The authors of this article repeatedly ask why Ethiopian Airways did not train the pilots for the situation they faced, ignoring the fact that their training wa

The authors of this article repeatedly ask why Ethiopian Airways did not train the pilots for the situation they faced, ignoring the fact that their training was in accordance with the requirements set out by Boeing and the FAA. Prior to the Max variants, trim runaway was normally stopped by the pilot resisting it with an opposing force on the yoke; this caused the system driving the trim change to stop. consequently, trim runaways rarely resulted in the airplane being much out of trim. This is also the case for the Max variants, except for MCAS-commanded changes, as this would defeat its purpose. Training for trim runaway in a simulator goes through the checklist memory items, ending with the toggling of the cutout switches. Any use of the trim wheels, let alone in the 'roller-coaster' maneuver for when they are hard to move, was dropped from training a long time ago [1]. The 737 AFM mentions the possible difficulty of using manual trim when the jack screw is under high load, and outlines the roller-coaster maneuver, but the checklist for trim runaway makes no mention of it and does not say anything about slowing down. Furthermore, the AD, issued after the cause of the Lion Air crash was found, says nothing about these issues. Nor does there seem to be any consideration that the roller-coaster maneuver is infeasible at low altitudes, or of the complication that, as mentioned by Salawat, reducing thrust results in the airplane pitching downwards, on account of the low-slung engines. So, MCAS raises the possibility of trim runaway being a qualitatively different experience than before, and significantly more difficult to handle, yet Boeing's and the FAA's response was to merely reiterate the existing procedures. Most significantly, they did not require, or even propose, any additional simulator training, even after the Lion Air crash. I think it is likely that no-one in these organizations connected the dots to anticipate the problem, but we should also consider the possibility that someone did, but it was downplayed to avoid the question of additional MCAS-specific training. As I have written elsewhere, the more you argue that the pilots made mistakes, the more you simultaneously argue that Boeing's and the FAA's response to the Lion Air crash was inadequate. The authors of this hatchet job say that "with hindsight", the situation could have been saved, and maybe they are right, but the one thing no-one has when they need it is hindsight. Boeing and the FAA had a responsibility to substitute training for hindsight, and if they intentionally defaulted on this, and especially if they did so in the name of sales, they are culpable. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4qDLR4s45U&t=296s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4qDLR4s45U&t=296s