadata be more than enough for them? Like the San Bernadino shooter, for example[1] (jump to decryption section) [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_San_Bernardino_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_San_Bernardino_attack
- vaer-k 7y ago
  Once upon a time, people did not carry devices around that logged their every move, and police work was still regularly conducted. Currently, there does not exist any technology to read minds. If there were, do you think that the government should be allowed to surveil our thoughts? Do you, umvi, draw the line at encryption, or do you feel there should be no limit to government access to our personal lives?
  - umvi 7y ago
    I think there should be privacy by default, but that the government should be able to access our personal lives with a warrant.

jki275 7y ago

No. You can't have backdoors in encryption. What you think is "expensive" today will not be tomorrow, and there's little that would be "difficult to obtain/replicate" -- SEMs are not hard to get access to, for instance. There is no security if you leave a backdoor for the government or anyone else.

umvi 7y ago
That's why my proposed system doesn't rely on the difficulty of reading write-only chips alone... You need both: 1. Physical access to the device 2. Physical access to the vendor's key storage (this could be extremely difficult if not impossible if the company were responsible - consider an air gapped storage vault) I still think my system could work if implemented by, say, Apple. You have only shown weaknesses of individual parts, not weaknesses of the entire system.
- jki275 7y ago
  You, like everyone else who has these ideas every few years when this government overreach bubbles up to the surface again, have made the mistake of believing that first the government is responsible enough to manage this kind of program -- they aren't and never will be, and second that engineering can stop engineering. If you can make it, someone can break it, and will. And companies are not responsible, that's not how this works. Also, a "weakness of the individual part" is a break, and the entire system collapses. You're essentially arguing for security by obscurity.
  - umvi 7y ago
    Who says the government has to manage it? Let Apple manage it so their reputation is on the line. Government just specifies that E2E is breakable with warrant; Apple can implement it how they want to preserve privacy. > And companies are not responsible, that's not how this works. Why not? If a company implements a government requirement poorly they are absolutely responsible for the ramifications, just like they are with existing regulations (like if I made a handheld gaming system that jams radios on accident, I'm responsible for not following FCC regulations properly). > Also, a "weakness of the individual part" is a break That's ridiculous. That's like saying you can't build a bridge out of pure rebar and you can't build a bridge out of pure concrete because individually they are too weak, so therefore you can't build a bridge out of rebar-reinforced concrete.

slavapestov 7y ago

> Is having absolute privacy worth an irreversible increase in unsolved murders/human trafficking/etc.? Yes.