4 ms·

I don't think they "tricked [them] into believing". More like "talked them into accepting".

bronson 7y ago
More like deceived: https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/%3famp=1 https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.seattletimes.com/business/b... Whether it was intentional to meet the schedule or accidental, we may never know.
taneq 7y ago
The only difference between these two descriptions is whether the FAA implicitly understood that the MAX is NOT the same as the 737. If yes, then they were talked into accepting it anyway. If no, then they were tricked (unless Boeing genuinely believed that there was no difference, which is clearly false.)
- nolok 7y ago
  The kind of people who work at the FAA jobs where those decision are made know enough about planes to realize that a different engine placement is not without effect. That alone means they should at least have done extensive testing internally, which they didn't since it was pretty much clear they used the older 737 simulators / didn't have 737 MAX simulators.
salawat 7y ago
This is a very common phenomena that as Quality Assurance you specifically have to work around when talking to regulators, and there are in fact, white collar cultural norms in place which shape the way most corporations I've worked at talk about potential regulatory risks. For one thing, if you bring up any questions regarding an issue at all, the preferred medium of communicating it until a decision is made tends to be direct person to person with no electronic paper trail. (This insulates the company from getting caught out by E-Discovery in case of legal troubles). Secondly, there's the practice I call anchoring. This is where you go to the regulator with a very narrow, refined question looking for an answer, explain why you think it's a good idea, and hope they don't think too much into it before saying yes you can do it. If it works, you have a document stating the regulator told you it was okay when you asked. To prevent this, you have to go to your regulator and give them a high and wide view. A) What is the problem B) What are the relevant regulations impacted C) What additional risks are created with both answers Businesses can be a bit squirmy when engineering folks start getting too chummy with compliance. I know I've found a good one when I don't get funny looks when asking if something questionable sounding has been run passed Compliance. Everything I've read in this investigation reeks of anchoring toward the FAA. Especially given the whistleblower testimony as reported in the 60 Minutes Expose on the MAX. [1]https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwje2sfB84njAhXULc0KHcwuCrUQwqsBMAB6BAgHEAU&usg=AOvVaw2APCLXMqKKxa5mxQOnsmvo https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwje2...

More like deceived: https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/%3famp=1 https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.seattletimes.com/business/b... Whether it was intentional to meet the schedule or accidental, we may never know.

taneq 7y ago

The only difference between these two descriptions is whether the FAA implicitly understood that the MAX is NOT the same as the 737. If yes, then they were talked into accepting it anyway. If no, then they were tricked (unless Boeing genuinely believed that there was no difference, which is clearly false.)

nolok 7y ago
The kind of people who work at the FAA jobs where those decision are made know enough about planes to realize that a different engine placement is not without effect. That alone means they should at least have done extensive testing internally, which they didn't since it was pretty much clear they used the older 737 simulators / didn't have 737 MAX simulators.

salawat 7y ago

This is a very common phenomena that as Quality Assurance you specifically have to work around when talking to regulators, and there are in fact, white collar cultural norms in place which shape the way most corporations I've worked at talk about potential regulatory risks. For one thing, if you bring up any questions regarding an issue at all, the preferred medium of communicating it until a decision is made tends to be direct person to person with no electronic paper trail. (This insulates the company from getting caught out by E-Discovery in case of legal troubles). Secondly, there's the practice I call anchoring. This is where you go to the regulator with a very narrow, refined question looking for an answer, explain why you think it's a good idea, and hope they don't think too much into it before saying yes you can do it. If it works, you have a document stating the regulator told you it was okay when you asked. To prevent this, you have to go to your regulator and give them a high and wide view. A) What is the problem B) What are the relevant regulations impacted C) What additional risks are created with both answers Businesses can be a bit squirmy when engineering folks start getting too chummy with compliance. I know I've found a good one when I don't get funny looks when asking if something questionable sounding has been run passed Compliance. Everything I've read in this investigation reeks of anchoring toward the FAA. Especially given the whistleblower testimony as reported in the 60 Minutes Expose on the MAX. [1]https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwje2sfB84njAhXULc0KHcwuCrUQwqsBMAB6BAgHEAU&usg=AOvVaw2APCLXMqKKxa5mxQOnsmvo https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwje2...