4 ms·

What amazes me about this whole sorry saga is what appears to be blatant deception on the part of Boeing. Boeing somehow tricked the FAA into believing, from t

by jussij 7y ago

What amazes me about this whole sorry saga is what appears to be blatant deception on the part of Boeing. Boeing somehow tricked the FAA into believing, from the pilots perspective the 737-MAX and 737 were the exact same plane. That allowed the plane to enter service quickly as it meant the pilots would not require any flight simulator retraining. What we now know is the 737-MAX is nothing like the 737 and the level of deception that seems to have occurred is concerning.

sopooneo 7y ago
I don't think they "tricked [them] into believing". More like "talked them into accepting".
- bronson 7y ago
  More like deceived: https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/%3famp=1 https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.seattletimes.com/business/b... Whether it was intentional to meet the schedule or accidental, we may never know.
- taneq 7y ago
  The only difference between these two descriptions is whether the FAA implicitly understood that the MAX is NOT the same as the 737. If yes, then they were talked into accepting it anyway. If no, then they were tricked (unless Boeing genuinely believed that there was no difference, which is clearly false.)
  - nolok 7y ago
    The kind of people who work at the FAA jobs where those decision are made know enough about planes to realize that a different engine placement is not without effect. That alone means they should at least have done extensive testing internally, which they didn't since it was pretty much clear they used the older 737 simulators / didn't have 737 MAX simulators.
- salawat 7y ago
  This is a very common phenomena that as Quality Assurance you specifically have to work around when talking to regulators, and there are in fact, white collar cultural norms in place which shape the way most corporations I've worked at talk about potential regulatory risks. For one thing, if you bring up any questions regarding an issue at all, the preferred medium of communicating it until a decision is made tends to be direct person to person with no electronic paper trail. (This insulates the company from getting caught out by E-Discovery in case of legal troubles). Secondly, there's the practice I call anchoring. This is where you go to the regulator with a very narrow, refined question looking for an answer, explain why you think it's a good idea, and hope they don't think too much into it before saying yes you can do it. If it works, you have a document stating the regulator told you it was okay when you asked. To prevent this, you have to go to your regulator and give them a high and wide view. A) What is the problem B) What are the relevant regulations impacted C) What additional risks are created with both answers Businesses can be a bit squirmy when engineering folks start getting too chummy with compliance. I know I've found a good one when I don't get funny looks when asking if something questionable sounding has been run passed Compliance. Everything I've read in this investigation reeks of anchoring toward the FAA. Especially given the whistleblower testimony as reported in the 60 Minutes Expose on the MAX. [1]https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwje2sfB84njAhXULc0KHcwuCrUQwqsBMAB6BAgHEAU&usg=AOvVaw2APCLXMqKKxa5mxQOnsmvo https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwje2...
cmurf 7y ago
I wouldn't say the 737 MAX is nothing like the 737 NG, they're quite a lot alike in important ways, but there are clearly significant differences. And there should be an aggressively adversarial system to determine whether the difference is significant enough to warrant a separate type certification for the MAX variant. I'm not at all amazed by Boeing's blatant deception and blame shifting. They've done this before, and with this same model of aircraft. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues

by jussij 7y ago

sopooneo 7y ago

I don't think they "tricked [them] into believing". More like "talked them into accepting".

bronson 7y ago
More like deceived: https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/%3famp=1 https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.seattletimes.com/business/b... Whether it was intentional to meet the schedule or accidental, we may never know.
taneq 7y ago
The only difference between these two descriptions is whether the FAA implicitly understood that the MAX is NOT the same as the 737. If yes, then they were talked into accepting it anyway. If no, then they were tricked (unless Boeing genuinely believed that there was no difference, which is clearly false.)
- nolok 7y ago
  The kind of people who work at the FAA jobs where those decision are made know enough about planes to realize that a different engine placement is not without effect. That alone means they should at least have done extensive testing internally, which they didn't since it was pretty much clear they used the older 737 simulators / didn't have 737 MAX simulators.
salawat 7y ago
This is a very common phenomena that as Quality Assurance you specifically have to work around when talking to regulators, and there are in fact, white collar cultural norms in place which shape the way most corporations I've worked at talk about potential regulatory risks. For one thing, if you bring up any questions regarding an issue at all, the preferred medium of communicating it until a decision is made tends to be direct person to person with no electronic paper trail. (This insulates the company from getting caught out by E-Discovery in case of legal troubles). Secondly, there's the practice I call anchoring. This is where you go to the regulator with a very narrow, refined question looking for an answer, explain why you think it's a good idea, and hope they don't think too much into it before saying yes you can do it. If it works, you have a document stating the regulator told you it was okay when you asked. To prevent this, you have to go to your regulator and give them a high and wide view. A) What is the problem B) What are the relevant regulations impacted C) What additional risks are created with both answers Businesses can be a bit squirmy when engineering folks start getting too chummy with compliance. I know I've found a good one when I don't get funny looks when asking if something questionable sounding has been run passed Compliance. Everything I've read in this investigation reeks of anchoring toward the FAA. Especially given the whistleblower testimony as reported in the 60 Minutes Expose on the MAX. [1]https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwje2sfB84njAhXULc0KHcwuCrUQwqsBMAB6BAgHEAU&usg=AOvVaw2APCLXMqKKxa5mxQOnsmvo https://m.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DaO7_indbfME&ved=2ahUKEwje2...

cmurf 7y ago

I wouldn't say the 737 MAX is nothing like the 737 NG, they're quite a lot alike in important ways, but there are clearly significant differences. And there should be an aggressively adversarial system to determine whether the difference is significant enough to warrant a separate type certification for the MAX variant. I'm not at all amazed by Boeing's blatant deception and blame shifting. They've done this before, and with this same model of aircraft. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues