3 ms·

When managing a special territory like Hong Kong, I think Beijing's goal is to promote its interests as much as possible, at the lowest possible cost in terms o

by _cs2017_ 7y ago

When managing a special territory like Hong Kong, I think Beijing's goal is to promote its interests as much as possible, at the lowest possible cost in terms of instability. What is the reason we observe seemingly the opposite policy: irritating people in silly ways, for little if any gain, and at a large cost in public discontent?

NeedMoreTea 7y ago
You would think so, wouldn't you? The only thing I can think is because HK has become so much less significant compared to the size of the Chinese economy, whilst Xi has been consolidating power ever since becoming president, removing term limits and so on. Rather like Putin in Russia. I suspect they are both prioritising differently than predecessors, or even themselves at the start of their presidency. At some point China seems to have switched from preserving the golden goose to trying to amalgamate and homogenise, so they've been steadily getting pro-Beijing Han Chinese to move to HK, and making larger changes. China's economy is fine even if HK struggles. The extradition is an odd one, as at the end of the 50 years of two systems I assume it won't be necessary, so simpler to just wait. I can't imagine it wasn't instigated by Beijing, with Lam tasked to deliver. Maybe it's a first move to compliance at all costs, more like in Tibet and Xinjiang. I sincerely hope not. Still, second guessing the why of their motives is way beyond my pay grade. :) At the end of the 50s when China threatened to invade if the British followed through with planned democracy, they also made very plain they'd like to keep HK just as it was. That is, a non-democratic colony that gave them a key route to trade with the West. Even though it had 10 years filling with skilled anti-communist refugees who fled the civil war and aftermath and kick-started HK in the first place. That clearly doesn't matter any more.
- _cs2017_ 7y ago
  I find it hard to believe that HK doesn't matter. Even leaving aside the city's economic importance, uncontrolled civil unrest carries the risk of an overthrow of the city government, leading to a rejection of the Chinese sovereignty. (Not to mention, it may also ignite pro-democracy activism in the rest of China.) Losing HK is unacceptable to Beijing, so if the HK unrest goes too far, it will have be quelled. Doing so without bloodshed may be impossible. Such an outcome would cause a dramatic escalation in the anti-Beijing sentiment in the Western world. Trump may not care much about what Beijing does in HK but the rest of the US political forces, on both sides of the aisle, do; the resulting sanctions would make Trump's trade war look like a friendly prank. Many other countries would join the US, dealing such a serious blow to the Chinese economy that it may cause domestic problems. In fact, things could get even worse. The outraged US politicians might send troops to Taiwan (which is likely to experience a major anti-Beijing shift, leading to fears of a Beijing military action). De-escalating such a confrontation could get very tricky indeed. Obviously, I hope none of this happens. My point is that, from the perspective of the Beijing leadership, mistakes in HK are very dangerous. So I highly doubt that they don't care.
  - NeedMoreTea 7y ago
    > risk of an overthrow of the city government That's got to be a very slim chance. There's already Chinese troops in Hong Kong, and have been since handover. The change in tone was clear and noted in the handover ceremony itself. It's not going to be uncontrolled unrest. They already sent in riot police, tear gas and rubber bullets against not-rioting protesters. A real attempt to overthrow or coup would be quelled long before it was successful. So far more likely more riot police or a Tiananmen type event than a coup. To global outrage perhaps, but the West just kept on giving more trade and manufacturing after all the others. > it may also ignite pro-democracy activism in the rest of China That seems unlikely too, given how hard news of HK, some history and other activism is censored and firewalled in mainland China. I have no idea how much is "known" but not spoken of, nor how generally or what unofficial networks there are. Waking up sentiment in Taiwan would be the last thing they sought though, so it's a pretty clear misstep regardless of mainland. Logic and common sense isn't always prominent in international relations, as seen everywhere from Brexit to US and China. Decades of the West not caring two hoots, or even barely officially mentioning, what oversteps they are making in HK, Tibet or Xinjiang may have given president-for-life Xi the impression he can mostly do as he likes. South Africa got years of international sanctions, trade and sport embargoes, post-Tiananmen China got a few years of minor sanctions, then ever more Western manufacturing. The US barely kept sanctions up for two years. I'm not surprised Xi could end up thinking he gets near carte blanche. I'm more surprised you think we might sanction hard this time, when so much more depends on Chinese manufacturing, even if the president did prove willing. Yet as you say it could escalate far into unknown and globally damaging consequences if sentiment and confidence tips too far. So some people there are starting to talk of leaving again... We'll see.
- tempguy9999 7y ago
  > China's economy is fine even if HK struggles eh? That's an rare statement outside of china. From Michael Pettis: +++ Overinvestment – Its political and economic systems are now dependent on elevated levels of investment spending. Moreover, a decreasing amount of those investment dollars are able to generate net-positive financial or social returns. Currency undervaluation – Money printing and excessive foreign reserves are creating imbalances that will be very hard for the central authorities to unwind without painful repercussions. Over-indebtedness & low interest rates – Much of China's new borrowing is used to pay interest on current debt. Any material rise in interest rates is sure to create a cascade of insolvencies. Asset bubbles – Much of Chinese wealth is tied up in assets that are exhibiting dangerous levels of price inflation, real estate being a prime example. (Property prices in Beijing and Shanghai are higher than Manhattan, which is astounding considering the much lower average Chinese income) +++ <https://www.peakprosperity.com/michael-pettis-the-future-of-china/> https://www.peakprosperity.com/michael-pettis-the-future-of-... which to be clear is from 2013 but I don't believe much has improved since (not an economist or china-watcher though)
  - NeedMoreTea 7y ago
    Purely speaking comparatively to Hong Kong's economic size, not that China isn't at the peak of a bubble, or couldn't tip into deep recession. Are recessions even allowed in the Chinese system? Even the deepest depression wouldn't put the imbalance back to 1980s levels, and if it were that deep it would no doubt be causing crisis in HK and elsewhere too.

