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Why do you need to switch? That regulation is irrelevant for Fastmail and changes nothing for them, as they've explained multiple times: https://fastmail.blog/2

Why do you need to switch? That regulation is irrelevant for Fastmail and changes nothing for them, as they've explained multiple times: https://fastmail.blog/2018/12/21/advocating-for-privacy-aabill-australia/ https://fastmail.blog/2018/12/21/advocating-for-privacy-aabi...

enriquto 7y ago
I appreciate your link, which I had not found by a fast scan of the fastmail docs. It certainly answers some of my questions. However the line of argument of this text is so-so. They say that the regulation is "irrelevant for them" because "it is highly unlikely that...". The words "highly unlikely", however, do not really mean anything and the argument falls down. Besides that part, most of their text seems quite honest, clear and compelling. Βut I would appreciate that they delve precisely into these "highly unlikely" cases.
- Deimorz 7y ago
  I honestly don't understand what you're talking about. The word "unlikely" isn't even in the post I linked. They could always decrypt your data. They don't need to add a backdoor, because they've always had full access. Nothing changes at all.
  - enriquto 7y ago
    > I honestly don't understand what you're talking about. The word "unlikely" isn't even in the post I linked. The crucial point of the post concerns the possibility that fastmail developers are forced to introduce secretly a government backdoor. This possibility is briefly dismissed as follows: > There are also concerns that individual employees may be forced to build a backdoor, without being able to alert their employer. While frightening for anyone working in technology, we believe this fear is largely unfounded [1]. Most organisations have practices (pair programming, code reviews, risk evaluations) that would reveal such behaviour quickly. The only reason given for the word "unfounded" is an article on zdnet [1], that explains the reasons why these backdoors are unlikely (but does not rule out the fact that they are possible). The word "unlikely" comes from the title of this article. [1] https://www.zdnet.com/article/australias-encryption-laws-are-highly-unlikely-to-dragoon-employees-in-secret/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/australias-encryption-laws-are...
    - Deimorz 7y ago
      That's talking about other Australian companies. Again, Fastmail has absolutely no need for a backdoor, and will never be requested to add one. They already have full access, a backdoor wouldn't do anything. They have a frontdoor.
      - enriquto 7y ago
        Thanks, it is clear to me now. Of course fastmail do not explain this so clearly; instead they require a few pages of word salad to "decorate" this fact.

enriquto 7y ago

I appreciate your link, which I had not found by a fast scan of the fastmail docs. It certainly answers some of my questions. However the line of argument of this text is so-so. They say that the regulation is "irrelevant for them" because "it is highly unlikely that...". The words "highly unlikely", however, do not really mean anything and the argument falls down. Besides that part, most of their text seems quite honest, clear and compelling. Βut I would appreciate that they delve precisely into these "highly unlikely" cases.

Deimorz 7y ago
I honestly don't understand what you're talking about. The word "unlikely" isn't even in the post I linked. They could always decrypt your data. They don't need to add a backdoor, because they've always had full access. Nothing changes at all.
- enriquto 7y ago
  > I honestly don't understand what you're talking about. The word "unlikely" isn't even in the post I linked. The crucial point of the post concerns the possibility that fastmail developers are forced to introduce secretly a government backdoor. This possibility is briefly dismissed as follows: > There are also concerns that individual employees may be forced to build a backdoor, without being able to alert their employer. While frightening for anyone working in technology, we believe this fear is largely unfounded [1]. Most organisations have practices (pair programming, code reviews, risk evaluations) that would reveal such behaviour quickly. The only reason given for the word "unfounded" is an article on zdnet [1], that explains the reasons why these backdoors are unlikely (but does not rule out the fact that they are possible). The word "unlikely" comes from the title of this article. [1] https://www.zdnet.com/article/australias-encryption-laws-are-highly-unlikely-to-dragoon-employees-in-secret/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/australias-encryption-laws-are...
  - Deimorz 7y ago
    That's talking about other Australian companies. Again, Fastmail has absolutely no need for a backdoor, and will never be requested to add one. They already have full access, a backdoor wouldn't do anything. They have a frontdoor.
    - enriquto 7y ago
      Thanks, it is clear to me now. Of course fastmail do not explain this so clearly; instead they require a few pages of word salad to "decorate" this fact.