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An unauthenticated protocol that allows unsigned routes to be blindly accepted is not a good protocol, that's why Cloudflare has been pushing RPKI for a while h
by nikisweeting 7y ago
An unauthenticated protocol that allows unsigned routes to be blindly accepted is not a good protocol, that's why Cloudflare has been pushing RPKI for a while https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki/
https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki-details/ https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki-details/
- Hikikomori 7y agoIt has authentication and requires explicit configuration to form a neighbor relationship. BGP was designed for operators to implement a routing policy. In most implementations it allows everything by default with no modifications to route metadata, so if you do not set up your policy correctly you'll have issues like this.
- nikisweeting 7y agoIt has authentication for only one hop, if routes propagated all the way up the chain with signatures, it would be much easier to block/limit bad AS behavior.
- Hikikomori 7y agoYour peering relationship is only for one hop. What it lacks is prefix/path validation, not authentication.
- nikisweeting 7y agoBut authentication of every advertised range all the way up the chain would allow upstream providers to easily differentiate valid large prefix announcements that were done intentionally (e.g. big ISP announcing some routes) from crazy nonsense done by an unknown party that isn't a big ISP. We definitely need prefix filtering, but there needs to be some easily verifiable source of identity tied to each announcement to be able to automate the process of accepting and rejecting large prefix announcements.