NeedMoreTea 7y ago

You would think so, wouldn't you? The only thing I can think is because HK has become so much less significant compared to the size of the Chinese economy, whilst Xi has been consolidating power ever since becoming president, removing term limits and so on. Rather like Putin in Russia. I suspect they are both prioritising differently than predecessors, or even themselves at the start of their presidency. At some point China seems to have switched from preserving the golden goose to trying to amalgamate and homogenise, so they've been steadily getting pro-Beijing Han Chinese to move to HK, and making larger changes. China's economy is fine even if HK struggles. The extradition is an odd one, as at the end of the 50 years of two systems I assume it won't be necessary, so simpler to just wait. I can't imagine it wasn't instigated by Beijing, with Lam tasked to deliver. Maybe it's a first move to compliance at all costs, more like in Tibet and Xinjiang. I sincerely hope not. Still, second guessing the why of their motives is way beyond my pay grade. :) At the end of the 50s when China threatened to invade if the British followed through with planned democracy, they also made very plain they'd like to keep HK just as it was. That is, a non-democratic colony that gave them a key route to trade with the West. Even though it had 10 years filling with skilled anti-communist refugees who fled the civil war and aftermath and kick-started HK in the first place. That clearly doesn't matter any more.

_cs2017_ 7y ago
I find it hard to believe that HK doesn't matter. Even leaving aside the city's economic importance, uncontrolled civil unrest carries the risk of an overthrow of the city government, leading to a rejection of the Chinese sovereignty. (Not to mention, it may also ignite pro-democracy activism in the rest of China.) Losing HK is unacceptable to Beijing, so if the HK unrest goes too far, it will have be quelled. Doing so without bloodshed may be impossible. Such an outcome would cause a dramatic escalation in the anti-Beijing sentiment in the Western world. Trump may not care much about what Beijing does in HK but the rest of the US political forces, on both sides of the aisle, do; the resulting sanctions would make Trump's trade war look like a friendly prank. Many other countries would join the US, dealing such a serious blow to the Chinese economy that it may cause domestic problems. In fact, things could get even worse. The outraged US politicians might send troops to Taiwan (which is likely to experience a major anti-Beijing shift, leading to fears of a Beijing military action). De-escalating such a confrontation could get very tricky indeed. Obviously, I hope none of this happens. My point is that, from the perspective of the Beijing leadership, mistakes in HK are very dangerous. So I highly doubt that they don't care.
- NeedMoreTea 7y ago
  > risk of an overthrow of the city government That's got to be a very slim chance. There's already Chinese troops in Hong Kong, and have been since handover. The change in tone was clear and noted in the handover ceremony itself. It's not going to be uncontrolled unrest. They already sent in riot police, tear gas and rubber bullets against not-rioting protesters. A real attempt to overthrow or coup would be quelled long before it was successful. So far more likely more riot police or a Tiananmen type event than a coup. To global outrage perhaps, but the West just kept on giving more trade and manufacturing after all the others. > it may also ignite pro-democracy activism in the rest of China That seems unlikely too, given how hard news of HK, some history and other activism is censored and firewalled in mainland China. I have no idea how much is "known" but not spoken of, nor how generally or what unofficial networks there are. Waking up sentiment in Taiwan would be the last thing they sought though, so it's a pretty clear misstep regardless of mainland. Logic and common sense isn't always prominent in international relations, as seen everywhere from Brexit to US and China. Decades of the West not caring two hoots, or even barely officially mentioning, what oversteps they are making in HK, Tibet or Xinjiang may have given president-for-life Xi the impression he can mostly do as he likes. South Africa got years of international sanctions, trade and sport embargoes, post-Tiananmen China got a few years of minor sanctions, then ever more Western manufacturing. The US barely kept sanctions up for two years. I'm not surprised Xi could end up thinking he gets near carte blanche. I'm more surprised you think we might sanction hard this time, when so much more depends on Chinese manufacturing, even if the president did prove willing. Yet as you say it could escalate far into unknown and globally damaging consequences if sentiment and confidence tips too far. So some people there are starting to talk of leaving again... We'll see.
tempguy9999 7y ago
> China's economy is fine even if HK struggles eh? That's an rare statement outside of china. From Michael Pettis: +++ Overinvestment – Its political and economic systems are now dependent on elevated levels of investment spending. Moreover, a decreasing amount of those investment dollars are able to generate net-positive financial or social returns. Currency undervaluation – Money printing and excessive foreign reserves are creating imbalances that will be very hard for the central authorities to unwind without painful repercussions. Over-indebtedness & low interest rates – Much of China's new borrowing is used to pay interest on current debt. Any material rise in interest rates is sure to create a cascade of insolvencies. Asset bubbles – Much of Chinese wealth is tied up in assets that are exhibiting dangerous levels of price inflation, real estate being a prime example. (Property prices in Beijing and Shanghai are higher than Manhattan, which is astounding considering the much lower average Chinese income) +++ <https://www.peakprosperity.com/michael-pettis-the-future-of-china/> https://www.peakprosperity.com/michael-pettis-the-future-of-... which to be clear is from 2013 but I don't believe much has improved since (not an economist or china-watcher though)
- NeedMoreTea 7y ago
  Purely speaking comparatively to Hong Kong's economic size, not that China isn't at the peak of a bubble, or couldn't tip into deep recession. Are recessions even allowed in the Chinese system? Even the deepest depression wouldn't put the imbalance back to 1980s levels, and if it were that deep it would no doubt be causing crisis in HK and elsewhere too.