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Actually, I find it surprisingly small when considering how powerful it is. In terms of men (2.2M active and reserve), combat tanks (6,300), artillery (1,700),
by flexie 7y ago
Actually, I find it surprisingly small when considering how powerful it is.
In terms of men (2.2M active and reserve), combat tanks (6,300), artillery (1,700), war ships (130), submarines (70) and fighter planes (2,400) it’s dwarfed by militaries of the past.
Of course the firepower is much larger nowadays and nuclear weapons also make conventional military play a different role, and the US military - although engaged in several conflicts around the world - is mostly a peace time force, but I still find it amazing that the armies of the WWII era were so much larger.
- steve19 7y agoOther countries with large armies tend to throw poorly trained, and in the case of NK, poorly fed conscripts at the problem. The US regularly fights wars so the troops are not only well trained but there is a lot of individual and institutional experience.
- azernik 7y ago> Other countries with large armies tend to throw poorly trained, and in the case of NK, poorly fed conscripts at the problem. This is a strange mischaracterization of Israel's and South Korea's militaries, which are two of the largest in proportion to population in the world. Other countries with large armies don't have to pay for the enormous logistical tail the US uses to deploy worldwide, and the unique readiness levels and naval/air capabilities required to do so on reasonable notice.
- steve19 7y agoIsrael is not in the top 20 active duty, South Korea is. A good friend of mine was forced to go back "home" to do military service after we graduated high school, from what he told me after basic training he basically served his time doing nothing near the dmz. Sounded like they didn't know what to do with the conscripts they were being served up by the system. Maybe he was unique or maybe he exaggerated.
- azernik 7y ago> Israel is not in the top 20 active duty Well yeah, it's a tiny country. In terms of active duty personnel per capita, it's fourth in the world (2.1% of population, as opposed to 1.2% for South Korea and 0.4% for the USA). > from what he told me after basic training he basically served his time doing nothing near the dmz. The security strategy of Israel and South Korea is: * Be able to call an army of ~10% of the population into being within 48-72 hours * Have an active-duty military with the latest and most up-to-date equipment and training to hold the line until that enormous reserve is ready * Have intelligence services capable of giving advance warning so the active-duty military doesn't need to hold out as long So yes of course someone drafted into the ROK army will be trained for combat, and then spend several years on equipment maintenance and training waiting for The Big One to roll around. Israel is a bit different in that, in addition to its preparations for high-intensity conventional war, its active-duty army is also involved in low-intensity conflict continuously. This is a major concern for the army, as it needs to make a tradeoff between levels of force to apply to the daily grind in the West Bank and the Gaza border areas, and the level of readiness for high-intensity conflict - Israel's poor performance in the 2006 Lebanon War was widely attributed within the Israeli military establishment to the reduced training for conventional warfare while the army was caught up in the counterinsurgency work of the Second Intifadah.
- azernik 7y agoThe mass conscription armies of the early 20th century were truly enormous, and survive today only in massively dictatorial states like Eritrea and North Korea or in democratic "fortress states" under extreme security pressure like Israel and South Korea. So for example, with about a sixth of the population of the US, South Korea has half as many tanks and and a larger combined active + reserve force. This is while spending a tenth of the US military budget. This last figure illustrates the real character of the US military - it is an imperial/expeditionary force, with enormous amounts of cash spent both on maintaining an overseas presence and on the logistical capabilities required to deploy the remainder overseas on short notice. Most other countries build their militaries to fight in or near their own territories, and so get much more combat power per dollar.
- dredmorbius 7y agoInteresting observation, though it becomes fairly readily explained on several points. The militaries of WWII were fighting an active, unrestricted, war. The US military of today is active, yes, but highly resstrained. aRather than occupy and subdue, its primary role is to project power -- think "gunboat diplomacy" for an earlier example, rather than exercise it. The nuclear arsenal as a prime example. Where the US does exercise force, it is typically highly focused and targeted. It is not unreasonable for foreign journalists to repprt on ongoing air raids from exposed locations within the cities directly targeted (see Bagdad, in both gulf wars, in ways that reporting from a firebombed Tokyo or Dresden would not have been. Murrow's rooftop reporting of the London Blitz was notable specifically for its daring. Several authors have noted (some, such as Robert J. Gordon apparently unconciously) of the near le=inear relationship between energy input per worker and productivity, particularly in the case of factory manufacturing of the 1st half ofvthe 20th century. Whether measured in mechanical horsepower or kilowatts, the relation holds. The US military brings a tremendous amount of energy (itself largely responsible for the pollution mention in TFA) per soldier, sailor, airman, and marine. That includes embodied energy in vehicles, arms, and structures, as well as motive and destri]uctive power, again with the nuclear arsenal as its apex. To wrap my examples: the military is also a highly-tuned logistics system. Much of the task of a military is package delivery -- parking hot lead, dU, HE, or other actives, where they will have a desired effect. Getting the parts and support where and when needed is complex, and the DoD is a masterwork of central planning efficiency. Result: fewer workers -- combatants -- required. As a parallel to the role of mechanisation and automation in general employment, there are multiple lessons to draw.